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Plaintiff/appellee F.C. STANGL, III ("Stangl"), respectfully 
submits this brief in response to the Brief of defendant/appellant 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. ("Ernst"). 
JURISDICTION 
On March 8, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Although Ernst has adequately enumerated the issues on appeal, 
it ignores its burden of marshalling the evidence and 
mischaracterizes the law applicable to its second, third and fifth 
issues. Because much of Ernst's appeal amounts to no more than a 
challenge of the trial court's findings of fact, Ernst has a duty 
to marshal the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial 
court. Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Ut. App. 
1993). Because Ernst failed to do so, this appellate court must 
assume "that the record supports the findings of the trial court" 
and proceed only to review the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law to the case." 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . 
Ernst attempts to mask this shortcoming by characterizing the 
issues on appeal as predominately legal. Contrary to Ernst's 
assertion, however, the application of the facts to the legal 
standard of promissory estoppel inherent in Ernst's second issue 
presents a mixed question of fact and law, the determination of 
which is "highly fact-dependent." Therefore, it is reviewed for 
clear error. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 
(Utah App. 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); 
1 
Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1993); Crismon v. Western Co., 742 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
Similarly, whether the trial court adopted the proper measure 
of damages for promissory estoppel, Ernst's third issue, requires 
application of a clearly erroneous standard, because damage 
assessment is a function of the fact finder. Andreason v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co. , 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993). Even if 
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact, this Court must affirm 
unless it finds clear error. Trolley Square, supra, Soter's, 
supra, Rlinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App. 1995). 
Finally, the trial court's damages calculation challenged by 
Ernst's fifth issue is presumed correct and will only be overturned 
"if it is clearly erroneous with no reasonable support in the 
evidence." Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App. 
1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Stangl initiated this action on or about May 2, 1989, by 
filing his Complaint asserting claims against Ernst for breach of 
a contract, promissory estoppel and breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 1-11. ) 1 Stangl alleged that 
Ernst breached its agreement to enter into a 25-year lease for the 
anchor space at the Jordan Valley Plaza, or alternatively that he 
was entitled to recover damages under promissory estoppel because 
he purchased and renovated the Jordan Valley Plaza in reasonable 
1
 Throughout this brief materials in the record on appeal are 
cited as UR. ." Similarly, references to the Appellant's Brief 
are cited as uAp. Brf. At ." 
2 
and detrimental reliance on Ernst's promise to become the anchor 
tenant. (R. 1-11.) 
The bench trial before the Honorable Michael Murphy commenced 
on February 11, 1993. (R. 2214, 3069.) The liability phase ran 
from February 11 to February 19, 1993. (R. 2214, 3069.) On 
February 17, 1993, the court bifurcated the trial into "liability" 
and "damages" phases, partly to allow the parties time to sort out 
the damages claim. (R. 2000, 7289-365.) On April 20, 1993, the 
trial court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it held that 
Ernst and Stangl had not entered into either a written or oral 
contract. (R. 2000-14.) (Attached as Addendum A). The court, 
however, left open the question of whether Stangl could recover 
damages under the theory of promissory estoppel. (R. 2000-14.) 
The damages phase of the trial commenced one year later on 
February 22, 1994 and ran through February 24, 1994. (R. 2214.) 
Following that phase, the court ruled that Stangl had established 
promissory estoppel. (Conclusions of Law ("Conclusions") Nos. 1-
12, R. 2229-32) . Based upon substantial evidence of oral represen-
tations and, more importantly, Ernst's conduct and actions, the 
court found that Stangl reasonably, substantially, and detrimental-
ly relied on Ernst's promise to enter into a lease as anchor tenant 
of the Plaza property. Thus, Stangl was entitled to recover his 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the acquisition and renovation 
of the Plaza property in the amount of $331,391.00. (Conclusions 
Nos. 1-12, R. 2229-32, Ex. 88A. ) 
On December 27, 1994, the trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in favor of Stangl. (R. 
2213-37.) (Attached as Addenda B and C) . The court determined 
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that promissory estoppel could be invoked to bar the statute of 
frauds in this case. (R. 2012.) Ernst filed its appeal on January 
20, 1995 challenging the availability of promissory estoppel as a 
remedy in this case and challenging the court's findings of fact in 
support of its conclusions. (R. 2243-44.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Ernst challenges the trial court's factual findings 
in this appeal, it has completely failed to marshal the facts 
adduced at trial which support the court's findings. Instead, in 
its statement of facts and in the body of its brief, Ernst has done 
nothing more than reiterate its version of the facts --a version 
already rejected by the trial court. To fully inform the court of 
the true and complete facts of the case, Stangl sets forth here the 
trial court's relevant findings of fact, with supporting record 
citations to supporting testimony and documentary evidence. 
1. The property that is the origination of this dispute is 
an "anchor space" store located in the Jordan Valley Plaza (the 
"Plaza") on the southwest corner of 9000 South and Redwood Road in 
West Jordan, Utah. (Finding of Fact No. 3 ("Finding"), R. 2215; 
see also 2916.) As of 1988, the time of the negotiations that are 
the subject of this action, the anchor store space had been vacant 
over a year, and the entire Plaza was deteriorated and in need of 
refurbishment. (R. 2916, 3503.) 
2. Stangl had owned the Plaza from 1979 to 1981. (Finding 
No. 4, R. 2215, see also 2916-23.) Stangl transferred the majority 
of the property to Roger Brockbank et ux. ("Brockbank") in 1981, 
retaining two out parcels or "pads." He remained a guarantor of 
Brockbank's loan for the purchase. The lender's interest in 
4 
Brockbank's loan was subsequently assigned to Aetna. (Finding No. 
4, R. 2215, see also 2920.) 
3. In early 1987, Brockbank's anchor tenant, Gibson Discount 
Store, vacated the premises, as well as other sites across the 
western United States. Ernst investigated the possibility of 
putting a store in sites Gibson had vacated, including the Plaza 
site. (R. 3495-96.) Ernst also commissioned a Site Feasibility 
Study for West Jordan, which it received in May 1987. (Finding No. 
7, R. 2216, 3496, Ex. 1.) Despite the marginal sales projected by 
the site feasibility study, Ernst remained interested in the Plaza 
site, and sometime in 1987 contacted Stangl to indicate its 
interest in the Plaza. (R. 2927.) Ernst then investigated the 
property through Brockbank, who owned the Plaza at that time, but 
was informed that he had leased the site. (See R. 3496-97.) 
4. In or about September 1987, Aetna formally notified 
Stangl that Brockbank had defaulted on the purchase loan. (R. 
2923, 3938-40, Ex. 393.) Aetna, however, never demanded payment 
from Stangl as a guarantor of the Brockbank obligation. (R. 2924, 
3420, 3926.) Both Aetna and Stangl believed that the value of the 
Plaza would exceed the value of the amounts due on the loan, and 
thus Stangl would not be liable to Aetna for any deficiency.2 
(Finding No. 6, R. 2215-16; see also 2923-26, 3419-20, 3930.) 
Aetna initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on the Plaza and 
Brockbank filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (Finding No. 6, R. 
2 Aetna's attorney, Steven Tyler, testified at trial that Aetna 
proceeded with the nonjudicial foreclosure because it did not 
believe that a deficiency was likely. (R. 3930.) 
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2215-16.) Thus, Stangl had no incentive to acquire the Plaza 
property to avoid liability as a guarantor of the Aetna loan. 
5. Seeing a business opportunity with respect to the Plaza 
following Brockbank's bankruptcy, Stangl arranged for Steve Pruitt 
("Pruitt"), as his agent, to inquire whether Ernst remained 
interested in leasing the former Gibson space at the Plaza. 
(Finding No. 8, R. 2216; see also 2927.) In or about late May 
1988, Pruitt contacted Mack DuBose, ("DuBose") Ernst's Vice 
President of Real Estate, to explore Ernst's interest in the Plaza 
location. (R. 4140.) DuBose indicated that Ernst was interested 
in the property as a site for an Ernst store. (Finding No. 9, R. 
2216.) 
6. On June 3, 1988, Pruitt forwarded documents relating to 
the Plaza property to DuBose. (Ex. 2.) In his June 3 letter, 
Pruitt erroneously indicated that Aetna would be enforcing Stangl's 
guarantee, that Stangl would have possession of the property by the 
end of June, and suggested that Stangl would refinance the Plaza 
property with Aetna.3 (Finding No. 10, R. 2216-17; see also 2928-
29, 4125-26, Ex. 2.) 
7. Between June 4 and June 23, 1988, DuBose, Thomas Stanton 
and Rod King, all of Ernst, met with Pruitt and visited the Plaza 
property to inspect the site of the proposed West Jordan Ernst 
store. (Finding No. 11, R. 2217; see also 2930, 3501, 4126-27, 
3 Ernst argues that Pruitt's June 3 letter negates any claim 
that Stangl relied on Ernst's representations in purchasing the 
property. That argument, rejected by the court, is negated by the 
evidence showing that Ernst knew that Pruitt's representations were 
in error and that Stangl had to acquire the property and obtain 
financing before he could begin construction requested by Ernst. 
See paragraphs 27 and 28 below. 
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4039.) The day following the inspection meeting, Pruitt and DuBose 
met to discuss a possible lease and lease terms. (R. 3503.) At 
that meeting, DuBose indicated that Ernst desired to move forward 
with construction and negotiations for Ernst to lease the anchor 
property at the Plaza on a "fast-track,f basis to ensure delivery of 
the premises to Ernst on October 1, 1988.4 (Finding No. 11, R. 
2217; see also 3503-05, 3585.) 
8. Beginning sometime in June, the parties both treated the 
project as an expedited one. Ernst was aware that Stangl needed 
approximately sixty days prior to October 1, 1988 to complete the 
required construction (Finding No. 31, R. 2224/ see also 3584) 
which would include, among other things, asphalt work, plumbing 
work, installing utilities and underground lines for drainage, 
surface concrete and curbs, earthwork, dredging, installing a new 
roof, building an addition, moving and installing sewage systems, 
relocating fire hydrants and signs, and renovating the building to 
fit Ernst's needs. (R. 3018-26, 3036-38, 3001/ Exs. 25, 73-73E, 
76, 71-71E.) 
9. On June 23, 1988, Pruitt, acting on behalf of Stangl, 
proposed basic terms and conditions for a lease agreement between 
Ernst and Stangl for the anchor property located at the Plaza, 
including (a) the store location/ (b) the building size/ (c) the 
primary lease term/ and (d) base rent. These essential lease terms 
did not change throughout the course of the parties' subsequent 
4
 A "fast-track" required the parties to undertake development 
activities (plans and specifications, construction, improvements, 
financing, etc.) concurrently with lease negotiations, to ensure 
that the property would be ready for occupancy within a very short 
time frame. 
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communications. (Exs. 3, 6, 9A, 12, 13, 23, 26, 27, 31.) In his 
letter, Pruitt specifically referenced Ernst's request that Stangl 
be able to provide a turn-key building to Ernst on a fast-track 
basis to be ready for fixture installment by October 1, 1988. (Ex. 
3.) 
10. In responding to Pruitt's June 23, 1988 letter, DuBose 
indicated that the parties' next step was to complete a "binding 
Offer to Lease" and that drafting the final lease would take 3-5 
weeks. (Ex. 6.) Significantly, DuBose specifically agreed that 
Stangl should provide Ernst a turn-key building with an October 1, 
1988 fixturing date, just over two months away. (R. 3584/ Ex. 6.) 
Thus, if the parties were to wait for a formal signed lease, there 
likely would not have been sufficient time to meet the October 1 
fixturing date.5 
11. Although he testified at trial that he believed there 
were no legal consequences which would flow from Ernst's "binding 
Offer to Lease," and that items in such a document would ultimately 
be contained in the final lease agreement, DuBose never communicat-
ed to Pruitt or Stangl any perceived limitations on the "binding 
Offer to Lease." (R. 2219-220, 3509-10, 3520-21, 3598, 4128.) 
12. On June 29, 1988, in anticipation of Ernst's fast-track 
tenancy, Stangl obtained the rights, but not the obligation, to 
acquire the Plaza property by entering into negotiations with both 
Brockbank and Aetna, the lien holder. (Finding No. 14, R. 2217; 
see also 3877-78.) On that date, Stangl paid Brockbank $1,000 and 
5
 Time to complete the "binding offer to lease," plus 21-35 days 
for time to complete architectural drawings and obtain financing 
and all necessary permits, would not have left Stangl 60 days to 
complete construction prior to October 1, 1988. 
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entered into an option to purchase the Plaza property from 
Brockbank, conditioned on conveyance of a warranty deed, Bankruptcy 
Court release of the property and Brockbank's ability to deliver 
clear and satisfactory title ("Purchase Option").6 (Finding No. 
14, R. 2217-18; see also 2942-45, 3877 Ex. 5 (attached as Addendum 
D.) The Option's exercise price was $1,500. (Finding No. 14, R. 
2217-18/ see also 2942-45, Ex. 5.) Stangl also made an offer to 
purchase Aetna's note ("the trust deed") on the Plaza which Aetna 
rejected, (Ex. 310 (attached as Addendum E) Ex. 314). On July 1, 
1988, Stangl again offered to purchase the trust deed from Aetna 
for $900,000, but conditioned his agreement on receipt of satisfac-
tory title, and, if necessary, Bankruptcy Court approval and 
Aetna's acceptance within ten days ("Offer to Purchase"). (Finding 
No. 14, R. 2947-49/ see also 3877-78, 3879-86, Ex. 315 (attached as 
Addendum F).) Aetna accepted Stangl's offer on or about July 14, 
1988 and granted Stangl the conditional right to purchase the 
Brockbank trust deed. (Ex. 317 (attached as Addendum G).) 
13. Stangl's interest in the Plaza property hinged on Ernst's 
leasing the anchor space. (Finding No. 16, R. 2218, 2975-76, 3029, 
3421-23, 3877-78, 4354-59.) Stangl had no other need to purchase 
the property. (Finding No. 16, R. 2218.) Had Stangl wanted to 
acquire the property for speculative purposes, he would have waited 
to acquire the Plaza property at the trust deed foreclosure sale. 
Instead, Stangl acquired the option to purchase the Plaza property 
from Brockbank and conditionally offered to purchase the trust deed 
6
 As of June 29, 1988, the property was encumbered by liens 
amounting to approximately $72,201.15 (See Ex. 66A (attached as 
Addendum I).) 
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from Aetna to facilitate the speedy acquisition of the Plaza 
property, solely to meet Ernst's fast-track fixturing date of 
October 1, 1988. (Finding No. 16, R. 2218-19; see also 3877-78.) 
14. On July 12, 1988, Stangl received a letter dated July 8, 
1988, from DuBose which was the formal binding "Offer to Lease" 
referred to in his June 29 correspondence. (Finding No. 20, R. 
2220, Ex. 9A.) The July 8, 1988 letter reiterated the terms of 
Stangl's June 23rd letter and added additional detail to those 
terms. In this communication, Ernst represented that it expected 
that the parties would cooperate and diligently pursue the 
preparation and execution of the lease documents and other 
obligations. (Ex. 9A, 12.) 
15. On or about July 12, 1988, Stangl and DuBose had a 
telephone conversation during which they discussed the terms set 
forth in DuBose's July 8 letter, that Stangl's lenders would need 
to approve the type of insurance coverage Ernst required and that 
Stangl would need to know the specific improvements required by 
Ernst in order to obtain appropriate loan amounts. (R. 2220, 2957-
63, 2964-74, 4130.) After that conversation, Stangl believed that 
they had reached an agreement as to all the essential terms of the 
lease. (R. 2983-85.) 
16. On July 15, 1988, DuBose wrote to Hal Smith, Ernst's 
president, for approval to enter into an "Offer to Lease" with 
Stangl for the Plaza property and attached, among other things, the 
1987 Robertson feasibility report. DuBose indicated in that 
memorandum that construction "must begin by 8/15/88." (R. 3541-44, 
3626-28, Ex. 14.) 
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17. Believing that all essential lease terms had been agreed 
upon, and anticipating no problems with Ernst becoming the anchor 
tenant, on or about July 16, 1988, Stangl then took steps towards 
obtaining financing from Valley Mortgage Corporation ("Valley 
Bank") for the acquisition of the Plaza property, construction of 
improvements requested by Ernst, and renovation of other portions 
of the Plaza property. (Ex. 15.) Stangl sought approximately $1.1 
million to acquire the Plaza property: $655,000 to remodel the 
anchor site for Ernst; and $131,000 to remodel other shop space at 
the Plaza property. (R. 3459, Ex. 15.) Stangl agreed to provide 
additional security to Valley Bank by using the two adjacent out-
parcels, both of which were leased, as cross-collateral for the 
Plaza property loan. (Finding No. 23, R. 2221, Exs. 15, 79A.) 
Valley Bank would not have approved the financing absent Ernst's 
tenancy. (R. 3421-23, 3483.) 
18. On July 18, 1988, DuBose sent to Pruitt Ernst's financial 
statement via overnight mail. (R. 3009-10, Ex. 18.) Pruitt told 
DuBose that Stangl needed the financials to aid in procuring 
financing for the project. (R. 4131-32, 3009-10.) Thus, Ernst 
knew that Stangl would be incurring significant financial obliga-
tions with the project. 
19. On or about July 19, 1988, after receiving Ernst's 
financial statements, Valley Bank approved Stangl's loan request. 
(Finding No. 23, R. 2221.) The loan agreement closed on July 28, 
1988. The agreement provided that no funds would be disbursed 
until Stangl actually acquired title to the Plaza property. 
(Finding No. 24, R. 2222; see also 4341, Ex. 311.) 
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20. In a letter dated July 18, 1988, the Dykeman Architects, 
which Ernst had hired to design the Plaza property store, indicated 
that they had "begun work on this project." (Ex. 17.) From July 
through September, Dykeman Architects performed $19,581.60 in 
services and expenses for Ernst. (Ex. 88A.) Most of that work was 
completed in July. (Ex. 34.)7 
21. On July 28, 1988, Stangl exercised his Purchase Option on 
the Plaza property from Brockbank by letter, but the actual 
purchase was still conditioned upon Brockbank providing title to 
the property free and clear of all liens. (Ex. 66F (attached as 
Addendum H).) Stangl closed the loan and exercised the Purchase 
Option only because of Ernst's insistence on proceeding on a fast-
track. (R. 3029, 4354-59.)8 
22. Throughout July and August 1988, Ernst's conduct 
repeatedly indicated that the project would proceed as planned and 
encouraged Stangl's reliance. During July and August 1988 Ernst 
and Ernst's architects referred written materials and communicated 
with Stangl's employees regarding construction plans. (R. 3887, 
3013-19, 3022-27, 3033-34, 3036, 3037-38, Exs. 17, 25, 34, 71, 72, 
73, 76.) Stangl, in turn, began making arrangements necessary to 
meet Ernst's construction requirements and to renovate the Plaza 
7
 Dykeman prepared the architectural renderings of the im-
provements Ernst required Stangl to complete prior to turning the 
property over to Ernst for fixturing. (Exs. 76, 71-71E, R. 3013-
15.) 
3
 Because Brockbank did not have clear title yet, both the 
Purchase Option and the Offer to Purchase remained conditional. 
Thus the court properly determined that Stangl had no obligation to 
purchase the property as of July 28, 1988. (See Finding No. 30, R. 
2224 . ) 
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property. (Finding No. 25, R. 2222/ see also 3018-22, 3038, Ex.7, 
66, 88A.) 
23. For instance, on July 8, Stangl applied to the West 
Jordan City Planning Commission for a conditional use permit, a 
site plan review and permission to locate a sign. Stangl's 
application indicated that the permits and review were for an Ernst 
store. (R. 2222, 2949, 3010, Exs. 7, 19.) To assist in obtaining 
a positive outcome at the Planning Commission hearing set for July 
20, 1988, DuBose wrote to the West Jordan City Manger on July 12, 
1988, stating Ernst's intent to consummate a lease at the Plaza 
property and to make vxa very long commitment to the community. . . 
." (Finding No. 25, R. 2222/ see also 3615-16, Ex. 10.) Ernst's 
Director of Construction, Rob King, attended the hearing and 
explained Ernst's construction and remodeling requirements for the 
Plaza property. (R. 3887-88/ Ex. 19.) On July 20, 1988, the West 
Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission conditionally approved the 
Plaza property project. (R. 3010-11, Ex. 19.) 
24. On July 22, 1988, Stangl secured a bid for the new roof 
Ernst required. (R. 3018-19, Ex. 76.) 
25. On August 2, 1988, Ernst solidified its promise to lease 
the Plaza property site. On that date, DuBose made two telephone 
calls to Steve Pruitt indicating that Jules Trump, the Chairman of 
the Board of Ernst, had approved the West Jordan project. (Finding 
No. 26, R. 2223/ see also 3544-45, 3660, 4132.) 
26. In reliance on the approval by Ernst's Chairman to enter 
into a lease for Ernst to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza 
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property, Stangl closed on the property on August 9, 1988.9 At 
that time, Brockbank could not deliver clear title or a warranty 
deed because of significant tax liens on the property. Stangl 
waived the condition of delivery of clear title contained in the 
Purchase Option and the Offer to Purchase (Finding No. 30, R. 2224, 
Exs. 5, 315, 317, 66A (attached as Addenda D,F,G)) and paid 
$1,272,351.15 which was more than the option price and included 
payment of the outstanding taxes. (Finding No. 30, R. 2224; see 
also 3034-35 Ex. 66A.) 
27. Stangl acted reasonably in acquiring the property in 
reliance on Ernst's promise to enter into a lease as the anchor 
tenant at the Plaza property, in light of Ernst's course of conduct 
and the August 2 phone calls from DuBose to Pruitt signaling that 
Ernst would be the anchor tenant at the Plaza property. (Finding 
No. 29, R. 2223; see also R. 2011.) Stangl would not have 
purchased the Plaza property from Brockbank, purchased Aetna's 
trust deed or drawn on the Valley Bank loan without Ernst's 
commitment to lease the property. (Finding Nos. 30 and 32, R. 
2224-25; see also 2975-76, 3036, 3144, 3313, 3902-03 4354-59.) 
DuBose could have and should have known that Stangl would make 
legal and economic commitments in furtherance of the project to 
accommodate the requested October 1, 1988 fixturing date. (Finding 
No. 29, R. 2223-24; see also 4333-40.) 
28. In fact, Ernst knew that Stangl was going to buy the 
Plaza property. Stangl discussed with DuBose his need to acquire 
9
 Stangl needed to close the purchase then to remain on the fast 
track, Ernst wanted the site by October 1, 1988 and construction 
would take approximately 60 days, a fact Ernst knew. See fl 8, 
supra, 
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the property on several occasions beginning in June 1988. (R. 
2960, 2966-67, 2970, 2974, 3126, 3143, 3312-13, 3778, 3780-85, Ex. 
18.) Ernst also knew that Stangl was financing the lease 
improvements, because Pruitt had requested Ernst's financial 
information specifically for Stangl to provide to Valley Bank. (R. 
3885, 3581, 3465, 4131-32, Ex. 18.) DuBose testified that normally 
Ernst addresses the question of which party would bear any pre-
lease risks during lease negotiations, with Ernst placing the risk 
on the developer. (Finding No. 29, R. 2224, 3142, 3311-12.) It 
did not do so in this case. (Finding No. 29, R. 2224.) Its 
failure to do so indicated that it understood Stangl was not acting 
at his own peril in obtaining financing, securing permits, and 
advancing with the construction. 
29. On August 23, 1988, DuBose sent Stangl a copy of a 
revised lease which he indicated Ernst was "prepared to execute." 
(Ex. 26.) That statement was false. Ernst was not convinced of the 
project's economic feasibility. (Finding No. 32, R. 2225; see also 
3670-79.) Ernst secretly intended to condition its commitment to 
execute the lease on being "satisfied" of the project's feasibili-
ty. (R. 3039, Ex. 26.) Ernst never revealed any feasibility 
concerns or contingencies to Stangl. (Finding No. 32, R. 2225, 
3673, 3674, 3677.) 
30. Instead, Ernst continued to represent to Stangl that it 
wished to proceed with the West Jordan project on a fast-track 
basis with a fixturing date of October 1, 1988 and acted in 
accordance with those representations. (Finding No. 33, R. 2225.) 
Ernst's architects continued to refer written construction 
materials to Stangl, who continued working towards the October 1, 
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1988 deadline. (Finding No. 33, R. 2225; see also 3036-37, 3043, 
Ex. 25, 75.) 
31. On August 29, 1988, Stangl responded to DuBose's August 
23, 1988, letter and requested changes to the August 23 draft 
lease. (Ex. 27.) Stangl did not anticipate that his proposals 
would in any way jeopardize the project. (Finding No. 34, R. 2225; 
see also 3042, 3828-32.) By this time, based on his prior 
communications and dealings with Ernst, this conclusion was 
entirely and reasonably justified. (Finding No. 34, R. 2225.) 
32. On September 12, 1988, DuBose responded to Stangl's 
August 29, 1988 correspondence. (Finding No. 35, R. 2226, Ex. 29.) 
In his letter, DuBose specifically addressed each of Stangl's 
proposed changes. He stated that several issues were unresolved, 
that there was a risk negotiations would terminate if those issues 
could not be resolved, and scheduled a September 14, 1988 meeting 
with Stangl in Salt Lake City. (Ex. 31.) DuBose's September 12, 
1988 letter was the first indication from Ernst that the project 
might be in jeopardy. (Finding No. 35, R. 2226.) 
33. Just before September 14, DuBose tendered his resignation 
from Ernst. (R. Finding No. 36, 2226; see also 3561.) DuBose did 
not inform Stangl he was leaving Ernst, and attended the September 
14 meeting with Stangl along with Ellis Kantor, DuBose's replace-
ment at Ernst. (Finding No. 36, R. 2226; see also 4135.) 
34. The September 14 meeting focused on five matters which 
had not previously taken on much significance. (Finding No. 37, R. 
2226; see also 3050-64, 3124, 4135, Exs. 29, 329.) Neither DuBose 
or Kantor mentioned any concerns about the economic viability of 
the project. (R. 3136.) At the meeting Stangl, stated his 
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preference concerning the five issues but indicated that if Ernst 
insisted, he would agree to resolve each of the five issues as 
Ernst proposed. (Finding No. 38, R. 2226-27/ see also 3052-53, 
3124-38, 4135-36.) Because Stangl indicated he would accede to 
Ernst's demands on the remaining five issues if it insisted, he 
reasonably believed that there were no terms remaining to be 
negotiated at the end of the September 14 meeting, and he reason-
ably expected to receive an acceptable lease from Ernst by 
September 23, 1988. (R. 2227, 3052-53- 3138-39, 3891-93, 4136, 
4158-59.) 
35. On September 15, 1988, DuBose terminated his employment 
with Ernst. (Finding No. 39, R. 2227.) On or about that same 
date, Thomas Stanton, Ernst's senior Vice-President of Operations, 
told Kantor that the Plaza property project had been placed on 
hold. (Finding No. 39, R. 2227, 4001.) Ernst did not diligently 
pursue preparation of lease documents after that point. (R. 4024.) 
36. Stangl called Ernst on September 23, 1988, to inquire 
about the lease. (Finding No. 40, R. 2227; see also 3144, 3313-
14.) At that time, Stangl was informed that DuBose no longer 
worked for Ernst. Kantor and Stanton both informed him that all of 
DuBose's projects were on hold. (R. 3163, 3145-50, 3314-16 4046.) 
Neither Stanton or Kantor indicated any problems with the lease 
terms as agreed. (R. 3145-50, 3316.) 
37. By letter dated September 29, 1988, Ernst, through 
Stanton, formally notified Stangl that Ernst did not intend to be 
a tenant in the Plaza property. (Ex. 35.) Stanton subsequently 
told Stangl that the only reason Ernst was not proceeding with the 
lease was the low volume numbers in the feasibility study prepared 
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for Ernst in 1987. (R. 3166, 4099-4100); see also (4086-93, 4095-
96.) At no time prior to September 29, 1988 did Ernst inform 
Stangl or Pruitt of the existence of the 1987 feasibility study, or 
that execution of a lease by Ernst was conditioned upon Ernst's 
satisfying itself of the feasibility of the project. To the 
contrary, all the essential lease terms had long been agreed upon, 
construction drawings and specifications had been given to Stangl, 
the Chairman of the Board had approved the project, Ernst actively 
participated in obtaining city approval and had represented to the 
city its intent to lease the Plaza property site. (R. 3580, 3674, 
3825-26, 4137-38. ) 
38. Ernst knew that Stangl would be required to take out 
loans and incur costs and irreversible obligations in order to 
proceed with the project and meet Ernst's fast-track requirements. 
(R. 3143, 3312-13, 3885, 3581, Ex. 12.) At no time did Ernst 
indicate its commitment to enter into a lease was conditional upon 
a satisfactory feasibility study or that Stangl would bear the risk 
if the project fell through. (R. 3142, 3515, 3826-27.) Ernst 
requested that Stangl take action quickly to comply with its fast 
track timetable, and Stangl complied. 
39. When Stangl received Stanton's September 29 letter, he 
found himself in a difficult position. Stangl had purchased the 
Plaza property, taken out substantial loans for such purchase, 
pledged other income producing properties and leases as collateral 
for such loans, made improvements and begun construction consistent 
with Ernst's stated requirements, all in reliance of Ernst's 
promise to enter into a lease as anchor tenant for the Plaza 
property. (Finding No. 42, R. 2227; see also 3142-45, 3152-59, 
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3258-59, 3320-27, 3902-04 4360-61, Ex. 88A.) Stangl had had no 
reason to believe that a lease could not be agreed to, given 
Ernst's course of conduct since June 2 9.10 
40. From October 1988 through April 1989, Stangl continued to 
work with Ernst in an attempt to continue to convince Ernst to 
become the anchor tenant. (R. 3894-96, 3901-02, 3430.) Ernst's 
conduct throughout that period indicated that it had not defini-
tively withdrawn from the deal. (R. 4005-06, 4049-55, 4104, 3894-
96, 3360-62, 3321-22, 3331-47, 3243-44, 3335, 3164-73, 3177-84, 
Exs. 38, 43.) Stangl reasonably continued to renovate the property 
with the justifiable hope that Ernst would reconsider and become a 
tenant. (Finding No. 43, R. 2227-28.) 
41. Also beginning in October, 1988, Stangl prudently 
attempted to find new tenants or a purchaser. (Findings No. 44, R. 
2228/ see also 3189-90, 3893-94, 4390-91, 4394, 4407-9.) 
42. Valley Bank agreed with Stangl's decision to complete the 
renovations (R. 3889-90, 3483-84), believing this was the only way 
the property could attract another anchor tenant or interest a 
potential purchaser. (Finding No. 43, R. 2227-28; see also 3152-
54, 3164-73, 3177-84, 3322-27, 3331-47, 3903-04, 4393.) Continuing 
with the renovations was reasonable in light of the fact that the 
prior owner of the property had been unable to sell it for several 
years due to its deteriorating condition, the Plaza property had to 
compete for tenants with two new shopping centers located nearby, 
Stangl had pledged his two adjacent properties and related leases 
as security for the Valley Bank loan to acquire the Plaza property, 
10
 See, e.g. , paragraphs 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 28, 
2 9 and 3 0 and 2 9 above. 
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and Stangl was incurring substantial interest expense on the loan 
he obtained to purchase the property. (Finding No. 43; R. 2228; 
see also 3155, 3902-04, 3503, 3259-69.) All said, Stangl expended 
over $2.2 million in acquiring the Plaza property in order to meet 
Ernst's fast-track requirement, and, after taking reasonable steps 
to convince Ernst to meet its prior commitment, and/or in mitigat-
ing his damages by completing renovations to attract new tenants or 
a purchaser. (Finding No. 45, R. 2228, Ex. 88A.) 
43. Stangl was finally able to sell the Plaza property on 
March 8, 1991, along with the two adjacent out-parcels he owned, to 
Green Isle Development Corp. (Finding No. 45, R. 2228; see also 
318 9; Ex. 48 (attached as Addendum J).) 
44 . The court determined that although no contract was 
formed, the elements of promissory estoppel existed. (R. 2229-30.) 
The court held that Stangl reasonably, substantially and detrimen-
tally relied upon Ernst's representations that it would enter into 
a lease to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza property, with 
remodeling to be done and possession to be taken on a fast-track 
basis and that Stangl was entitled to recover his out-of-pocket 
expenses (R. 2229-32) . The court did not award Stangl a breach of 
contract measure of damages. (R. 2232.) Stangl's out-of-pocket 
expenses were measured by the amounts Stangl incurred in acquiring 
and refurbishing the Plaza property to make it marketable, less 
rental income he received from other tenants and the sale price 
allocable to the Plaza property when Stangl sold it and his two 
other adjacent out parcels. (Finding No. 46, R. 2228-29.) The 
trial court found that Stangl's damages were $331,391, having 
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reduced them from the $407,309 Stangl claimed he was due. (Finding 
No. 48, R. 2229, Ex. 88A (attached as Addendum K).) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ernst has utterly failed to apprise this court of the true 
nature of the factual evidence presented to the trial court. 
Instead, Ernst purposefully cites only selected facts in an effort 
to retry the case and give a false impression of the case to this 
Court. Ernst challenges the trial court's findings without 
reference to any of the voluminous evidence which supports those 
findings. A quick review of the trial court's findings and Ernst's 
"Statement of Facts" shows the total incongruence between the two. 
Ernst's determination to reargue the case without marshaling the 
evidence which supports the trial court's findings is fatal to 
Ernst's factual challenges it raises in points VII. B, VII. C, and 
VII. E. Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 
875 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Viewing the facts as a whole, it is clear that the trial court 
ruled correctly on all issues on appeal and should be affirmed. 
The trial court correctly determined that promissory estoppel is 
available for use as a theory of recovery notwithstanding the 
Statute of Frauds, and that the facts merit its application here. 
In addition, the trial court employed an appropriate measure of 
damages under the promissory estoppel claim which avoided injustice 
in this case, and acted well within its discretion in carefully 
considering all of Ernst's objections, evaluating the evidence for 
possible prejudice and rendering well thought out decisions as to 
the admissibility of each piece of evidence to which Ernst 
objected. The record clearly supports the trial court's legal 
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rulings, and Ernst has not supported, and cannot support, its 
contention that the trial court acted erroneously or abused its 
discretion. The decision below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
When reviewing the trial court's decision on appeal, the Utah 
Court of Appeals will "presume [the decision] to be correct and 
search for grounds upon which [it] may be upheld." Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 
1992) . Therefore, the Court of Appeals will affirm "a trial 
court's decision whenever [it] can do so on a proper ground . . . 
. " Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 
1120, 1123 (Utah 1984). The record in this case establishes that 
the trial court's decision was correct on the grounds upon which it 
was made. The trial court's judgment must therefore be affirmed. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
IS AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THIS CASE. 
Promissory estoppel provides an appropriate basis for recovery 
in this case.11 Ernst's argument to the contrary misstates Utah 
law on the applicability of promissory estoppel in cases involving 
the Statute of Frauds. The very cases on which Ernst relies show 
11
 It is important to note initially that Ernst mixes up Stangl's 
two estoppel claims to serve its purposes on appeal. Stangl 
presented two separate promissory estoppel claims to the trial 
court. In connection with his breach of contract claim, Stangl 
argued that Ernst was estopped from denying the existence of an 
enforceable lease contract. This argument was extinguished by the 
court's finding that no contract actually existed. Stangl's second 
promissory estoppel claim, on which the court awarded judgment, did 
not depend on the existence of a binding contract. Stangl argued, 
and the court agreed, that justice requires that Ernst be held 
liable for its promise to Stangl that it would enter into a 
mutually acceptable lease consistent with Ernst's fast track 
construction schedule. This promissory estoppel claim is rooted in 
equity and all analysis must be conducted with equitable principles 
firmly in mind. 
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the fallacy of its argument. For example, McKinnon v. Corporation 
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, , 529 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1974) as quoted by Ernst, 
acknowledged that the Utah courts have long accepted that promisso-
ry estoppel extends to cases involving the Statute of Frauds. (See 
App. Brf. at 17) .12 
In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on Medesco v. 
LNS International, 762 F. Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991), a diversity 
case applying Utah law. In Medesco, Judge Winder rejected the 
defendants' claims that promissory estoppel was unavailable to 
plaintiffs bringing a state securities law claim because of the 
Statute of Frauds. The defendants had argued that the list of 
exceptions in the Statute of Frauds applicable to contracts for 
securities sales is exclusive and bars any "judicially created 
exceptions." 762 F. Supp. 920. Judge Winder held that the 
decision as to whether a party is promissorily estopped from 
asserting the Statute of Frauds is not precluded by the Statute, 
and involves the balancing of a number of different policies. 762 
F. Supp. at 926. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139, said 
Judge Winder, provides the appropriate analytical framework within 
which to weigh these policies. Id.13 Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 
12
 The quoted passage provides that 
In Easton v. Wycoff, 295 P. 2d 332 (Utah 1956) , this court 
stated that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had been 
extended, in a limited form, to those cases concerned with the 
Statute of Limitations or the Statute of Frauds, where the 
promise as to future conduct constituted an intended abandon-
ment of an existing right of the promisor. 
Id. at 436 (emphasis added). 
13
 Section 139 provides that: 
(continued...) 
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570 (Utah 1953), Easton and McKinnon (the cases upon which Ernst 
primarily relies) "are now dated by the Utah Supreme Court's 
adoption of § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the 
policy of justifiable reliance that underlies this section."14 
Medesoo, 762 F. Supp. at 925. See also Andreason, 848 P.2d at 175 
n.l. 
Ernst contends that this court must disagree with Medesco, and 
instead rely on Ravarino, Easton and McKinnon. Not only did 
Medesco distinguish those cases, they have also been superseded by 
the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
§ 90 in Southeastern Equip. Co. v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
13
 ( . . . continued) 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce the action or forbearance 
is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if 
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
The remedy for breach is limited as justice requires. 
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise, the following circumstances are 
significant: 
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, 
particularly cancellation and restitution; 
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action 
or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought; 
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance 
corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise, 
or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and 
convincing evidence; 
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance; and 
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was 
foreseeable by the promisor. 
14
 Judge Winder also questioned the precedential value of the 
cases because of the way in which they confused the doctrines of 
equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel. Ld. at 925, n.8. 
24 
1985) . Ravarino, Easton and McKinnon all applied an early, 
narrower form of promissory estoppel.15 The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 90, adopted in Mauss, modified and provided a more 
flexible approach to the manner in which Utah applies the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1188/ see also Andreason, 848 P. 2d 
at 175 & n.l (noting that Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 
"infused a more flexible approach into both the substantive and 
remedial aspects of promissory estoppel"). 
In any event, none of the older cases on which Ernst relies 
rejected outright the use of promissory estoppel in all cases 
subject to the Statute of Frauds. See Medesco, 762 F. Supp. at 925 
n.7 (pointing out that none of the plaintiffs in the three cases, 
Ravarino, 260 P.2d 570, Easton, 295 P.2d 332 and McKinnon, 529 P.2d 
434, appeared to have suffered any reasonable, detrimental reliance 
as a result of the defendants' oral promises, and therefore, 
although promissory estoppel was available, it was simply not 
applicable in those cases); see also Andreason 848 P.2d at 175 n.l 
(noting the availability of the promissory estoppel in certain 
situations) . Rather, Utah has long recognized that a party to a 
contract otherwise subject to the Statute of Frauds might obtain 
equitable relief pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in 
15
 It is important to note at this point that the majority of 
cases cited by Ernst to support its position on the application of 
promissory estoppel to this case were decided under an older 
promissory estoppel standard no longer applied by Utah courts. 
Promissory estoppel has evolved from a narrow doctrine requiring a 
specific and definite promise, in part because full contract 
damages were generally awarded, to return to its equitable roots in 
which courts focus not on the definiteness of the promise, but on 
the promissory commitment, centered on the promisee's right to rely 
and the promisor's duty to prevent foreseeable reliance. JEd. pp. 
38-58. For a lengthy discussion of the evolution of promissory 
estoppel see Corbin on Contracts § 8.11 (Rev'd Ed. 1993). 
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an appropriate situation. In addition, Utah courts have histori-
cally enforced oral contracts for an interest in land notwithstand-
ing the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 
1172, 1176-77 (Utah App. 1995) (oral modification to written escrow 
agreement enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds § 25-5-
3 when appellees changed their position and partially performed in 
reliance on the oral modification); Budge v. Barron, 169 P. 745, 
748 (Utah 1917) (upholding oral rescission of a written contract 
for the sale of land when the seller, in reliance on the rescis-
sion, enters into a new contract to resell the land).16 
Moreover, Medesco's application of Section 139 is consistent 
with the holdings of many other jurisdictions which recognize that 
promissory estoppel may, in appropriate cases, allow a plaintiff to 
recover notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.17 In Mcintosh v. 
16
 See also Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 387 P.2d 246 (Utah 
1963) (holding that the fact that the parties unsuccessfully 
attempted to complete written contract does not foreclose the 
possibility that other contractual obligations could arise between 
them in equity in quantum meruit notwithstanding the Statute of 
Frauds); Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714 (Utah 1949) (finding 
enforceability of a contract for an interest in land based on 
equitable estoppel notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds); 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710-11 (Utah 1977) 
(notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, equity will impress a constructive trust in favor of a 
beneficiary of an oral trust under certain circumstances despite 
the absence of a writing evidencing an intent to create such a 
trust) . 
17
 Promissory estoppel has been widely applied by other state 
courts in cases in which it would be inequitable to allow the 
Statute of Frauds to defeat an otherwise meritorious claim. See 
e.g., Chidester v. Eastern Gas and Fuel Assoc, 859 P.2d 222, 224-
25 (Colo. App. 1992) (citing section 139) ; Nicol v. Nelson, 776 
P.2d 1144, 1147 (Colo. App. 1989), cert, denied, 785 P.2d 917 
(Colo. 1989)(applying section 139(1) to the statute of frauds 
governing real property) ; Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P. 2d 764 (Colo. 
1983)(considering the statute of frauds governing sale of securi-
ties and citing § 139 with approval); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. 
(continued...) 
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Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Hawaii 1970), the court made a comprehensive 
analysis of modern law and applied Section 13918 to enforce an oral 
employment contract notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. The 
court found that Section 13 9 gave the trial court the necessary 
flexibility to relieve a party of the Statute of Frauds when the 
party's reliance is such that injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcing the promise. Id. at 180-82. 
In contrast, none of the jurisdictions Ernst says have refused 
to adopt Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 139 despite their 
application of Section 90 have actually gone so far. First of all, 
only two of the cases cited by Ernst, Greaves v. Medical Imaging 
Systems, Inc. , 879 P.2d 276 (Wash. 1994) and Stearns v. Emery-
Waterhouse Co. , 596 A. 2d 72 (Maine 1991), actually considered 
applying Section 139 to the facts before them. Neither of those 
courts foreclosed future adoption of the section; they merely 
declined to adopt Section 139 under the facts of the particular 
employment cases under consideration. The other case Ernst relies 
17
 { . . . continued) 
v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1979) (holding that in Iowa 
promissory estoppel is a valid nonstatutory exception to the 
applicable Statute of Frauds and applying § 13 9) ; Walker v. Ireton, 
559 P.2d 340, 344-346 (Kansas 1977) (adopting Tentative Draft of 
139 based on its review of the courts historical lean on the 
equitable doctrine of reliance and its specific recognition and 
application of § 90 to other cases); Crail v. Blakelv, 505 P.2d 
1027 (Calif. 1973); Mcintosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Hawaii 
1970) (applying § 139 in Tentative Draft to enforce an oral 
employment contract notwithstanding its violation of a strict 
interpretation of the applicable Statute of Frauds); Babey v. 
Lowman, 218 N.E. 2d 626 (Ohio 1966); Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 
217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954) . See also Calamari & Perillo, The Law 
of Contracts § 19-48, 841-44 & n. 68 (and cases cited therein). 
18
 Then in tentative draft form. 
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on, Farmland Serv. Coop, Inc. v. Klein, 244 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1976) 
did not even consider Section 139.19 
Ernst argues that where, as here, the parties specifically 
anticipated a written agreement, enforcing an oral promise will 
"render the statute meaningless."20 (See Ap. Brf. at 22-24.) That 
argument ignores both the broad equitable sweep of modern promisso-
ry estoppel law in Utah and the purpose of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Statute of Frauds exists to prevent fraud and perjury by 
requiring certain contracts to be in writing. English v. Standard 
Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991) . That purpose is in no 
way eviscerated by the appropriate application of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel to cases involving the Statute of Frauds.21 
Application of Section 139 does not result in the automatic 
"enforcement" of contracts barred by the Statute; it does not bind 
parties to terms they are merely negotiating. Rather, Section 139, 
in conjunction with Section 90, provides the court with a necessary 
19
 In addition, Ernst incorrectly cites Schwedes v. Romain, 587 
P. 2d 388 (Mont. 1978) as stating the philosophy of the cited 
jurisdictions. Schwedes was decided prior to the second 
Restatement's adoption of § 139. In Trad Industries Ltd. v. 
Brocran, 805 P. 2d 54 (Mont. 1991) , the Montana Supreme Court applied 
promissory estoppel to preclude the defendant from asserting the 
Statute of Frauds, where the plaintiff reasonably and foreseeably 
relied on defendant's representations to his detriment and 
injustice could be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Id. 
at 59. 
20
 To make this argument, Ernst relies on a clause in a letter it 
sent to Stangl; a letter that Ernst itself argues did not form a 
binding contract, and to which Ernst objects to being bound. 
21
 It is certainly not eviscerated in this case, where West 
Jordan public records indicated Ernst was making a long-term 
commitment to the community, where Ernst's architects were 
supplying necessary drawings to have the property improved in time 
for fixturing by October 1, where Ernst supplied its financial 
statements knowing that Stangl was obtaining financing to acquire 
the property, and where Ernst established the fast-track timetable. 
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and proper equitable method to prevent injustice when one has 
reasonably and detrimentally relied on a promise which otherwise 
does not rise to the level of an enforceable contract. There must 
be a definite promise as well as reasonable reliance. These 
elements were missing in the cases cited by Ernst. Moreover, 
recovery under Section 13 9 depends not on the consideration stated 
in the unenforceable contract, but is governed by the court's 
finding of what justice requires.22 
Utah recognizes that equitable principles demand that, under 
certain circumstances, where a promisor has induced another party 
to do acts pursuant to and in reliance upon the promise, and as a 
result, the promisee has suffered unjust detriment, the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel will be used to make the promisee whole. See, 
e.g., Andreason, 848 P.2d at 174-75. Section 139 reconciles the 
public policy behind that equitable principal with the public 
policy underlying the Statute of Frauds. See Mcintosh v. Murphy, 
469 P. 2d 177, 180 (Hawaii 1970) (explaining the policy behind 
enforcing agreements which violate the Statute of Frauds as a 
policy of avoiding unconscionable injury). The Medesco ruling is 
a logical application of the rule announced in Mauss, McKinnon and 
other Utah cases; it does nothing to weaken the Statute of 
Frauds.23 The trial court properly followed Medesco in concluding 
22
 Here, for example, the court specifically refused to enforce 
the 25 year lease contract, and instead awarded Stangl his out-of-
pocket expenses. Thus, the Statute of Frauds remains alive and 
well, untouched by the trial court's ruling in this case. 
23
 Ernst argues that because no Utah state court has specifically 
adopted Section 13 9 in a reported case, this court must reverse the 
trial court. As shown above, however, notwithstanding Utah's 
seemingly strict application of the Statute of Frauds, Utah courts 
(continued...) 
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that "promissory estoppel may be invoked [in this case] to bar the 
application of the Statute of Frauds." (R. 2012.) This Court 
should affirm the trial court's adoption of the rule stated in that 
case. 
II. BECAUSE ERNST FAILED TO MARSHALL THE FACTS, IT CANNOT NOW 
ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Ernst attempts to portray its appeal as one based on legal 
issues or, at least, mixed questions of law and fact. Ernst's 
reasoning is clear: while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, 
findings of fact may not be set aside unless found clearly 
erroneous. Interiors Contracting v. Smith Halander, 881 P.2d 929 
(Utah App. 1994) (citing Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a)) . Ernst's factual 
challenges permeate its legal arguments, however, demonstrating 
that its real complaint against the trial court's decision is that 
Ernst simply does not agree with the trial court's findings of 
fact. 
Ernst challenges four basic findings of the court: Ernst had 
requisite awareness of Stangl's acts in reliance; Ernst made a 
sufficiently definite promise to enter into a lease agreement with 
remodeling and improvements to occur on a fast-track basis; Stangl 
purchased the property in reasonable reliance; and Stangl suffered 
detrimental damages. To support its claims that the court erred in 
reaching these conclusions, Ernst cites to carefully selected 
portions of the record that reflect not the facts as the court 
found them to be, but the facts as Ernst wishes they were. No 
23
 ( . . . continued) 
have long recognized the applicability of promissory estoppel to 
cases within the Statute of Frauds. 
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where does Ernst attempt to marshall the evidence that supports the 
court's findings to show that such evidence is insufficient.24 
Utah appellate courts are very clear about the burden an 
appellant must meet when challenging a trial court's findings of 
fact. "To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact 
on appeal, x [a] n appellant must marshall the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against 
the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.''" Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 
(Utah App. 1993); accord, Interiors, 881 P.2d at 933 (holding that 
the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence 
when appellant failed to include evidence supporting trial court's 
findings in its brief and set fourth only evidence supporting his 
position); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1313, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (requiring one challenging factual 
findings to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists" (emphasis in original)); 
Turnbaucrh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 944 (Utah App. 1990) .2S 
24
 Even a quick comparison of the court's findings of fact and 
Ernst's "Statement of Facts" in its brief demonstrates Ernst's lack 
of candor on this point. The lack of congruence between the two is 
nothing short of amazing. 
25
 Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly refused to consider 
the arguments of appellants who have failed to marshal the evidence 
which they were required to do so. See Commercial Union Assocs. v. 
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993) (appellate court "will 
assume that the record supports the trial court's findings" where 
appellant fails to marshal evidence); Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) ("When the duty to 
marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the 
(continued. . . ) 
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Ernst's failure to marshall the evidence in favor of the trial 
court's decision requires this court to reject Ernst's factual 
challenge. Therefore, this court must accept as true the trial 
court's findings that (1) Ernst had the requisite awareness of 
Stangl's acts in reliance (Finding No. 29; R. 2223); (2) Ernst 
promised through its words and conduct that it would enter into a 
lease with remodeling to be done and possession taken on a fast-
track basis (R. 2219-23, Finding Nos. 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29); 
(3) Stangl purchased the Plaza property in reliance upon Ernst's 
promise (Finding Nos. 16, 29, 30; R. 2218-24); and (4) that Stangl 
suffered detrimental damages as a result of his reliance totaling 
$331,391. (Findings 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48; R. 2227-29.) Because 
these findings support the court's application of promissory 
estoppel, the trial court's decision must be affirmed. 
III. THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S APPLICATION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. 
As shown above, this court must accept the trial court's 
findings as true. In any event, however, the record firmly 
establishes that the evidence at trial sufficiently supports the 
challenged findings. The court's findings, in turn, support its 
conclusion that all elements required for promissory estoppel were 
established in this case. 
25
 ( . . . continued) 
merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as 
valid."); accord Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 
App. 1995); Lake Philzas Serv. v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 959 
(Utah App. 1993). 
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A. Ernst was aware of all facts material to the agreement. 
Promissory estoppel requires only knowledge of the fact that 
the injured party will perform, not the details of how it will do 
so. If the promisor should reasonably have expected its promise to 
induce action or forbearance, then the promisor will be held liable 
for all acts or forbearance reasonably resulting from such 
reliance. See, Sanders v. Arkansas Missouri Power Company, 593 
S.W.2d 56 (Ark. App. 1980) ("as long as the action in reliance on 
a promise is reasonable it matters not that the action taken was 
not directly induced by the promise sought to be enforced."); see 
also Restatement (2d) Contracts §§ 90, 139 (requiring only 
foreseeability, not that the actual reliance was foreseen); Corbin 
on Contracts § 8.12, pp. 73-74 (explaining that reasonable 
foreseeability of injurious reliance is an important factor but 
actual foreseeability is not required) . Cf:. Union Tank Car Co. v. 
What Bros., 387 P.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Utah 1964) (equitable relief not 
available where defendant subcontractor entered bid based on 
ordinary paint but project required special expensive paint, a fact 
which plaintiff never made defendant aware). 
Finding 29 is sufficient to establish the foreseeability of 
Stangl's acts in reliance on Ernst's promise to lease such 
property. In Finding 29, the court stated: 
On August 9, 1988, Stangl closed on the purchase of the 
Plaza property from Brockbank. In light of the August 2 calls 
from DuBose to Pruitt and all that had proceeded before that 
time, this was a reasonable step in furtherance of what DuBose 
had signaled and represented, i.e., that Ernst would be the 
anchor tenant at the Plaza property. While DuBose could not 
have anticipated this precise step, he could have and should 
have reasonably anticipated that Stangl would make legal and 
economic commitments in furtherance of the project to accommo-
date an October 1 possession date. DuBose himself testified 
that normally the question of risk bearing for pre-lease 
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expenditures is addressed during negotiations. That was not 
the case here. 
(R. 2223.) 
The evidence presented at trial supports a finding that Ernst 
should have known that Stangl was purchasing and financing the 
Plaza property in reliance on Ernst's promise to lease such 
property.26 (R. 2960, 2966-67, 2970, 2974, 3126, 3143, 3885, 3581, 
3465, 4131-32.) Stangl testified that he discussed purchasing and 
financing the Plaza property with DuBose on several occasions, 
beginning in June 1988. (R. 3885, 3581, 3465.) (R. 3312-313.) 
(R. 3778, 3780-85.) Moreover, Ernst expedited the transfer of its 
financials to Pruitt when Pruitt told DuBose that Stangl needed 
them to secure financing. (R. 3778, 3780-85.) In addition, 
Ernst's involvement in the permitting process and providing Stangl 
with construction drawings demonstrates its knowledge of Stangl's 
progress along the fast track required by Ernst. (See Finding Nos. 
25 and 33.) 
The trial court found and concluded, and the record supports, 
that Ernst should have known that Stangl would perform substantial 
acts in reliance upon Ernst's promise. Thus, Ernst possessed the 
requisite knowledge of all facts material to its promise to enforce 
a promissory estoppel claim. 
26
 Ernst's focus on Pruitt's June 3, 1988 letter is a red 
herring. It ignores clear testimony that in the course of 
communications Ernst became aware that Stangl did not own the 
property and was purchasing it and financing the improvements with 
the expectation that Ernst would be the anchor tenant. See 
Statement of Facts at ^ 27 and 28, supra. 
34 
B. The trial court correctly found that Ernst promised to 
lease the Plaza property site and that such promise fit 
within the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
A "promise" is an expression of a commitment to act in a 
specific manner communicated in such a way that the person to whom 
it is addressed may justly expect performance and may reasonably 
rely thereon. Corbin on Contracts § 1.13 (Rev'd Ed. 1993)27. A 
promise may be made through words or conduct; it may be implied, 
tacit, inferred or express. Ld. "If a person has reason to know 
that his or her words or other conduct may reasonably cause another 
to believe that a promise is being made and such belief actually 
results, a promise has been made even though the speaker or writer 
of the words does not intend to convey such meaning." Ld. at 37 & 
n.4 . 
Here, the trial court found, and the evidence shows, that 
Ernst promised to enter into a mutually acceptable lease agreement 
with Stangl, with remodeling and other improvements to the Plaza 
property to be done on a fast-track basis, concurrent with the 
final lease negotiations. (Finding Nos.17-26, R. 2219-23, see also 
R. 2230-31.) The court's findings of fact 17 through 26 set forth 
the course of events culminating with DuBose's call to Pruitt on 
August 2, signalling that Ernst would be the anchor tenant at the 
Plaza property. (Finding No. 29, R. 2219-23/ see also 2011.) 
Ernst argues that because the lease negotiations were ongoing, it 
could not have made an enforceable promise prior to having a final 
27
 All subsequent citations to Corbin on Contracts refer to the 
third revised edition. 
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written document.28 This argument is another red herring. The 
court did not enforce any actual lease terms, having found that no 
oral or written agreement had been reached. It compensated Stangl 
for his out-of-pocket losses incurred in reasonable reliance upon 
Ernst's promise to enter into a lease with the essential business 
terms to which the parties had agreed as early as June, 1988: 
Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set the 
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable lessor 
should reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by a mutually 
acceptable "Offer to Lease" containing the significant 
business points. Even though Ernst's form of an "Offer 
to Lease" expressly contemplated a subsequent, written 
lease, Ernst's language and conduct indicated that the 
subsequent lease would resolve only the less significant 
matters not addressed in the "Offer to Lease." Further-
more, it was reasonable to conclude that any items not 
raised in Ernst's June 29 or July 8 letters were not 
significant. Ernst should have reasonably anticipated 
that Stangl would draw these same conclusions. There is 
no reason to believe that Stangl and Ernst would not have 
reached agreement on all lease points. 
(Conclusions No. 2/ R. 2230.) The court found that Ernst's 
representations and conduct justified Stangl's reliance. (R. 2230-
31.) In considering the evidence, the trial court properly focused 
on Ernst's representations and course of conduct, in particular, 
Ernst's requirement of a fast-track construction schedule. The 
facts support the court's finding that Ernst promised to enter into 
28 R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817 (Utah 1952), on 
which Ernst relies is inapplicable to the case at bar because it 
was decided under the First Restatement of Contracts, and because 
it involved a contractor/subcontractor dispute, a situation in 
which the doctrine is uniquely applied. John Price Associates, 
Inc. v. Warner Electric, Inc., 723 F.2d 755, 757-58 (10th Cir. 
1983) (promissory estoppel prevents a subcontractor from with-
drawing its bid after a general contractor relies on the 
subcontractor's bid in computing and submitting its bid for a 
general contract). Daum declined to apply promissory estoppel in 
reverse - i.e., to force a general contractor who used the 
subcontractor's price in making his bid to actually award the work 
to that subcontractor. Use of a bid is not an acceptance of it or 
a promise to accept it, said the court. 
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a lease with Stangl with remodeling and possession to occur on a 
fast-track basis. 
C. Stangl purchased the Plaza property in reasonable 
reliance upon Ernst's promise. 
The trial court considered and rejected Ernst's argument that 
Stangl was legally obligated to purchase the Plaza property prior 
to August 2, 1988, and thus did not purchase it in reasonable 
reliance on Ernst's promise.29 The court found, based on all the 
evidence, that (1) Stangl was not obligated to close the deal on 
the purchase of the Plaza property from Brockbank until August 9, 
1988, after he was assured by DuBose's August 2 representations 
that Ernst was committed to the deal (Finding No. 29, R. 2223); and 
(2) "Had Stangl known that Ernst would not lease the anchor space 
at the Plaza property, he could have declined to purchase the Plaza 
property and the Aetna trust deed, and he could have aborted the 
financing package obtained from Valley Bank" (Finding No. 30, R. 
2224) . 
The evidence presented to the court, by way of documents and 
testimony, supports the court's findings. Prior to Stangl's 
negotiations with Ernst, Aetna had not called in Stangl's guarantee 
of the Brockbank loan (R. 3420, 3926, 3930) nor did it ever 
indicate an intent to do so. Stangl testified that he positioned 
himself with the ability to purchase the Plaza property, and 
finally did purchase it, only because of Ernst's representations 
29
 Ernst also claims the fact that the parties continued working 
toward a final lease agreement after that date negates Ernst's 
August 2, 1998 statements as a promise. Even before August 2, 
1988, however, the major terms were fixed and never changed; nor 
did Ernst's apparent intent to go forward on the fast-track ever 
change. (Finding No. 25). 
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and conduct indicating that it was committed to becoming the Plaza 
property anchor tenant. (R. 3877-78, 3421-23, 3029, 4354-59, 4355, 
2975-76.) In addition, Hoffman, the Valley Bank employee in charge 
of the Plaza property loan, indicated his understanding that Stangl 
was purchasing the Plaza property because Ernst had agreed to 
become anchor tenant. He testified that the loan would not have 
been extended without the understanding that Ernst would be the 
anchor tenant. (R. 3421-24.) 
Furthermore, both the Purchase Option (Ex. 5 (Addendum D) ) and 
Offer to Purchase (Exs. 315, 317 (Addenda F & G) ) conditioned 
Stangl's obligation to consummate the Plaza property purchase on 
transfer of clear title. (Exs. 5, 66F (Addendum H) . ) On August 2, 
1988, it was clear that because of significant tax liens, Brockbank 
could not deliver clear title.30 (R. 4355-60, Exs. 5, 66A (Adden-
dum I), 66F.) Thus, the court properly recognized that Stangl 
could have "aborted" the deal. It was only because of Ernst's 
promise to lease the premises that Stangl waived his contractual 
rights and purchased the Plaza property and the trust deed on 
August 9, 1988, still subject to tax liens. Thus, the court found, 
Stangl was not obligated to purchase the property or the trust deed 
prior to August 9 and did so only in reliance on Ernst's promise to 
complete lease negotiations. 
30
 Ernst erroneously alleges that because Stangl previously 
contemplated the existence of outstanding tax liens on the property 
he could not have purchased the property in reliance on Ernst's 
promise. To the contrary, it clear that Stangl realized that the 
condition of clear title to the property might not be met by 
Brockbank, but if provided reasonable assurance that Ernst would 
lease the anchor space, Stangl was ready to waive the "clear title" 
requirement, pay off Brockbank's delinquent taxes and acquire clear 
title to the property, in reliance upon Ernst's promise to lease 
the anchor space. 
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Ernst also argues that Stangl's purchase of the property in 
reliance upon Ernst's promise was not reasonable considering the 
parties' insistence on a written and executed lease agreement. 
Once again Ernst erroneously focuses on a red herring and ignores 
Ernst's representations and conduct, both leading up to and 
following its promise, that continually pushed Stangl onto a fast-
track to build its space. Ample evidence exists, from which the 
court properly found that Stangl's reliance was reasonable. Even 
though no written lease had been prepared, Ernst represented that 
it needed the property ready for fixturing by October 1, 1988; knew 
that substantial construction needed to be performed and that it 
could likely not be completed if Stangl waited for a signed lease 
prior to acquiring the property, obtaining permits and beginning 
construction; Ernst submitted materials and made representations to 
West Jordan City indicating it would lease the property; Ernst 
submitted a binding Offer to Lease which was consistent with the 
essential lease terms negotiated in June; and none of the other 
matters to be negotiated were by any stretch of the imagination 
"deal-breakers" to which Stangl would not ultimately accede to 
Ernst's requests. See Statement of Facts at ft 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 
18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30. 
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D. Stangl suffered detriment as a result of his reliance on 
Ernst's promise and the trial court employed the proper 
measure of damages to ensure justice.31 
The court found that Stangl suffered detriment "based upon his 
reasonable reliance upon Ernst's representations that it would 
enter into a lease to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza 
property" in the amount of $331,391. (R. 2229.) This amount 
constitutes Stangl's "out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the 
acquisition and refurbishment of the Plaza property" less rental 
income received from other tenants and less amounts allocable to 
the Plaza property upon its sale to Green Isle.32 (R. 2228.) This 
finding is consistent with the evidence and is legally correct. 
Because damage assessment is a function of the fact finder, this 
Court reviews the measure of damages employed by the trial court 
for clear error. Andreason, 848 P.2d at 174. The trial court's 
damage calculation will be set aside only if "clearly erroneous 
with no reasonable support in the evidence." Klinger v. Rightly, 
889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Ut. App. 1995) 
Promissory estoppel, like part performance, is an equitable 
doctrine concerning equitable rights and remedies. Id. ; Tolboe 
Const. Co. v. Staker Paving & Const Co., 682 P.2d P.2d 843, 845 
31
 VII.C and VII.E of Appellant's brief present arguments 
virtually identical to its argument set forth in Section VII.B(5). 
By making the same argument in three places, Ernst attempts to 
camouflage the true nature of its argument. In reality, Ernst 
challenges the factual basis of the court's damage award Stangl 
addresses the extent of Stangl's detriment and the measure of 
damages employed to compensate that detriment together under this 
heading. 
32
 Ernst again challenges this finding of the trial court without 
marshalling the evidence supporting it. Accordingly, as explained 
above, this court must consider the trial court's finding to be 
accurate. 
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(Utah 1984) . Accordingly, courts have wide discretion and may 
grant whatever relief is necessary to achieve complete justice. 
Andreasen, 175-176/ Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 137 
P.2d 347, 353 (Utah 1943); Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 
1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 1981); Gerson Electric Constr. v. Honeywell, 
Inc. , 453 N.E.2d 726, 728 (111. App. 1983). See also Corbin on 
Contracts § 8.11, p. 57; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 90, 
139. In keeping with the equitable nature of promissory estoppel, 
courts have awarded the full range of promissory remedies, 
including expectation damages, specific performance, reliance 
damages, restitution damages, lost profits and many blended 
recoveries as equity dictates.33 See, e.g., Breaux v. Schlumberger 
Offshore Services, 817 F.2d 1226, 1232 (5th Cir. 1987) (awarded 
lost future rentals on promissory estoppel claim) ; Chedd-Ancrier, 
756 F.2d at 937 (awarding full contract damages) ; Walters, 642 F.2d 
at 110 0-01; Westside Galvanizing Servs., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. , 921 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1990) (awarding a blended recovery of 
expectation and reliance damages); Wilk v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351 
(Cal. 1947) (specific performance); Signal Hill Aviation Co., Inc. 
v. Stroppe, 158 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1979) (award of both reliance 
damages and lost past and future profits) . As one court explained, 
"since it is the historic purpose of equity to secure complete 
33
 This is consistent with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, 
which authorizes remedies limited only "as justice requires." § 
90(1) 8c comment (d) , § 139(1); Andreason, 848 P.2d at 175; 
Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting 
that benefit-of-the bargain damages are often appropriate for 
promissory estoppel); Chedd-Angier Production v. Omni Publications 
Int., 756 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1985) ("whether to charge full 
contract damages, or something less, is a matter of discretion"); 
Corbin on Contracts § 8.11 at 56. 
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justice, the courts are able to adjust the remedies so as to grant 
the necessary relief. . . . " Walters, 642 F.2d at 1100. See 
Corbin, § 8.12, pp. 67-7. 
The court here acted within its discretion, and without error, 
in awarding Stangl his out-of-pocket expenses. Contrary to Ernst's 
assertion, detrimental reliance damages are not necessarily limited 
to a narrow window of time between the promise and repudiation of 
that promise.34 Rather, a promissory estoppel plaintiff in a 
failure to lease case is entitled to a reasonable time following a 
breach of promise to mitigate his damages and to recoup "expenses 
during this time, plus any loss sustained on the disposition of the 
building." 35 Mahonev v. Delaware McDonald's Corp., 770 F.2d 123, 
128 (8th Cir. 1985). 
In Mahoney, the plaintiff exercised an option to purchase a 
building and incurred substantial debt in reliance on a promise to 
lease. The defendant subsequently breached its promise, and never 
occupied the lease premises.36 Looking to the Restatement (2d) § 
90, the court held plaintiff had a duty to mitigate his damages and 
that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time following the 
34
 The Arizona failure to lease case cited by Ernst at 38-39 of 
its brief, viewed promissory estoppel as a substitute for consid-
eration, rather than as an equitable principle. Trollope v. 
Koerner, 515 P.2d 340 (Ariz. App. 1973). In any event, that case 
did not evaluate promissory estoppel reliance damages. Rather, the 
case involved a claim of a theory of quasi-contractual recovery. 
Id. at 341. The measure of damages used by the Trollope court is 
thus inapplicable to the promissory estoppel case at hand. 
35 This aspect of the case distinguishes it from the facts of 
Andreason, 848 P. 2d 171. The Andreason plaintiffs did not incur 
any continuing obligations as a result of their reliance, nor were 
they required to mitigate their damages. 
36
 In Mahoney, unlike this case, there was no indication that the 
building was not marketable. Jd. at 128. 
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breach of the promise to accomplish such mitigation. The court 
held that plaintiff's "expenses during this time, plus any loss 
sustained on the disposition of the building, would constitute his 
just reliance damages." 770 F.2d at 128. Based on the specific 
facts of that case, the court reversed an award of the plaintiff's 
interest costs and other expenses over approximately a four-year 
period, but did allow plaintiff to recover those costs incurred in 
the five-month period after the breach during which the building 
remained vacant. Id. 
Here, Stangl originally asked the court for damages measured 
by his lost profits over the 25 year lease period, costs incurred 
in acquiring the property, and all costs incurred in mitigation 
until he sold the property. (R. 2084-103.) The trial court viewed 
all the evidence, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and 
determined that justice required that Stangl recover only his out-
of-pocket expenses incurred in acquiring the Plaza property to meet 
Ernst's fast-track time schedule and then mitigating his damages by 
refurbishing the property to get Ernst in as a tenant or attract a 
new anchor tenant or purchaser. (Finding 46, R. 2228-29.) 
The court found that Stangl incurred substantial debt to 
purchase the Plaza property, buy out the trust deed, and make 
Ernst's required improvements all in reliance on Ernst's promise to 
enter into a lease and become the anchor tenant.37 Upon Ernst's 
37
 See Finding No. 42, R. 2227/ s^e also 3142-45, 3152-59, 3258-
59, 3320-27, 3902-04 4360-61, Ex. 88A. Ernst asserts that as of 
September 29, 1988, the Plaza property had a positive value of at 
least $177,070 and Stangl had spent only $7,380.59 on improvements. 
Ernst fails to mention, however, that by that date, Stangl had also 
paid $24,571.58 in loan interest, $36,937.20 in loan origination 
fees and insurance (this number is reduced from the $44,341.20 
(continued...) 
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repudiation, Stangl did not and could not simply walk away from an 
unmarketable, run-down property, but continued to make the 
improvements set in motion by Ernst's promise and made necessary by 
Ernst's repudiation. No evidence supports Ernst's implicit 
assumption that had Stangl ceased all efforts to upgrade the 
property as of September 29, 1988, he could have sold it at all, 
much less for $1.5 million. To the contrary, the evidence 
established that Stangl unsuccessfully tried to attract a purchaser 
or a new anchor tenant by contacting hardware stores, grocery store 
chains, movie theater operators, fabric stores, drug stores and 
others. (Finding No. 44, R. 2228; see also 3189-90, 3893-94, 4390-
91, 4394, 4407.) 
Stangl had to create a finished product in order to sell or 
lease the property. (R. 3259-67.) In light of the deteriorated 
condition of the property, the existence of two new shopping 
centers in the area, Stangl's significant and ongoing interest 
payment obligations, and Stangl's pledge of his adjacent properties 
and leases as security for the Plaza property loan, the Court found 
that Stangl acted reasonably in improving the property to attract 
a new anchor tenant or purchaser. As in Mahoney, Stangl is 
entitled to his expenses in doing so. Thus, the court concluded 
that "justice requires that Ernst pay Stangl his out-of-pocket 
37
 ( . . . continued) 
listed in Ex. 88A, Subpart "A: to reflect the court's deduction of 
$7,404 in finding 48; (c) $3,305.78 in legal fees regarding 
property acquisition (this number is reduced from $3,738.78 listed 
in Ex. 88A, Subpart "A" to reflect the court's deduction of fees in 
its finding 48(b)). 
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costs of $331,391.00." (Finding Nos. 46-48, R. 2228-29, Conclusion 
No. 11, R. 2232; see also 3259-69.)38 
All said, Stangl spent over $2.2 million in purchasing and 
renovating the Plaza property. (Finding No. 44, R. 2228, Ex. 88A 
(Addendum K) . ) He recovered only $1,688,447.48 by the sale to 
Green Isle. (Ex. 88A.) Ernst knew its requirement that the site 
be ready for fixturing by October 1, 1988 meant that Stangl had to 
purchase the property and commit himself to the project before a 
final lease could be signed (see R. 2224, 3018-26, 3036-38, 3584/ 
Exs. 14, 6.) Ernst started the train rolling and invited Stangl 
38
 Ernst also challenges aspects of the damage award to Stangl. 
It asserts that Stangl under-reported the amount he received from 
Green Isle for the Plaza property, because he backed out $92,355.52 
of the Green Isle purchase price for back taxes attributable to the 
Brockbank portion of the Plaza property. (See R. 4506, Ex. 88A, 
Subpart D.) (See Stangl's testimony that the closing statement 
erred when it indicated the taxes being paid were for any tax years 
prior to 1988, R. 4505 -06.) This argument is based upon Ernst's 
inability to properly read a closing statement. Stangl received no 
compensation from Green Isle for payment of back taxes. In fact, 
at closing, Stangl was obligated to come up with an additional 
$120,151, in part to pay off the back taxes. (See Ex. 48.) Thus, 
those taxes were additional expenses incurred by Stangl with 
respect to the Plaza property and were properly included in the 
damage calculation. Moreover, the back taxes paid at the closing 
of the sale to Green Isle were not the same as the back taxes 
Stangl was obligated to pay when he purchased the property from 
Brockbank. 
Ernst also asserts that the damages should have been reduced 
by $11,700 for an allegedly uncredited vacancy rate adjustment 
included in Stangl's original damage exhibit but left out of 
Exhibit 88A. Ernst, however, ignores the portion of the record 
where Stangl testified that on the early version of his damages 
exhibit he erroneously included the vacancy rate on two parcels 
(the Firestone and IET properties) that were leased during the 
entire relevant time period. (R. 4521.) As Stangl testified, when 
he discovered the vacancy rate mistake, he backed the variable out 
of his damages calculations in order to correct the numbers and to 
do his best to provide an accurate damages calculation. (R. 4521.) 
The trial court heard Stangl's testimony and received all relevant 
exhibits and determined the damage award accordingly. The evidence 
supports the trial court's damages calculations and they may not be 
disturbed. 
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aboard. Once on board, Stangl's only option was to stay on for the 
ride. (R. 3259-65.) The record fully supports the trial court's 
holdings that Stangl's reliance on Ernst's promise resulted in his 
detriment in the amount of $331,391. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO BY ERNST. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting 
Stangl's damage evidence. Ernst's complaints to the contrary 
misstate both what actually occurred below and the appropriate 
legal standard for this court to apply. The decision of whether or 
not to admit particular evidence at trial is within the trial 
court's discretion. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 108-09 (Utah 
1986). "'Where the authority to perform a proposed action rests 
with the discretion of the court, [appellate courts] must allow 
considerable latitude in which he may exercise his judgment.'" Id. 
(quoting Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976)). Teece held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to 
impose sanctions against a plaintiff who did not comply with 
defendant's discovery requests when the record supported its 
finding of justifiable delay. 715 P.2d at 109.39 The record here 
39
 This is not refuted by the holding of Darrington v. Wade, 812 
P. 2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), the inapposite case upon which Ernst 
relies to support its argument that Stangl should have been 
"punished" for his actions. Darrington involved sanctions imposed 
on grossly elusive and uncooperative defendants. See id. at 454-55. 
After entering and setting aside two default judgments, the trial 
court ordered defendants to pay additional costs and attorney's 
fees as a discovery sanction, but refused to reinstate the default 
judgment. Id. at 455. The appellate court found that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to impose harsher 
sanctions. IdL Contrary to Ernst's assertion, the court did not 
state that violations of discovery rules should not go unpunished. 
It merely noted its belief that the particular circumstances of the 
case warranted some kind of Rule 37 discovery sanction. 
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conclusively shows that the trial court carefully considered all of 
the objections Ernst made, evaluated the evidence for possible 
prejudice, and rendered a well thought out decision as to the 
admissibility of each piece of evidence to which there as an 
objection. (See R. 7289-365, 4835-77, 4847-48, 4792-94, 4646-47, 
4636-40, 4421-24, 4363, 4309-17, 2991-98, 2104-24, 2039-49.) 
Prior to the court's decision to bifurcate the trial, Stangl 
introduced his Exhibit 65, showing the cash flow analysis relating 
to the Plaza property project and Stangl;s damages theory. (R. 
3190, 3196.) Ernst objected to the exhibit on the ground that it 
had only recently been provided to Ernst and that it did not apply 
the proper measure of damages under either promissory estoppel or 
breach of contract. (R. 3197-99.) The court heard argument on 
Ernst's objections, but made no determination as to admissibility 
at that time. (R. 3227.) When faced with Ernst's motion to 
bifurcate on February 17, 1993, the court heard argument, deter-
mined it was unclear that either party was at fault and bifurcated 
the trial to give the court an opportunity to rule as to liability 
and Ernst extra time to work out its problems. (R. 7289-365.) In 
the end, it was one full year before the trial reconvened. The 
court never admitted Stangl's Exhibit 6540 and during both phases, 
the court reserved on Ernst's objections until all evidence was in, 
in order to fairly rule as to admissibility. (R. 2125, 2126, 2991-
98, 3227, 4363, 4421-24, 4646-47, 4855, 4857.) The trial court 
obviously took Ernst's objections seriously, considered and weighed 
40
 Ernst offered that exhibit or portions of it as defendant's 
Exhibit 406, which the court did admit. Surely, Ernst does not 
challenge the admissibility of its own exhibit. (R. 4877.) 
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them carefully, and ultimately determined to allow the admission of 
some, but not all of the offered evidence. The trial court has 
discretion to make such judgment calls; it is best positioned to do 
so. Ernst has not shown, nor can it show any evidence supporting 
its contention that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the evidence complained of.41 
Ernst unfairly frames the circumstances surrounding Stangl's 
revised damages calculation as a "trial-by-ambush tactic" intended 
to deprive Ernst of the opportunity to fairly analyze the damages 
aspect of the case. Rather, Stangl's damages calculation revisions 
stemmed from his efforts to eliminate accounting errors in order to 
present the most accurate damages calculation.42 The record 
41
 A review of the exhibits and record pages cited by Ernst to 
support its claim of error shows that claim to be baseless. First, 
Ernst only objected to the following: introduction of evidence 
concerning Stangl's banking relationship with Valley Bank (R. 2991-
98, 4309-17, 4461-63), admission of two canceled checks evidencing 
Stangl's interest payments to Brockbank (R. 2039-83, 4309-17, 4410-
12), the admission of several of Stangl's revised damages calcula-
tion exhibits (R. 4309-17, 4636-40, 4646-47, 4835-907), and 
admission of Stangl's amended tax returns (R. 4835-907). Of the 
evidence objected to, only two of the revised damages calculations 
and the two canceled checks were ultimately admitted into evidence 
and considered by the court (R. 4794, 4835-907, 4365). Ernst's 
citations also show that Stangl's methodology used to calculate his 
damages never changed throughout trial (Exs. 88, 88A, 404). 
Stangl's revised calculations ultimately resulted in a reduced 
claim in Ernst's favor (Ex. 88A) and Ernst was on notice of the 
objected to elements Stangl's damages claims throughout discovery 
(R. 2104-27, 4835-907, see also 4362-64, 4853). In any event, the 
court gave Ernst ample opportunity to show prejudice and carefully 
considered Ernst's objections in making its rulings as to admis-
sion. (R. 4309-18, 4316-17, 4392-94, 4835-907, 2039-83.) 
42
 Stangl's out-of-pocket costs stemmed from numerous complicated 
financial transactions and it was necessary to review a substantial 
number of documents concerning those transactions to accurately 
calculate those costs. (R. 4419, 4309). In preparing for trial 
and briefing, Stangl checked and rechecked the damages calculat-
ions. During trial, Ernst pointed out additional errors, and 
Stangl promptly amended the total damages amount to account for 
(continued...) 
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indicates that the changes resulted not from new methodology as 
stated by Ernst, but rather from the discovery of errors in favor 
of both Stangl and Ernst and information obtained throughout the 
proceedings. (R. 4637, 4609, 4599-4600, 4528-29, 4309-12, Exs. 88, 
88A, 404 (Addenda L, K & M).) 
In any event, Ernst cannot claim prejudice from Stangl's 
efforts to refine his damages calculations. Stangl's promissory 
estoppel damage theory never changed during trial. At all stages 
of discovery and throughout the proceedings, Ernst was free to 
question the witnesses about Stangl's damages and to review any 
applicable documents it desired, including the back-up documents 
for Stangl's exhibits. (R. 2104-24, Plaintiff's Response to 
Objection (attached as Addendum N.) Ernst simply declined to do 
so, or do its own analysis of Stangl's damage claim. Ernst can 
show no evidence that Stangl ever withheld any documentation 
underlying his damage calculation. Stangl should not be punished 
because Ernst failed to ask questions or copy documents concerning 
each specific background element of Stangl's total damages claim. 
Indeed, ultimately the amount submitted benefitted Ernst.43 (Ex. 
42 ( . . .continued) 
those errors and submitted a revised damages summary exhibit. (R. 
4309-12.) Exhibit 88A presents the final revision to those 
calculations, Stangl also provided the court and Ernst with Exhibit 
89 which explained the changes contained in 88A from Exhibit 88 and 
the resulting $100,749.67 reduction in Stangl's damages claim. (R. 
4636, Ex. 89.) These discoveries and the resulting damage 
calculation revisions were conscientious efforts to ensure that the 
trial court and defendant were presented with the most accurate 
calculations available. Stangl's damages were fairly and accur-
ately presented. (R. 4309-12.) 
43
 Stangl's out-of-pocket loss calculations ranged from $534,342.53 
to a final calculation of $407,308.60. (Exs. 65A-C, 88, 88A, 404) . 
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88A.) Stangl's several damage exhibits represent his effort to 
amalgamate his costs into one complete and accurate document. 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in this case. 
Ernst cannot point to anything in the record which establishes that 
Stangl refused to comply with any court order or eluded or refused 
to cooperate in discovery. Instead, the record shows that Stangl 
made conscientious efforts to present the court with the most 
accurate damage analysis possible. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons discussed above, Ernst's appeal 
must be denied, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 1996. 
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CASE NO. 890902771 CN 
This matter was tried to the court sitting without a jury. In 
the midst of trial the court granted defendant's alternative motion 
to bifurcate. As a consequence, only liability issues were tried; 
damage issues were severed, to be tried at a later date if 
necessary. 
Plaintiff's claims arise out of a purported lease by plaintiff 
to defendant of a considerable portion of a shopping center 
development in Salt Lake County referred to as Jordan Valley Plaza 
("Plaza11). Plaintiff's theories of recovery are breach of 
contract, promissory estoppel, breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and equitable compensation. At trial and throughout 
this litigation, defendant challenged the factual and legal bases 
for each of plaintiff's theories. One of its primary defenses was 
the Statute of Frauds. 
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STANGL V. ERNST PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") had an ownership 
interest in the Plaza from approximately 1979 until the fall of 
1981 at which time he transferred his interest to the Brockbanks. 
Stangl, however, remained a guarantor of Brockbanks' obligation to 
the lender. Ultimately the lender's interest was assigned to 
Aetna. In early 1987, Stangl was informed that the Brockbanks had 
defaulted on their loan. In September, 1987, Aetna formally 
notified Stangl of the Brockbanks' default. Aetna, however, never 
made a demand on Stangl as a guarantor of the Brockbank obligation. 
Because Aetna was of the belief that there was little likelihood of 
a deficiency, it initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on the 
property. 
Sometime in the first five months of 1987, defendant Ernst 
Home Center, Inc. ("Ernst"), a Seattle, Washington corporation, 
became aware of the availability of space in the Plaza formerly 
occupied by Gibson Discount, an anchor tenant. As a consequence, 
Ernst contracted for a site feasibility study which was completed 
in May, 1987. Ernst interpreted this study to indicate that an 
Ernst store at the Plaza site would be economically marginal. 
There is no indication that Ernst proceeded any further with the 
site on its own initiative. 
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Armed with the knowledge of Gibson's vacating the property, 
Brockbank's default and bankruptcy, and Aetna's foreclosure, Stangl 
apparently saw a development opportunity. In late May, 1988, a Mr. 
Steve Pruitt, acting on behalf of Stangl, generated a call to Ernst 
probing their interest in leasing the primary site at the Plaza. 
Pruitt's call was forwarded to Mr. Mack DuBose, Ernst's Vice-
President in charge of real estate planning and development. 
DuBose indicated some level of interest and on June 3, 1988, Pruitt 
forwarded to DuBose materials relating to the Plaza. In this June 
3 correspondence, Pruitt erroneously indicated that Aetna would be 
enforcing Stangl's guarantee and that Stangl would have possession 
of the property by the end of June. In the same correspondence, 
however, Pruitt suggested that Stangl would refinance the Plaza 
with Aetna. 
Sometime between June 4 and June 23, 1988, DuBose and two 
other Ernst employees inspected the property with Pruitt. The day 
following this site visit, DuBose and Pruitt met and DuBose 
expressed a desire to proceed. On June 23, 1988 Pruitt sent a 
letter to DuBose outlining some very basic terms including the term 
of the lease and option periods and base and percentage rent. 
Pruitt specifically referenced Stangl's responsibility to provide 
a turnkey building and set a fixturing date of October 1, 1988. 
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Pruitt, however, did not address any of the following issues: 
whether Ernest would be obligated to continuously operate on the 
premises or would have the right to vacate and merely pay the base 
rent; whether and under what conditions Ernst could sublet or 
assign its interest; whether Stangl's failure to meet his 
continuing duties would cause an abatement in rent. 
On June 29, less than a week following Pruitt/s June 23 
letter, Stangl paid Brockbank $1,000.00 for a one month option to 
purchase the Plaza. The option provided for two extensions upon 
the payment of additional consideration. 
In late afternoon on June 29, 1988, DuBose faxed a response to 
Pruitt's June 2 3 proposal. With one exception, DuBose responded to 
each specific item proposed by Pruitt. DuBose specifically 
indicated agreement with Stangl providing a turnkey operation and 
absorbing parking lot resurfacing costs. DuBose also agreed with 
the October 1, 1988 fixturing date and proposed the commencement of 
rent sixty days after the premises were turned over to Ernst for 
fixturing. The one item to which DuBose did not respond was 
entitled "Occupancy Expenses" which included a Pruitt proposal for 
a triple net lease with Ernst paying all occupancy costs including 
insurance. DuBose made no reference to issues involving continuous 
use, subletting and assignment or abatement. DuBose then proceeded 
STANGL V. ERNST PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to indicate that an agreement could be reached. He stated that the 
next step would be to complete a "binding Offer to Lease" and the 
final step was to draft the actual lease which would take three to 
five weeks. 
DuBose's testimony indicates his belief that no legal 
consequences flow from a "binding Offer to Lease." His testimony 
further indicates that the items in a "binding Offer to Lease" were 
matters which were settled and would ultimately be contained in the 
final lease agreement. While the court credits DuBose's testimony 
and belief in this regard, he never communicated to Pruitt or 
Stangl his perceived limitations on the "binding Offer to Lease." 
On July 8, 1988, Stangl applied to the West Jordan City 
Planning Commission for a conditional use permit, a site plan 
review and permission to locate a sign. The application indicates 
that it was for an Ernst store and a hearing date was set for July 
20, 1988. On July 12 DuBose wrote to the City Manager of West 
Jordan indicating Ernst's intent to consummate a lease at the 
Plaza. 
On July 8, 1988 DuBose authored a letter to Stangl and Pruitt. 
Stangl did not receive the letter until the afternoon of July 12. 
In this letter DuBose specified the "terms acceptable to [Ernst] 
relative to the Leasing [sic] of space in the. . . Plaza." He 
further stated that "[t]he lease contemplated by this proposal 
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shall be based on the. . . terms and conditions" specified in the 
letter. While not expressly so described, the proposal in the July 
8 letter was a proposed "binding Offer to Lease" as DuBose had 
previously used that phrase. 
Sometime between Stangl's receipt of the July 8 letter and 
July 14, 1988, Stangl and DuBose had a telephone conversation. 
Stangl claims that during this telephone conversation he and DuBose 
reached an agreement on all significant points and that he 
expressed the agreement in a letter to DuBose dated July 14, 1988. 
DuBose acknowledges that he spoke with Stangl or Pruitt in this 
time period but denies that they reached any oral agreement. There 
is insufficient credible evidence to establish the claimed oral 
agreement preceding the Stangl letter of July 14. Consequently, 
Stangl's July 14 letter at that time constituted a mere 
counteroffer to DuBose's July 8 letter. 
On July 15, 1988, DuBose authored a letter to Stangl which 
Stangl claims constitutes a signed acceptance of the proposal in 
Stangl's letter of July 14. There is insufficient credible 
evidence to establish that the July 15 letter is an acceptance or 
a verification of an acceptance of the proposal in Stangl's July 14 
letter. Instead, the July 15 letter anticipated an "Offer to 
Lease" which was yet to be "completed" and forwarded a form lease 
0 0 2 n 0 -
STANGL V. ERNST PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
for discussion of additional items which would have to be resolved. 
It does appear, however, that DuBose did not have any strong 
objections to the proposal contained in Stangl's July 14 letter. 
DuBose forwarded that letter or an adaptation thereof for approval 
as an "Offer to Lease11 to Ernst's President. In this referral, 
DuBose indicated that construction "must begin by 8/15/88." 
Although there was some indication that Ernst had internally 
placed the project on hold during the latter part of July, Ernst 
did not inform Stangl that the project was in jeopardy or would be 
delayed. All outward appearances were that the project would 
proceed. Throughout the month of July, 1988, Ernst's architects, 
Dykeman, referred written materials and communicated with Stangl's 
employees regarding construction. On July 18, DuBose through his 
secretary referred Ernst's financials to Pruitt requesting discrete 
treatment of the financials. On July 20, Ernst's Director of 
Construction, Rob King, attended a meeting of the West Jordan 
Planning and Zoning Commission. 
Finally, on August 2, 1988 DuBose generated two telephone 
calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had been approved and 
that a letter of intent would be forthcoming. Pruitt testified he 
interpreted this to mean the letter of intent would be the Stangl 
letter of July 14, the last written communication on terms and 
conditions. At least as of the phone conversations between Stangl 
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and DuBose just preceding Stangl's letter of July 14, however, 
Stangl effectively conducted the negotiations on his own behalf and 
Pruitt was on the periphery. The evidence does not support a 
finding that in the August 2 phone conversations DuBose led anyone 
to believe that the July 14 letter, or for that matter the July 8 
letter, would be the operative document, A reasonable inference is 
that DuBose did not have reference to either but merely indicated 
the project would proceed. DuBose then apparently set about 
editing the July 14 letter as a means of preparing the promised 
letter of intent or Offer to Lease. (See Exhibit 22). 
On August 5, 1988 Stangl sent to DuBose the Ernst form lease 
with substantial changes apparently proposed by Stangl's counsel. 
As a consequence, DuBose determined not to forward an Offer to 
Lease and did not further communicate with Stangl until August 23, 
1988. 
Since sometime in June, the parties treated the project as an 
expedited one with delivery of the premises to Ernst for fixturing 
on October 1, 1988. DuBose acknowledged that approximately 60 days 
were needed to complete construction prior to delivery for 
fixturing. DuBose's hesitation between August 5 and August 23 did 
not retard the speed with which other aspects of the project 
proceeded. The Ernst architects continued to refer written 
construction materials to Stangl. On or about August 17, Stangl 
3S?a*r-
STANGL V. ERNST PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
sought bids on the asphalt work. While it appears that Stangl 
committed to acquire the Aetna Trust Deed and note owing by 
Brockbank on July 14, he did not close with the Brockbanks until 
August 9. In light of the August 2 calls from DuBose to Pruitt and 
all that had proceeded before that time, this was a reasonable step 
in furtherance of what DuBose signaled, i.e., that Ernst would be 
the anchor tenant at the Plaza. While DuBose could not have 
anticipated this precise step, he could have and should have 
reasonably anticipated that Stangl would make legal and economic 
commitments in furtherance of the project to accommodate an October 
1 possession date. DuBose himself testified that normally the 
question of risk bearing for pre-lease expenditures is addressed 
during negotiations. That was not the case here. 
Following the August 2 phone calls, it was approximately three 
weeks before DuBose next communicated with Stangl. On August 23, 
1988 he sent to Stangl a copy of a lease which he indicated Ernst 
was prepared to sign. In his testimony, DuBose admitted that this 
commitment was not entirely correct for Ernst was not yet convinced 
the project was economically feasible. DuBose further testified 
that before Ernst would commit to the project a feasibility 
analysis would have to be completed. Ernst did not explain this to 
Stangl. 
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Stangl responded with proposed changes on August 29, 1988, 
Stangl did not anticipate that any of his proposed changes would be 
sufficiently problematic to jeopardize the project. Based on 
previous communications and dealings with DuBose, this conclusion 
was entirely and reasonably justified. 
DuBose responded on September 12, 1988 with a letter 
specifically addressing each of Stangl's proposed changes of August 
29. DuBose stated that several issues were unresolved and there 
was a risk negotiations would terminate absent resolution of the 
significant issues. DuBose then scheduled or confirmed a meeting 
with Stangl in Salt Lake on September 14. This was the first 
indication from Ernst that the project was in jeopardy. 
Just before his trip to Salt Lake, DuBose tendered his 
resignation to Ernst. DuBose and Ellis Kantor, both representing 
Ernst, met with Stangl in Salt Lake on September 14. Contrary to 
the testimony of DuBose and Kantor, they did not inform Stangl that 
DuBose was leaving Ernst. At the meeting there were five primary 
issues to be resolved: abatement of rent; subletting; 
responsibility of providing and paying for insurance; percentage 
rent in the option period; and, whether Ernst could cease 
operations or be required to continuously operate. These open 
issues had not previously risen to the level of significance that 
0 02«ao 
STANGL V, ERNST PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
they acquired for the September 14 meeting. For example, these 
issues were not even mentioned in the July 8 letter from DuBose. 
At the September 14 meeting Stangl indicated his preference on 
the open issues but stated that, if Ernst insisted, each of the 
issues would be resolved in accordance with Ernst's preference. 
Based on the meeting, Stangl reasonably expected to receive from 
Ernst an acceptable lease by September 23. The day following the 
meeting was DuBose's last day with Ernst. On or about that same 
day, Thomas Stanton, Ernst's Senior Vice-President of Operations, 
told Kantor the project was on hold. On September 23, Stangl 
generated a call to Ernst inquiring about the lease. He was then 
informed that DuBose was no longer employed. Both Kantor and 
Stanton further informed Stangl that DuBose's projects were on 
hold. Stanton also alluded to a market study. This was the first 
indication Stangl had of such a study or the need for such a study. 
In a letter of September 29, Stanton formally notified Stangl that 
Ernst would not be a tenant in the Plaza. 
In accordance with the above factual determinations, Ernst and 
Stangl did not enter into a contract whether written or oral. 
There was no acceptance by Ernst of the counteroffer specified in 
Stangl7s July 14 letter. While Ernst's July 15 letter anticipated 
that an "Offer to Lease11 would be completed, the parties did not 
complete an offer to lease. 
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Beginning with its June 2 9 letter, however, Ernst set the 
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable lessor should 
reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by a mutually acceptable "Offer 
to Lease" containing the significant business points. Even though 
Ernst's form of an "Offer to Lease" expressly contemplated a 
subsequent, written lease, its language and conduct indicated that 
the subsequent lease would resolve only the less significant 
matters not addressed in the "Offer to Lease." Furthermore, it was 
reasonable to conclude that any items not raised in Ernst's June 29 
or July 8 letters were not significant. Ernst should have 
reasonably anticipated that Stangl would draw these same 
conclusions. 
It was not unreasonable for Stangl to believe that the project 
would proceed following DuBose's phone calls of August 2. Those 
phone calls suggest at that time DuBose attributed no particular 
significance to the differences between his letter of July 8 and 
Stangl's letter of July 14. 
With DuBose's promises and representations of August 2 in 
hand, it was reasonable for Stangl to make commitments, incur 
obligations and proceed with the project in order to deliver 
i\ A f. ^ J .« 
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possession as close to October 1 as possible. DuBose should have 
expected Stangl to undertake such actions following his oral 
commitments of August 2 and before a formal lease was executed. 
In addressing the issue of reliance and part performance, the 
parties at trial focused on mid-July as the beginning point of 
Stangl's financial commitments. This Memorandum Decision, however, 
resolves that August 2 should be the beginning point for analysis 
of commitments. It is significant that important steps in Stangl's 
acquisition of the Plaza occurred both before and after the August 
2 promises. For these reasons the court has now chosen to defer 
ruling on precisely which of Stangl's actions were induced by the 
August 2 promises. 
Having resolved that no contract was formed, this court need 
not address the bulk of the issues arising out of the Statute of 
Frauds.1 The court previously resolved that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel may be invoked to bar the application of the 
Statute of Frauds. Medesco Inc. v. LNS International, Inc., 7 62 F. 
Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991) . In this case promissory estoppel either 
subsumes or is the substantial equivalent of equitable 
^ t is appropriate, however, merely to note that upon further 
consideration, the court now acknowledges the first paragraph of 
its February 10, 1993 Minute Entry is an erroneous application of 
Utah Code Ann., Section 25-5-4(1). 
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compensation, the only other of plaintiff's theories not dependent 
on a contract. Consequently, the remaining issues to be addressed 
when the trial resumes include the following: (1) the actions taken 
or completed by Stangl after August 2; (2) whether such actions 
were induced by Ernst; and, (3) the appropriate remedy. 
The court assumes that this Memorandum Decision constitutes 
compliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The party 
prevailing on any issue, however, is free to submit further 
proposed findings consistent with this Memorandum Decision which he 
or it deem necessary. Counsel should further feel free to schedule 
a telephone or other conference with the court to discuss the 
nature and timing of further proceedings. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an 
individual, dba F.C. STANGL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., ) Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
a Washington corporation, ) 
) (Hon. Michael Murphy) 
Defendant. ) 
This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") 
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") had 
breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at the 
Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had detrimentally 
relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst and that he was 
entitled to recover damages based upon a theory of promissory 
estoppel. Liability issues were tried before the Court, without 
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jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to February 19, 1993. 
In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20, 1994, the Court ruled 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish a contract, but 
that Ernst may be liable to Stangl under the theory of promissory 
estoppel. The Memorandum Decision is attached to these Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit "A" and are 
incorporated herein by reference. The remaining issues were 
tried before the Court from February 22, 1994 to February 24, 
1994. 
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl, 
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T. Hard. 
Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by Roger J. 
Kindley. Ernst was also represented by David A. Greenwood and 
Patrick J. O'Hara during the first phase and by Elizabeth Dolan 
Winter during the second phase. 
Having examined the admissible evidence presented at 
both phases of trial and having heard the arguments of counsel, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") has been in 




2. Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") is a 
Washington corporation in the business of retail sales of home-
improvement materials, tools, plant nursery items, and other 
consumer products and services. 
3. This lawsuit concerns the Jordan Valley Plaza 
("Plaza") located at 9000 South Redwood Road, West Valley City, 
Utah. 
4. From sometime in 1979 through the fall of 1981, 
Stangl had an ownership interest in the Plaza at which time his 
interest in the Plaza was transferred to the Brockbanks with the 
exception of two small contiguous parcels of land which Stangl 
retained to develop. The Brockbanks assumed the indebtedness 
secured by the Plaza. Stangl remained a guarantor of Brockbanks1 
obligation to the lender. The lender's interest was subsequently 
assigned to Aetna. 
5. In September 1987, Aetna formally notified Stangl 
that the Brockbanks had defaulted on the loan secured by the 
Plaza. Aetna, however, never made a demand for payment on Stangl 
as a guarantor of the Brockbanks1 obligation. 
6. Both Aetna and Stangl believed that the value of 
the Plaza would exceed the value of the amounts due on the loan, 
i.e. that there would be no deficiency for which Stangl would be 
liable. Accordingly, Aetna initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure 
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of the property. The Brockbanks then filed for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
7. In the first five months of 1987, Ernst had become 
aware of the availability of space in the Plaza which had 
formerly been occupied by Gibson Discount, an anchor tenant. As 
a consequence, Ernst caused a site feasibility study to be 
completed in May, 1987. At that time, Ernst interpreted this 
study to indicate that an Ernst store at the site would be 
economically marginal. 
8. Given the Brockbanks1 default and bankruptcy, and 
Aetna's anticipated foreclosure of the Plaza, Stangl saw a 
business opportunity with respect to the property. In late May, 
1988, Mr. Steve Pruitt, acting on behalf of Stangl, generated a 
call to Ernst to determine whether it had any interest in leasing 
the anchor space at the Plaza. 
9. Pruitt's call was forwarded to Mr. Mack DuBose, 
Ernst's Vice-President in charge of real estate planning and 
development. DuBose indicated that Ernst had some interest in 
the property as a site for an Ernst store. 
10. On June 3, 1988, Pruitt forwarded to DuBose 
documents relating to the Plaza. In his June 3, 1988 letter, 
Pruitt erroneously indicated that Aetna would be enforcing 
Stangl's guarantee and that Stangl would have possession of the 
property by the end of June. In the same correspondence, 
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however, Pruitt also suggested that Stangl would refinance the 
Plaza with Aetna. 
11. Between June 4 and June 23, 1988, DuBose and two 
other Ernst employees met with Pruitt and inspected the anchor 
space in particular and the Plaza generally. The day following 
the site visit, DuBose and Pruitt met. During this meeting, 
DuBose expressed a desire to proceed further with negotiations 
whereby Ernst would lease the anchor tenant site at the Plaza. 
12. On June 23, 1988, Pruitt sent a letter to DuBose 
outlining some very basic terms of a proposed lease including the 
initial period of the lease, option periods, base rent and 
percentage rent. Pruitt's letter specifically referenced 
requests by Ernst that Stangl be able to provide a turnkey 
building to Ernst which would be ready for installment of 
fixtures by October 1, 1988. 
13. There were a number of matters that were not 
addressed in Pruitt!s June 23, 1988 letter, including: whether 
Ernst would be obligated to continuously operate on the premises 
or would it have the right to vacate and merely pay the base 
rent; whether and under what conditions Ernst could sublet or 
assign its interest; and whether Stangl1s failure to meet his 
continuing duties would cause an abatement of rent. 
14. On June 29, 1988, Stangl took steps to obtain the 
right but not the obligation to acquire the Plaza if Ernst 
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expressed further interest in entering into a lease. On that 
date, Stangl executed an Option agreement with the Brockbanks and 
paid the Brockbanks $1,000.00. The Option had an exercise price 
of $1,150,000. The Option also required the Brockbanks to: (1) 
require the Bankruptcy Court to release the property; (2) cure 
all defects in title to the property; and (3) convey the property 
by warranty deed. 
15. Also on June 29-, 1988, Stangl instructed his 
counsel to offer to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust deed 
on the Brockbank property. Stanglfs initial offer to purchase 
Aetna's interest in the trust deed was rejected. On July 1, 
1988, Stangl offered to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust 
deed for $900,000.00. The offer was subject to title to the 
property satisfactory to Stangl and bankruptcy court approval. 
This offer was accepted by Aetna on July 14, 1988. 
16. Stangl had no need or desire to acquire the Plaza 
property unless Ernst would lease the anchor space. If Stangl 
had wanted to acquire the property for his own account or for 
speculative purposes, he would have waited to acquire the Plaza 
at the foreclosure of the trust deed. The reason that Stangl 
acquired an option to purchase the Plaza from the Brockbanks and 
simultaneously made an offer to purchase the trust deed from 
Aetna was to facilitate the speedy acquisition of the property to 
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enable Stangl to meet Ernst's intended fixturing date of October 
1, 1988. 
17. In late afternoon on June 29, 1988, DuBose faxed a 
response to Pruitt's June 23 letter. With one exception, DuBose 
responded to each specific item proposed by Pruitt. DuBose 
specifically agreed that Stangl should provide a turnkey 
operation with the October 1, 1988 fixturing date. DuBose also 
indicated that Stangl should absorb parking lot resurfacing costs 
and proposed the commencement of rent sixty days after the 
premises were turned over to Ernst for fixturing. The one item 
to which DuBose did not respond was entitled "Occupancy Expenses" 
which included a Pruitt proposal for a triple net lease with 
Ernst paying all occupancy costs including insurance. DuBose 
made no reference to issues involving continuous use, subletting 
and assignment or abatement. 
18. DuBose indicated that an agreement could be 
reached with Stangl regarding the terms of the lease. He stated 
that the next step would be to complete a "binding Offer to 
Lease" and the final step was to draft the actual lease which 
would take three to five weeks. 
19. Although at trial DuBose testified that he 
believed there were no legal consequences which would flow from a 
"binding Offer to Lease" and that items in such a document would 
ultimately be contained in the final lease agreement, DuBose 
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never communicated to Pruitt or to Stangl his perceived 
limitations on the "binding Offer to Lease." 
20. On July 12, 1988, Stangl received a letter from 
DuBose dated July 8, 1988 wherein DuBose specified the "terms 
acceptable to [Ernst] relative to the Leasing [sic] of space in 
the Plaza." He further stated that "[t]he lease contemplated by 
this proposal shall be based on the . . . terms and conditions" 
specified in the letter. While not expressly so described, the 
proposal in the July 8 letter was a proposed "binding Offer to 
Lease" as DuBose had previously used that phrase. 
21. Shortly after Stangl's receipt of the July 8 
letter, Stangl and DuBose had a telephone conversation. Stangl 
claims that during the conversation he and DuBose reached 
agreement on all significant lease points and that he expressed 
that agreement in a letter to DuBose dated July 14, 1988. There 
is insufficient credible evidence to establish the claimed oral 
agreement preceding the July 14 letter. Consequently, Stangl's 
July 14 letter at that time constituted a mere counteroffer to 
DuBose's July 8 letter. 
22. On July 15, 1988, DuBose authored a letter to 
Stangl which Stangl claims constitutes a signed acceptance of the 
proposal in Stanglfs letter of July 14. There is insufficient 
credible evidence to establish that the July 15 letter is an 
acceptance or a verification of an acceptance of the proposal in 
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Stangl's July 14 letter. Instead, the July 15 letter anticipated 
an "Offer to Lease" which was yet to be "completed." That letter 
contained a form lease for discussion of additional items which 
would have to be resolved. DuBose, however, did not have any 
strong objections to the proposal contained in Stangl's July 14 
letter. DuBose forwarded that letter or an adaptation thereof 
for approval as an "Offer to Lease" to Ernst's President. In the 
submission to Ernst's president, DuBose indicated that 
construction "must begin by 8/15/88." 
23. On or about July 16, 1988, Stangl took steps to 
obtain financing from Valley Bank and Trust for the acquisition 
of the Plaza, for construction of improvements requested by 
Ernst, and for development of other portions of the Plaza. Among 
other things, Stangl sought approximately $1.1 million to acquire 
the Plaza; $655,000 to remodel the anchor site for Ernst; and 
$131,000 to remodel other shop space at the Plaza. He also 
proposed rolling into the new loan package two loans previously 
approved by Valley Bank for development of the two properties 
adjacent to the Plaza which Stangl owned. To improve the overall 
security for the loan package, Stangl's two adjacent properties, 
both of which had tenants committed for leases on buildings which 
Stangl would build, would also act as collateral for the other 
Plaza-related indebtedness. Stangl's loan request was approved 
by Valley Bank on or about July 19, 1988. 
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24. The loan agreement with Valley Bank was closed on 
July 28, 1988. No funds were disbursed at that time, and the 
Loan Agreement did not provide for disbursement of funds until 
Stangl acquired title to the Plaza. 
25. Although there was some indication that Ernst had 
internally placed the project on hold during the latter part of 
July, Ernst did not inform Stangl that the project was in 
jeopardy or would be delayed. All outward appearances were that 
the project would proceed. Throughout the month of July, 1988, 
Ernst's architects (Dykeman and Associates) referred written 
materials and communicated with Stanglfs employees regarding 
construction. On July 8, 1988, Stangl had applied to the West 
Jordan City Planning Commission for a conditional use permit, a 
site plan review and permission to locate a sign. The 
application indicated that it was for an Ernst store and a 
hearing date was set for July 20, 1988. On July 12, 1988, DuBose 
wrote to the City Manager of West Jordan indicating Ernst's 
intent to consummate a lease at the Plaza. On July 18, DuBose, 
through his secretary, referred Ernst's financial statements to 
Pruitt requesting discrete treatment of the financials. On July 
20, Ernst's Director of Construction, Rob King, attended a 
meeting of the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission to 
explain Ernst's intentions with respect to the Plaza. 
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26. On August 2, 1988, DuBose generated two telephone 
calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had been approved by 
Ernst's management and that a letter of intent would be 
forthcoming. 
27. The evidence does not support a finding that in 
the August 2 phone conversations DuBose led anyone to believe 
that the July 14 letter, or for that matter the July 8 letter, 
would be the operative document. A reasonable inference is that 
DuBose did not have reference to either but merely indicated that 
the project would proceed. DuBose then apparently set about 
editing the July 14 letter as a means of preparing the promised 
letter of intent or Offer to Lease. 
28. On August 5, 1988 Stangl sent to DuBose the Ernst 
form lease with substantial changes apparently proposed by 
Stangl1s counsel. As a consequence, DuBose determined not to 
forward an Offer to Lease and did not further communicate with 
Stangl until August 23, 1988. 
29. On August 9, 1988, Stangl closed on the purchase 
of the Plaza property from the Brockbanks. In light of the 
August 2 calls from DuBose to Pruitt and all that had proceeded 
before that time, this was a reasonable step in furtherance of 
what DuBose had signaled and represented, i.e., that Ernst would 
be the anchor tenant at the Plaza. While DuBose could not have 
anticipated this precise step, he could have and should have 
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reasonably anticipated that Stangl would make legal and economic 
commitments in furtherance of the project to accommodate an 
October 1 possession date. DuBose himself testified that 
normally the question of risk bearing for pre-lease expenditures 
is addressed during negotiations. That was not the case here. 
30. In order to close on the purchase of the Plaza, 
Stangl waived certain conditions contained in the Option 
agreement and the offer to purchase the trust deed from Aetna. 
More specifically, the Brockbanks had several tax liens on the 
property and thus could not deliver satisfactory title or a 
warranty deed to Stangl. Based on the assurances from Ernst that 
a lease would be entered into, Stangl agreed to pay additional 
amounts to pay off the tax liens. Had Stangl known that Ernst 
would not lease the anchor space at the Plaza, he could have 
declined to purchase the Plaza property and the Aetna trust deed, 
and he could have aborted the financing package obtained from 
Valley Bank. 
31. As indicated above, since sometime in June, the 
parties treated the project as an expedited one with delivery of 
the premises to Ernst for fixturing on October 1, 1988. DuBose 
acknowledged that approximately sixty days were needed to 
complete construction prior to delivery for fixturing. 
32. Following the August 2 phone calls, it was 
approximately three weeks before DuBose next communicated with 
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Stangl. On August 23, 1988 he sent to Stangl a copy of a lease 
which he indicated Ernst was prepared to sign. In his testimony, 
DuBose admitted that this commitment was not entirely correct for 
Ernst was not yet convinced the project was economically 
feasible, DuBose further testified that before Ernst would 
commit to the project, a feasibility analysis would have to be 
completed. Ernst did not ever explain this to Stangl. Had 
Stangl known that Ernstfs leasing of the anchor space was 
contingent upon an economic feasibility study, he would not have 
acquired the Plaza. 
33. DuBose!s hesitation between August 5 and August 23 
in finalizing lease terms did not retard the speed with which 
other aspects of the project proceeded. The Ernst architects 
continued to refer written construction materials to Stangl. On 
or about August 17, Stangl sought bids on the asphalt work in 
accordance with specifications received from Ernst on August 12, 
1988. 
34. On August 29, 1988, Stangl responded to DuBose's 
August 23 letter with proposed changes. Stangl did not 
anticipate that any of his proposed changes would be sufficiently 
problematic to jeopardize the project. Based on previous 
communications and dealings with DuBose, this conclusion was 
entirely and reasonably justified. 
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35. DuBose responded on September 12, 1988, with a 
letter specifically addressing each of Stangl!s proposed changes 
of August 29. DuBose stated that several issues were unresolved 
and there was a risk negotiations would terminate absent 
resolution of the significant issues. DuBose then scheduled or 
confirmed a meeting with Stangl in Salt Lake City on September 
14. This was the first indication from Ernst that the project 
was in jeopardy. 
36. Just before his trip to Salt Lake City, DuBose 
tendered his resignation to Ernst. Nevertheless, DuBose and 
Ellis Kantor, both representing Ernst, met with Stangl in Salt 
Lake City on September 14. Contrary to the testimony of DuBose 
and Kantor, they did not inform Stangl that DuBose was leaving 
Ernst. 
37. At this September 14 meeting there were five 
primary matters to be resolved: abatement of rent; subletting; 
responsibility of providing and paying for insurance; percentage 
rent in the option period; and, whether Ernst could cease 
operations or be required to continuously operate. These open 
issues had not previously risen to the level of significance that 
they acquired for the September 14 meeting. 
38. At the September 14 meeting Stangl indicated his 
preference on these five issues but stated that, if Ernst 
insisted, each of the issues would be resolved in accordance with 
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Ernst's preference. Based on the meeting, Stangl reasonably 
expected to receive from Ernst an acceptable lease by September 
23. 
39. The day following the Salt Lake City meeting was 
DuBose's last day with Ernst. On or about that same day, Thomas 
Stanton, Ernst's Senior Vice-President of Operations, told Kantor 
the Jordan Valley Plaza project was on hold. 
40. On September 23, Stangl generated a call to Ernst 
inquiring about the lease. He was then informed that DuBose was 
no longer employed by Ernst. Both Kantor and Stanton further 
informed Stangl that DuBose's projects were on hold. Stanton 
also alluded to an economic study. This was the first indication 
Stangl had of Ernst's need for such a study before leasing the 
anchor space at the Plaza. 
41. In a letter dated September 29, 1988, Stanton 
formally notified Stangl that Ernst would not be a tenant in the 
Plaza. 
42. Upon receipt of that letter, Stangl found himself 
in a position whereby he had purchased the Plaza, taken out 
substantial loans to purchase that property, had pledged his 
properties and leases adjacent to the Plaza, and had begun 
construction consistent with Ernst's stated desires. 
43. At that point, Stangl could have chosen to stop 
further activity with respect to the refurbishment of the Plaza, 
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or he could continue to improve the Plaza in the hopes that Ernst 
would become a tenant, that it would be attractive to another 
anchor tenant or that it would interest a potential purchaser. 
Stangl, with Valley Bank's agreement, continued to renovate the 
Plaza. This was a reasonable course of action because, among 
other things, the Brockbanks had been unable to sell the property 
for several years given its deteriorating condition, there were 
two new shopping centers established in the near vicinity with 
which the Plaza had to compete for new tenants, and Stangl had 
pledged his other properties and leases as security for the loan 
to acquire the Plaza. 
44. Stangl spent over $2.2 million in purchasing and 
renovating the Plaza. Stangl engaged in substantial and 
reasonable efforts to find a new anchor tenant or to find a 
purchaser for the Plaza. 
45. On March 8, 1991, Stangl was finally able to sell 
the Plaza and the two adjacent properties which he owned (upon 
which a Firestone store and emissions inspection store were built 
and leased) to Green Isle Development Corp. 
46. The Court determines that Stangl is entitled to 
recover his out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the acquisition 
and refurbishment of the Plaza less rental income he received 
from other tenants and less amounts allocable to the Plaza when 
it and Stangl's two other properties (upon which a Jiffy Lube 
28248.1 1 6 
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store and a Firestone store had been built and leased) were sold 
to Green Isle. 
47. Except for certain adjustments described below, 
Plaintifffs Exhibit 88A, fairly and appropriately sets forth 
Stanglfs damages. 
48. Stangl!s damages, based upon his reasonable 
reliance upon Ernst's representations that it would enter into a 
lease to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza, are $331,391.00. 
That amount is determined from plaintiff's Exhibit 88A showing 
damages of $407,309, less the following deductions: 
(a) $27,851 for escrow adjustments which were counted 
twice in the calculation of damages; 
(b) $433 in legal fees which were incurred prior to 
reliance upon Ernst's representations; 
(c) $7,404 in loan origination fees which were 
incurred prior to August 2, 1988; 
(d) $40,230 which represents selling costs for 
properties other than the Plaza. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Ernst and Stangl did not enter into a contract 
whether written or oral. There was no acceptance by Ernst of the 
counteroffer specified in Stangl's July 14 letter. While Ernst's 
July 15 letter anticipated that an "Offer to Lease" would be 
completed, the parties did not complete an offer to lease. 
28248.1 17 
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2. Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set the 
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable lessor should 
reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by a mutually acceptable 
"Offer to Lease" containing the significant business points. 
Even though Ernst's form of an "Offer to Lease" expressly 
contemplated a subsequent, written lease, Ernst's language and 
conduct indicated that the subsequent lease would resolve only 
the less significant matters not addressed in the "Offer to 
Lease." Furthermore, it was reasonable to conclude that any 
items not raised in Ernst's June 29 or July 8 letters were not 
significant. Ernst should have reasonably anticipated that 
Stangl would draw these same conclusions. There is no reason to 
believe that Stangl and Ernst would not have reached agreement on 
all lease points. 
3. It was not unreasonable for Stangl to believe that 
the project would proceed following DuBose's phone calls of 
August 2. Those phone calls suggest at that time DuBose 
attributed no particular significance to the differences between 
his letter of July 8 and Stangl's letter of July 14. 
4. Ernst through its words and conduct represented to 
Stangl that it would enter into an agreement with Stangl to lease 
the anchor space at the Plaza with remodeling to be done and 
possession to be taken on a "fast track" basis. 
2 8 2 4 8 . 1 18 
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5. With DuBose's promises and representations through 
August 2 in hand, it was reasonable for Stangl to make 
commitments, incur obligations and proceed with the project by 
acquiring and renovating the property in order to deliver 
possession as close to October 1 as possible. DuBose should have 
expected Stangl to undertake such actions following his oral 
commitments of August 2 and before a formal lease was executed. 
6. Stangl reasonably relied upon such representations 
to his detriment, and took definite and substantial actions in 
reliance upon those representations. Most significantly, he 
acquired the Plaza which he had no reason to do, he incurred over 
$1.1 million in debt which he otherwise would not have incurred, 
and he pledged other assets to secure that note which he 
otherwise would not have encumbered. 
7. Stangl had no obligation to purchase the Plaza 
property from the Brockbanks, acquire the trust deed from Aetna, 
or have the July 19, 1988 loan package funded by Valley Bank, 
prior to date of the actual closing of the purchase of the 
property on August 9, 1988. 
8. Ernst should have reasonably expected that its 
representations would induce Stangl to take dramatic action or 
forbearance in order to meet the "fast track" possession date. 
9. After learning that Ernst did not intend to enter 
into a lease, Stangl reasonably and in good faith expended funds 
28248.1 19 
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to complete renovation of the property in order to entice Ernst 
to lease the property, attract a new anchor tenant, or find a new 
purchaser of the property. 
10. Injustice can only be avoided in this case by 
enforcing Ernst's promise to lease the anchor space under 
promissory estoppel. 
11. Under the theory of promissory estoppel, this 
Court has authority to do "what justice requires" and award 
damages ranging from out-of-pocket costs to full contract 
damages. This Court determines that justice does not require 
that Stangl receive contract damages, i.e. the minimum amount to 
which Ernst had agreed to pay as rent for the term of the lease. 
This Court determines that justice requires that Ernst pay Stangl 
his out-of-pocket costs of $331,391.00. 
12. Stangl is the prevailing party in this action and 
is awarded his costs. 
28248.1 20 
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the C7\ J day of December, 1994, a true and correct 
copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
hand-delivered to the following: 
Elizabeth D. Winter 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
and mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following: 
Roger J. Kindley 
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3400 






Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766) 
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359) 
Steven R. McCowin, Esq. (4621) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
FJIS8 5S8W.G* SOUST 
Third Judical Oiswict 
DEC 2 7 » 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By — -—L—' 0«iw«y c l e r * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
F. C. STANGL, III, an 








Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Honorable Michael Murphy 
Va-3C~H-%G9;c^-^ 
This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") 
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") 
had breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at 
the Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had 
detrimentally relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst 
and that he was entitled to recover damages based upon a theory 
of promissory estoppel. Liability issues were tried before the 
Court, without jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to 
February 19, 1993. In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20, 
199\63320 1 
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1994, the Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish a contract, but that Ernst may be liable to Stangl 
under the theory of promissory estoppel. The Memorandum 
Decision is attached to the Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law as Exhibit "A" and are incorporated therein by 
reference. The remaining issues were tried before the Court 
from February 22, 1994 to February 24, 1994. 
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl, 
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T. 
Hard. Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by 
Roger J. Kindley. Ernst was also represented by David A. 
Greenwood and Patrick J. O'Hara during the first phase and by 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter during the second phase. Having entered 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Judgment is entered in favor of Stangl ^a^^^S^Li115^ 
Ernst in the amount of $331,391.00. 
I:%,.A-^A. 
Honorable Michael 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
^T>WVv(-^K^ 
io -(VOW* 199\63320 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the day of December, 1994, a true and correct 
copy of the proposed JUDGMENT was mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Elizabeth Dolan Winter 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Roger J. Kindley 
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3400 
Seattle, Washington 98101-3034 
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON 
170 S. Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




Thu i» o legally binding form if not undtrUood t««k competent advice 
O P T I O N 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THCSE PRESENTS 
T h a l JOROAN VALLEY ASSOCIATES and/or ROCER R BROCKBANK 
o( S a l t Lake C i t y UT hereinafter referred to as Seller hereby agrees for end In con 
sideratlon of ONE THOUSAND ANO M O / i O O ( i 1 , 0 0 0 0 0 , DoUars. 
paid by F C S t a n q l I I I , a r e a l e s t a t e broker buy ing for h i s own a c c o u n t 
0f S a l t Lake C i t y , UT hereinafter referred to as Buyer as follows M/ ^ 
I PROPERTY Seller hereby gives and grants to Buyer and to his heirs and assigns for a period o f ^ / months'from 
the date hereof hereinafter referred to as First Option Period the exclusive right and privilege of purchasing the follow. 
ing described real property located at H 5 5 W 9 0 t h S (SW C o r n e r R e d w o o d R d / 9 0 t h S . J 
County of 
S a l t Lake State of U t a h
 an(j more particularly described 
as follows 
318,507 square feet of land (approximately 7 3 acres) 
and 62,800 square feet of buildings. 
The Jordan Valley Shopping Center tn West Jordan, Utah. 
Together with ail water rights appurtenant thereto or used In connection therewith /C^t^T 
(Said r e a ^ r o p e ^ a n d Improvements if any shall hereinafter f g r f t r ^ o ^ T f c f f i p ^ ) ^ $ $ Q > Q Q 0 Q Q * 
2 PRICE The total purchase price for said property is t h e e x i , s t , n g debt , . _ _ ^ J-ffOte.. e? i ^ ' o o p r ^ " ' 
($ 1 , 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 O Q t ^ u ^ ) p a y a b l € l n U w f u i money of the United States strictly within the following times to-VrlL xfr ! 
sums paid for this option and any extension thereof as herein provided shall be first applied on the purchase price tnd the ' 
balance shall be paid a* follows ( 1 . ) Buyer w i l l assume and e x t i n g u i s h t h e fcjlrst mortgage 
and accrued i n t e r e s t and g i v e S e l l e r an u n s e c u r e d ( 2 . ) Note foi / f$206,OOO.00 / fa} 
payab le as f o l l o w s Ten year term a t 8% i n t e r e s t p a y a b l e a t $H~33^r6j /month 
w i t h a b a l l o o n p r i n c i p a l payment of $200,-000 00 a l l due a t the1 en\3' oT t h e 10th 
year T h i s Note w i l l be p e r s o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d by F C. S t a n g l I I I . ( 3 . ) 
$ 5 0 , 0 0 0 00 c a s h , p a y a b l e - $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 o p t i o n f e e and a d d i t i o n a l $ 4 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p a y a b l e on c l o s i n g 
3 EXTENSION OF OPTION Upon payment by Buyer to Seller of an additional sum of TWEJNXX..^URJHQU£ANC 
ANP VQ/lQQ--r-zr„--?z-zzr^z.zzzzzzz-z.--.----z- <* 24,QQQ J)S)„ ) Dollars. cas^r'lJywtttf'f 
check prior to the expiration of the first option period this option shall be extended for ^ _ . 1 Z - T L C months, herein* 
•fter referred to as Second Option Period* Upon Buyers payment to Seller of a further sum of TWENTY -J^JjjS. 
THOUSAND AND N O / 1 0 0 - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . , 2 5 , 0 0 0 ^ 0 0 , r ^ , u r ^ o r / 1 0 ^ ? t J r p l r m . 
tion of the second option period this option shall b* extended for a third period of |J* 1 .jL Additional months, 
hereinafter referred to as Third Option Period" 
4 EXERCISE OF OPTION This option shall be exercised by written notice to Seller on or before the expiration of 
the first option period or If extended the expiration of the second or third option periods as the case may bt Notice to 
exercise this option or to extend the option for a second or third option period whether personally delivered or mailed to 
Seller at his address as indicated after Seller's signature hereto by registered or certified mail postage prepaid, and post-
marked on or before such date of expiration shall be timely and shall be deemed actual notice to Seller S e l l e r s h a l l 
r e q u i r e the Bankruptcy Court t o r e l e a s e t h i s p r o p e r t y and t e r m i n a t e t h e bank-
5 EVIDENCE OF TITLE r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e f i n a l c l o s i n g o f 
t h i s s a l e . 
(a) Promptly after the execution of this option Seller shall deliver to Buyer for examination such abstracts of title?. 
title policies and other evidences of title as the Seller may have In the event this option is not exercised by Buyer, all 
such evidences of title shall be Immediately returned without expense to Seller 
(b) In the event tht* option Is exercised as herein provided Seller agrees to pay all abstracting expense or at Seller's 
option to furnish a polk) of title Insurance In the name of the Buyer 
(c) (f an examination of the title should reveal defects tn the title Buyer shall notify Seller ln writing thereof, 
and Seller agrees to forthwith take all reasonable action to clear the title If the Seller does not clear title within a reason-
able time Buyer may do so at Sellers expense Seller agrees to ma«ce final conveyance by Warranty Deed or ~~~~ZJZZ 
a s d i r e c t e d j n t n t €Vent of sale of other than real property If either party falls to perform 
the provisions of this agreement the party at fault agrees to pay all costs of enforcing this agreement, or any right arising 
out of the breach thereof Including a reasonable Attorney s fee 
S001001? 
6. CLOSING ADJUSTMENTS. All risk of loss and destruction of property and expenses of Insurance shall be borne by 
Seller until date of possession. At time of closing of tale, property taxes, rents. Insurance. Interest and other expenses of 
property shall be prorated as of date of possession. All other taxes. Including documentary taxes, and all assessments, 
mortgage Hens and other liens, encumbrances or charges against the property of any nature, shall be paid by Seller except 
a 3 s e t f o r t h i n P a r a g r a p h 2 o f t h i s o p t i o n . 
7. POSSESSION. Seller agrees to surrender possession of the property on or before . 
written notice of the exercising of this option by Ouyer. 
, days following 
8. The Seller recognizes £..\£..v....5M??.9.l Real Estate Company 
(Broker and Agent) through lu salesman . .None .. ........
 n 
as the Real EsUte Broker with whom Seller listed this property for sale, and Seller agrees to pay a commission to said 
Broker of .....Q f of the gross sale price. Seller hereby authorizes the agent to withhold such cornmUalon from the 
proceeds of sale at time of closing. 
9. if this option be not exercised on or before the dates specified herein for exercise of same, the option shall trplr* 
of Ita own force and effect and the Seller may retain such option monies as have been paid to the Seller as full consideration 
for the granting of this option. • 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller hereunto has set his name this ^2..?itk.. . day of M.J&Wm^ 
SICNED IN PRESENCE OF: 
Seller 
Address of Seller: , 
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KlM«AU-» * * * * . ClHDCKCTT * W A O O O O P S 
cnximm 
^ B * 2», 139% 
s a l t * 8oo 
»«*c ! * * • c i t y , Utah 9412* 
<s«ati 
"'^•awtandiaa that TV™l'i«««uL F . c . s taag i rrr T - , 
-^
 LLmuL
 Coapany, * Utah r 7ti' ***or o* Utah 
" • T S £ . £ T * * f* a « t va* •MmimZSltFLj? **• o f f i c i a l 
~ * «« **g« 1M0 o f tba o f f l c i a l r a c o r ^ f 7 «<*««« l a 
S0O13373 
KIMBALL. PAHW, CAOCKCTT 4 WAOOOUPS 
Aatna Lif a Inauranca Coapany 
JUna 29, 1988 
Paga 2 
This of far will remain opan until 12:00 noon, Mountain 
Daylight Tiaa, July 1, 1988, on which data tha saaa will axplre 
unlaaa accaptad* Wa loolc forward to your rasponsa* 
Sincaraly, 
KZMBALLf PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
oiLa.'^L 
ccz F. c. Stangl IZZ 
Victor A. Taylor 
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Exhibit F 
F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO. 
4435SOOTH 700 EAST • SUfTEM • SALT t>KEOTY. UTAH 841070088 • PHONE(801)282-0381 
SPECIALISTS IN COUuefiCJAL ANO INDUSTRIAL PLANNING ANO 0£VCLOP*ieNT 
July 1, 1988 
AIRBORNE EXPRESS 
(ALSO SENT PAXT~ 
Mr. Larry Konefal 
c/o AETNA REALTY INVESTORS, INC. 
City Placa 
Hartford, CT 06156 
Re: Broclcbank Loan 
Dear Mr. Konefal: 
It is oy understanding that Aetna Lifa Insurance 
Company, a Connecticut Corporation ("Aetna") is tha sole 
holder of tha beneficial interest under that certain Deed of 
Trust, dated September 3. 1381, executed by Bruce R. Brocicbanlc 
and Jeanne- 0. Brocicbanlc, husband and wife, and Roger R. 
Brocicbanlc and Lada A. Brocicbanlc, husband and wife, collectively 
as trustors, in favor of Utah Title and Abstract Company, a 
Utah Corporation, as trustee-, and Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation, a Otab Corporation ("Western Mortgage"), as 
beneficiary, and recorded oa September 4, 1981 as Entry 
No.3601828 in Book 5289 at Page 254 of tha official records. 
(Said Deed of Trust was assigned to Aetna pursuant to a 
certain Assignment of Security Investments, dated July 22, 
1987, executed by Western Mortgage, as assignor, in favor of 
Aetna, as assignee, and recorded on July 23, 1987 as Entry 
No. 4496632 in Book 5944 at Page 1680 of tha official records.) 
This latter constitutes my (T.C. Stangl XXX**9) offer 
to purchase- said beneficial interest for tha sum of $900,000.00 
(NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND AID NO/100) cash, payable Srithin ten 
(10) days after this gffer is accepted, subject to confirmation 
of title* satisfactory to me> and to receipt of Banlcrupty 
Court approval, if necessary. 
This offer will remain open until 12:00 noon. Mountain 
Daylight Time, July 12, 1988, on which data tha offer will 
expire unless accepted. I .look forward to your response. 
P.C. Stangl III 
FCS:cj 
cc: Victor A. Taylor, Attorney 
Steven Tyler, Attorney 
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Juiy I4f 1988 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Mr. F. C. Stangi, III 
F. C. Stangi Construction Co. 
Suite 300 
4455 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-3092 
Re: Roger R. Brockbank (the "Debtor") 
Chapter 11 Case No. 88B-00747 
Dear Mr. Stangi: 
Larry Konefal has asked that I follow up his recent conversation with 
you regarding your offer, as set forth in your letter to him dated Juiy I, 
1988, to purchase (the "Sale") the beneficial interest of Aetna Life Insurance 
Company ("Aetna") in a certain Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust") under 
which Aetna holds an interest in property which is part of the estate of the 
Debtor. 
1. This letter constitutes Aetna's acceptance of your offer co 
purchase the Deed of Trust for the sum of $900,000.00 cash, 
payable within 10 days following the within acceptance of your 
offer. 
2. Aetna will be prepared to deliver the Deed of Trust and related 
Instruments to you on July 25f 1988 following verification of 
receipt of funds on or before July 25, 1988 in the amount of 
$900,000.00. 
3. Aetna will prepare the necessary instrument for assignment of the 
Deed of Trust. 
4. Aetna will provide at its earliest convenience further instructions 
regarding the account to which funds should be transferred. 
S0010Q47 
r* EXHimT 
H E B B 8e GITI.IN" 
Mr. F. C. Stangl, III 
July 14, 1988 
Page 2 
5. Future correspondence concerning arrangements for Jloitn^ of £ • 
Sale should be directed to Steven E. Tyler Esq., Canister, 
Duncan & Nebelcer, Kennecott Building, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84133, 9801) 530-7300. 
Very 
HTD/rp 
cc: Marilda G. Alfonso, Esq. 
Lawrence J. Konefal 
Steven E. Tyler, Esq. (via telecopier) 
SOO10048 
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LAW o r r i c c s o r 
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J A M U C. SWfMOUXIt JAM M. H < N « C 
M O M AT a. COCHMCAO AMIAM a. MOMMICU. 
§ T f A * * < H J . MVIU. O4AAU0 W. COOAM 
OAMY A, oooac OAv»o a. AWOCWHUCX 
*O«CAT s. CUAMH »cio« c c V^CITHCAO 
r n O M A i a . O A C C M W O M M M . I U ^ N C 
fflCHAAO O. CLATTOM STCVCM A. AAMMT 
UAVMC K CA4MMACU. July 28, 1988 
HAFP DELIVERED 
Roger R. Brockbank 
1701 East 4620 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: Exercise of Potion 
Dear Roger: 
As you know, we represent F. C. Stangl III. Mr. Stangl, 
through his attorneys, hereby exercises his option under the 
Option, dated June 29, 1988, entered into between you and Mr. 
Stangl. The closing of the purchase and sale of the subject 
property shall take place as soon as the property can be 
transferred to Mr. Stangl free and clear of all liens. Because 
of the failure to give notice to Wall Investment Company of the 
hearing yesterday, its liens would continue to attach to the 
subject property as things now stand. Therefore, ve will request 
Bill Thurman, your attorney, to re-notice the hearing so that the 
sale of the subject property will be absolutely free and clear of 
all liens. 
If you have any questions with respect to this letter or if 
we can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact 
the undersigned or Mr. Stangl. 
Sincerely, 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
0J~G^L 
Victor A. Taylor 
cc: F. C. Stangl III y 
William Thomas Thurman, Esq. 







LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY 
BUYERS SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
{yrjR ft, flfttCKBANK F. C. STANCL. I l l 
Suytft 
P'operty 
AtM,**l JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA 
| 
Sales Price 
Etrnest Money Oeposit paid to Oocion Monev co Brockbank 
Title Insurance Premiums Lenders b i l led co Valley 1 
Recording Feet A l l b i l l ed co Valley 
Escrow Closing Fe# 1 
Prorations: As of Nn pmrarlnn* 19 
Taxes for 19 No proraciona day* o i 
Fire Insurance days tf> 
Amt. S Exo. Prem. $ 
T>Hnqn*nr TJOCM 
TVliTvpi#-r|f r « M 
r>Hnqn*nr TJOCM 
Existing Indebtedness With 
Prtnc. S As of 
Interest From To 
Reserve Account Balance As of 
Assumption Fe* 
PrcaLssarr _Ngcm 
- EaercMed fund*. . 
Sub-Totals 
Balance di*> from Buvers 
Totals 
. Order Number _ 
CHAflOES ft 








































Date: Auguac 9 , 1988 Approve 
Principal & Interest 
Taxes a Insurance 
TOTAL 
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Milling Addr««t 
Prepared by 
LANOMA^K TITLE CO. 
><WW fi^^-^C 
exmeiT NO. /?>y. 
r GROVE* 
SOC15677 




LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY 
SELLERS SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
ROGER R. 5R0CKBANK r . C . STANGL, I I I 
StMOT Suytrt 
::°Zl?. Jordan Valley Plaza 
Salts Price 1 
Earnest Money Oeposlt Oocion Monev 1 
Expanses: 1 
Title insurance Premiums Owners P o l i c y 607. 
esc.Recordlna F e ^ s O ^ - f l ^ T * S a t i s f a c t i o n . S u b s c . r e l e a s e . 
Escrow Clostno Fe« e c c - I 
F*rrn*j*H fSmH* nn Sfp-» U r r k * H *n 1 \j rlnv** 1 
F.*rrrx7 *t>r iTp f^» 
R/v^orrHln^ nf H « r*1 !•*«#• ] 
Prorations: As of Mr> rmrrrttHnn* 19 I 
Taxes for 19 days Q 
Fire Insurance day* 0 ^ r r m r i t r l n n * 
Amt. % Exp. Prom. % 
Other 
Sales Commission to 
Existing Indebtedness With A * m * \Af* Tn«i i«mr« m . 
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Exhibit K 
EXHIBIT 65- SUMMARY OF RELIANCE DAMAGES 
All costs incurred in acquiring and developing all the 
properties sold to Green Isle 3/91-Ex. 88, subpart HA" $2,900,402.38 
Less those costs associated with acquisition and 
development!-^ the Firestone and Ind. Test'g 
properties - Ex. 65, subpart "BH ($682,585.23) 
Equals costs incurred in acquiring and developing 
the Brockbank property in reliance on Ernst leasing $2,217,817.16 
Less credit for rental income received on North Shops 
and from Jiffy Lube- Ex. 65, subpart "CH ($122,061.08) 
Less credit for amount received from sale of Brockbank portion 
Brockbank portion of the property to Green Isle-Ex 65,subpart "D" ($1,688,447.48) 
TOTAL OUT-OF-POCKET DAMAGES 
SUFFERED BY STANGL IN RELIANCE ON ERNST LEASING $407,308.60 
In addition, Mr. StangI will testify about the loss of the banking relationship. 
EXHIBIT 65— SUBPART "A" 
Jordan Valley Plaza 
Detailed Costs and Expenditures through 3/8/91 
Description of Costs 
1 Acquisition of Brockbank Property- Ex. 66A $1,272,351.15 
1a Credit for Aetna escrow funds- Ex. 66A ($23,453.86) 
1b Interest payments on Note to Brockbank (9/88 to 1/91)-Ex. 66C 48,333.43 
2 VB&T Loan Origination Fee- Ex. 66B 37,020.00 
3 v l & T Title Insurance-Ex. 66B 5,054.00 
4 VB & T Legal Fees- Ex.66B 2,167.20 
5 VB & T Inspection Fees- Ex. 66B 500.00 
6 VB & T Rigby Appraisal Fees- Ex. 66B 4,500.00 
7 VB & T Interest through 3/8/91- Ex. 66B 309,977.80 
8 Property Taxes- 1988- Ex. 66 34,132.50 
9 Value of Firestone Land-Ex. 65, Subpart G 193,828.94 
10 Value of lnd,Testing Land-Ex.65, Subpart G 129,518.49 
11 Selling Cost for sale to Green Isle- Ex. 48 143,708.00 
1 2 Payment to VB & T at time of sale to Gr. Is.- Ex. 48 1 20,1 51.02 
13 Tenant expense reimb. Michow/Larsen- Ex. 66 3,084.66 
14 Deleted. Included in line item no. 24 0.00 
15 Dillman Electric- Ex. 66 950.00 
16 Kimball, Parr legal fees- Ex. 66D 3,770.03 
17 Firestone expenditures- Ex.66 251,451.06 
18 Independent Testing expenditures-Ex. 66 86,750.03 
19 Jiffy Lube expenditures- Ex 66 190,152.49 
20 On-site expenditures- Ex. 66 127,489.33 
21 American Publishing expenditures-Ex. 66 10,740.15 
22 American Printing expenditures-Ex. 66 3,971.41 
23 Weight Watchers expenditures- Ex. 66 7,640.61 
24 North Shops expenditures-Ex. 66 146,458.78 
25 Jordan Valley lease repair exp.-Ex. 66 1,335.73 
26 Youth Care expenditures- Ex. 66 1,187.06 
27 Payments made to reduce principal after default-Ex. 66B 27,963.43 
28 Less Loan Reduction Amount-Ex.66B (240,331.06) 
TOTAL ACQUISITION COSTS AND EXPENDITURES $2,900,402.38 
EXHIBIT 65, SUBPART "A" JORDAN 
BEFORE AND AFTER 9/30/88 
VALLEY PLAZA- DETAILED COSTS 
1 Acquisition of the Property 
1a Credit for Aetna escrow funds 
I b Interest Paid on Brockbank Note 
2 VB&T Loan Orignation Fee 
3 VB&T Title Insurance 
4 VB&T Legal Fees 
5 VB&T Inspection Fees 
6 VB&T Appraisal fee 
7 VB&T Interest through 3/8/91 
8 1988 Property Taxes 
9 Firestone Land 
10 Emission Testing/Fastech Land 
I I Selling Costs (Greenlsle Sale) 
12 VB&T to close (Greenlsle Sale) 
1 3 Tenant Improvement Reimbursement 
Minchow/Larsen 
14 Deleted, $375 included in item #24 
1 5 Dillman Electric 
16 Kimball, Parr Legal Fees 
(regarding acquisition) 
17 Firestone (hard costs 1/27/88 
through 11/3 /88 
18 Emission Testing (hard costs) 
1 9 Jiffy Lube (hard costs 
20 On-Site Improvements (hard costs) 
21 American Publishing (hard costs) 
22 American Printing (hard costs) 
23 Weight Watchers (hard costs) 
24 North Shops (hard costs) 
25 Jordan Valley Lease Repair (hard costs) 
26 Youth Care (hard costs) 
27 Principal Reduction Payments 
28 Less Loan Reduction Amount 
Before 9 /30 /88 
$1 ,272 ,351 .15 
($23,453.86) 
1,666.67 
37 ,020 .00 
5 ,054.00 
2 ,167 .20 
100.00 
22 ,904 .91 
193 ,828 .94 
129 ,518 .49 
3 ,738.78 
2 5 1 , 4 5 1 . 0 6 
7 ,380.59 
After 9 /30 /88 
$46 ,666 .76 
4 0 0 . 0 0 
4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 8 7 , 0 7 2 . 8 9 
3 4 , 1 3 2 . 5 0 
143 ,708 .00 
120 ,151 .02 
3 ,084 .66 
0 .00 
9 5 0 . 0 0 
31 .25 
8 6 , 7 5 0 . 0 3 
190 ,152 .49 
120 ,108 .74 
10 ,740 .15 
3 ,971.41 
7 ,640.61 
146 ,458 .78 
1,335.73 
1,187.06 
27 ,963 .43 
(240 ,331 .06) 
TOTAL $1,903,727.93 $996,674.45 
Totals 
$1 ,272 ,351 .15 
($23,453.86) 
$48 ,333 .43 4 / 
$ 3 7 , 0 2 0 . 0 0 
$5 ,054 .00 
$2 ,167 .20 
$500 .00 
$4 ,500 .00 (11 /17 /1988) 
$309 ,977 .80 
$34 ,132 .50 (11/8/88) 
$193 ,828 .94 
$129 ,518 .49 
$143 ,708 .00 (3 /8 /1991) 
$120 ,151 .02 (3 /8 /1991) 
$0 .00 
$3 ,084 .66 (3 /6 /1991) 
$0 .00 (2 /1 /1990) 
$950 .00 (10 /19 /1989) 
$0 .00 
$3 ,770 .03 
$0 .00 
$251 ,451 .06 
$86 ,750 .03 (11 /22 /88-12 /10 /89) 
$190 ,152 .49 (12 /31/88-8 /8 /89) 
$127 ,489 .33 
$10 ,740 .15 (3 /16/90-11/9 /90) 
$3 ,971.41 (4 /18 /90-8 /30/90) 
$7 ,640.61 (3 /18/90-6/8 /90) 
$146 ,458 .78 (3 /12 /89-7 /31/89) 
$1 ,335 .73 (3 /26 /89-8 /18/89) 
$1 ,187 .06 (11 /25 /90-12 /27 /90) 
$27 ,963 .43 (6 /18 /90-9 /18 /90) 
($240,331 .06) (2 /28/91) 
$0 .00 
$2 ,900 ,402 .38 
EXHIBIT 65A- ANALYSIS OF PAYMENTS RECORDED FOR ON-SITE IMPROVEMENTS 
CATEGORY 
020 - PLANS 
030 - BLDG PERMITS 
040 - INSURANCE 





170 - STRUCTURAL FRAME 
260 - HEATING & AIR 
270 - ELECTRICIAL 
280 - FIRE SYSTEM 
390 - FINISH CARPENTRY 
400 - SPECIALTY ITEMS 
500 - SITE DRAINAGE 
510-CURB & GUTTER 
520 - ASPHALT 
530 - FENCING 
580 - FLOOR COVERINGS 
660 - LANDSCAPING 
690 - FINISH CLEANUP 
740-CONTINGENCIES 
760 - SUPERVISION 



















































































EXHIBIT 6 5 — SUBPART "B" 
Costs Associated with Acquisition and Development of 
Firestone and Independent Testing Properties 
Firestone Land (See Ex 65, subpart "G") $193,828 94 
Independent Testing Land (See Ex 65, subpart "G") 5129,518 49 
Firestone Construction Costs and Expendrtures-Ex 66 $251,451 06 
Independent Testing Costs and Expenditures- Ex 66 $86,750 03 
Interest Paid on these costs-Ex 65, Subpart "E" $70,222 35 
Less Allocated Share of Loan Reduction- Ex 65, sub "F" ($49,185 65) 
$682 585 23 
EXHIBIT 65- SUBPART "CM 
Total net Income received on Jordan 
Valley Plaza, not including depreciation 
Firestone Rent: $115,710.00 
Firestone CAM $10,066.46 
Independent Testing Rent $47,284.82 
Independent Testing CAM $4,168.31 
Total Firestone & Ind. Tesfg Rent & CAM $177,229.59 
Total Net Rental Income from 
Jordan Valley Plaza- Ex. 65C, p.2 $198,541.00 
Less Net Firestone and Ind. Tesfg Rent & CAM ($177,229.59) 
Plus addition of net interest on "Jack Green" loan $5,240.95 
Plus addition of interest taken as expense, but $81,567.64 
which is included in Brockbank and Valley Bank 
interest amounts in subpart "A" 
Plus addition of legal fees from Kimball, Parr $13,941.08 
included in subpart "A" and legal fees 
incurred for Firestone related matters 
TOTAL NET RENTAL INCOME PERTAINING TO 
REST OF JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA (I.E. THE 
BROCKBANK PROPERTY 
$122,061.08 
Calculation of Total Net Rental Income for Ex 65, Subpart "C" 
Exhibct 65C - rents rececved (actually rent, CAM, & misc income) 
1988 $33.275 00 
1989 $160.09800 
1990 $195.082 00 
1991 $42.546 00 
Total $431.00100 
Exhibrt 65C- expenses (including depreciation listed 1988, 1991) 
1988 ($38.588 00) 
1989 ($117 603 00) 
1990 ($70.643 00) 
1991 ($50 768 00) 
Total ex ($277,602 00) 
Exhibrt 65C identifies Jordan Valley Net Rental Income 
1988 ($5.313 00) 
1989 $42.495 00 
1990 $124.439 00 
1991 ($8.222 00) 
Total Net Rental Income for Jordan Valley $153,399 00 
Total net rental income, w/o depr'n 1988-$ 13.521. 1991-$31,621 
total depreciation listed in tax returns^ $45,142 $45,142 00 
TOTAL NET RENTAL INCOME. NOT INCLUDING DEPREC'N $198,541 00 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART *D" 
Analysis of Amount Received for Property 
at Time of Sale to Green Isle, Using Income 
Valuation Method 
Annual Firestone Building Rent 
Annual Independent Testing Building Rent 
TOTAL RENT 
Less 7% (management, repairs.etc.) 
NET INCOME 
Valuation of Firestone & Ind Tesf g Using 
10% Capitalization Rate 
Total Sales Price for all the Properties sold 
to Green Isle 
Less Valuation of Firestone & Ind Tesf g 
Value of Properties Acquired from Brockbank 
in anticipation of Ernst leasing the property 










EXHIBIT 65- SUBPART "E" 
Firestone & Ind Testing Interest Calculations 































11 50% Interest Calculation 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00029766 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00031082 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
CK00031082 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00031555 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00032683 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK000321819 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CRAFT 
CODE(19C) 
0 0 0 0 6 5 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 6 5 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 6 5 








































$422 150 64 





$466 049 97 
$466 688 39 
$492,516 55 











From Ex 19C 
0 0 0 0 4 2 refers to 
0 0 0 0 6 5 refers to 
"Phase VI" 
"Phase VIII" 
Ex 311 identifies Phase VI as const'n of North Pad building (Ind Tesfg) 
Phase Vlll as pmt for existing loan, which was Firestone 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART - p 
Allocation of Loan Reduction 
Ind. Test'g Disbursements- Ex. 65, subpart "E" $71,199.06 
Firestone Disbursements- Ex. 65, subpart "E - $430,280.50 
Total Disbursements Ind. Test'g and Firestone $501,479.56 
Total Loan Balance Before Reduction 
as shown on Ex. 668 $2,450,331.06 
Ratio of Ind. Test'g/Firestone to Total 20% 
Loan Reduction Amount- Ex. 66B $240,331.06 
Ind. Test'g/Firestone portion of reduction $49,185.65 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART "G" 
Calculation of land 
values for Firestone & IET 
FIRESTONE 
Gross Annual Rent $47,880.00 
less 7%(repairs, reserves,etc.) ($3,352.00) 
Net Rent $44,528.00 
10% Caprtilization Rata $445,280.00 
Less Construction Costs (Ex. 66) ($251,451.06) 
VALUE OF FIRESTONE LAND 
AT TIME OF SALE $193,828.94 
INDEPENDENT TESTING 
Gross Annual Rent $23,254.68 
less 7% ($1,627.83) 
Net Rent $21,626.85 
10% Capitalization Rate $216,268.52 
Less Construction Costs (Ex 66) ($86,750.03) 
VALUE OF IND: TESTING LAND 
AT TIME OF SALE $129,518.49 
JOB #665 FIRESTONE 
COOE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $1,040.45 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 6,950.43 
40 INSURANCE 275.00 
70 LEGAL 4 .604.95 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 35.04 
100 LAYOUT 530.14 
1 10 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 952.20 
1 10 EXCAVATION-OTHER 6.663.00 
1 20 FOUNOATIONS-LABOR COSTS 4.1 02.89 
1 20 FOUNDATIONS-OTHER 1 6.449.04 
1 30 FLOOR SLABS-LABOR 2.040.06 
130 FLOOR SLA8S-OTHER 6 .429.30 
160 CONCRETE TESTS 268.50 
1 70 STRUCTURAL FRAMING-LABOR 660.49 
1 70 STRUCTURAL FRAMING -OTHER 1 4 .803.49 
180 STRUCTURAL STEEL 3 .482.00 
200 FINISH CARPENTRY-EXT. 10.1 14.00 
210 HOLOMETAL-LABOR 686.92 
210 HOLOMETAL-OTHER 4 .417.68 
220 MASONRY 21 .450 .00 
230 ROOFING 6 .025.00 
250 PLUMBING 15.807.06 
260 HEATING ANO AIR CONDITIONING 20 .717 .60 
270 ELECTRICAL 19 .095.00 
3 1 0 INSULATION 2 .574 .00 
320 ORYWALL 3 .980.00 
330 PLASTER-LABOR 107.10 
360 MISC. STEEL-LABOR 480.99 
360 MISC. STEEL-OTHER 327.26 
300 CABINETS 554.00 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT.-LABOR 922.84 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. - OTHER 1.467.67 
4 0 0 CONTINGENCIES-LABOR 1.857.06 
4 0 0 SPECIALTY ITEMS 1 2.77 1.67 
4 7 0 OVERHEAD OOORS-LABOR 610.79 
470 OVERHEAD OOORS-OTHER 14.379.02 
490 GLASS 4 .256 .00 
500 SITE DRAINAGE-LABOR 157.65 
500 SITE ORAINABE-OTHER 378.00 
510 CURB. GUTTER. SIDEWALK-LABOR 2.470.77 
510 CURB. GUTTER. S10EWALK-OTHER 1.1 12.77 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 5.309.80 
530 FENCING 240.00 
550 CAULKING 326.46 
560 PAINTING 6.300.00 
570 ACOUSTIC 2.348.00 
580 FLOOR COVERING 2.553.59 
610 TOILET PARTITIONS 540.00 
620 HAROWARE-LABOR 987.82 
620 HARDWARE-OTHER 622.03 
660 LANDSCAPING 2,948.40 
680 SEWER WATER GAS CONNECTIONS 861.65 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 79.18 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP-OTHER 240.99 
710 TELEPHONE 369.36 
720 UTILITIES 109.21 
740 CONTINGENCIES-LABOR 105.00 
740 CONTINGENCIES-OTHER 1,337.10 
^ 6 0 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 7,172.27 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 3,024.37 
TOTAL ALL CODES $251,451.06 
JOB #691 INDEPENDENT TESTING 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $487.93 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 435.00 
40 INSURANCE 103.00 
370 PREHUNG DOORS 98.02 
$90 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 29,978.10 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS-LABOR 1 35.07 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS- OTHER 546.00 
560 PAINTING 385.00 
660 LANDSCAPING 7,218.13 
680 SEWER WATER GAS CONNECTIONS 2,1 86.00 
740 CONTINGENCIES 44.00 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 21 8.97 
780 ADDITIONAL WORK 44,764.90 
99 999 PAYROLL BUROEN 149.91 
TOTAL ALL COOES $86,750.03 
JOB t 690 JIFFY LUBE 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $1,179.44 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 2,840.00 
40 INSURANCE 141.00 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 98,278.65 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 489.50 
640 BLINDS 541.24 
660 LANDSCAPING 3,848.28 
740 CONTINGENCIES 106.00 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 800.19 
780 ADDITIONAL WORK 81,741.35 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 186.84 
TOTAL ALL CODES $190,152.49 
JOB * 6 7 4 GIBSON/ON-SITE IMPRS, 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
10 LAND $1,000.00 
20 PLANS 2.229.07 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 90 .00 
£ 0 INSURANCE 9 .560.00 
B% INTEREST 73 .666 .36 
70 LEGAL 3.00 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 3.182.47 
100 LAYOUT-LABOR COSTS 320.42 
1 10 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 1.227.97 
1 10 EXCAVATION-OTHER 41 .795 .75 
120 FOUNDATIONS 89.48 
1 70 STRUCTURAL FRAMING 84.57 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 950 .00 
270 ELECTRICAL 2 .653.00 
280 FIRE SYSTEM 1.497.00 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT.-LABOR 88.65 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. - OTHER 264.50 
400 CONTINGENCIES-LABOR 459.24 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 115.71 
500 SITE DRAINAGE-LABOR 581.78 
500 SITE ORAINABE-OTHER 453.87 
510 CURB, GUTTER, SIOEWALK-U\BOR 1,893.27 
510 CUR8, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-OTHER 9 ,354 .90 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 31 ,079 !00 
530 FENCING 72.00 
580 FLOOR COVERING 479 .33 
660 LANOSCAPING 12.061.61 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 39.06 
740 CONTINGENCIES 3.096.74 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 1.772.83 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 1,994.11 
TOTAL ALL CODES $202,155 .69 
less land (10) and less in(crcst(60) (74.666.36) 
TOTAL CARRIEO TO EXHIBIT 65 $127,489 .33 
JOB 1 808 AMERICAN PUBLISH'G 
CODE COOE DESCRIPTION 
30 BUILDING PERMITS $224 .10 
40 INSURANCE 625 .00 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 121.38 
90 DEMOLITION 55 .60 
130 FLOOR SLABS 299.17 
190 INTERIOR FRAME PART 1,462.00 
210 HOLOMETAL-LABOR COSTS 121.30 
210 HOLOMETAL 576.63 
220 MASONRY 296 .00 
250 PLUMBING 1.135.00 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 120.26 
270 ELECTRICAL 810 .00 
350 STAIRWAYS & HANDRAIL 52.02 
370 PREHUNG DOORS 174.70 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 248.84 
560 PAINTING 1,394.00 
570 ACCOUSTICAL TILE 168.00 
580 FLOOR COVERING 111 86 .27 




760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 899 .57 




TOTAL ALL CODES $10 ,740 .15 
2/21/94 
JOB #787 AMERICAN PRINTING 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 




370 PREHUNG DOORS 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 
490 GLASS 
560 PAINTING 
580 FLOOR COVERING 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR COSTS 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 














TOTAL ALL CODES $3,971.41 
JOB * 7 8 1 WEIGHT WATCHERS 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
30 BUILDING PERMITS $194.22 
90 DEMOLITION 843.14 
230 ROOFING 17.70 
250 PLUMBING 1,085.00 
270 ELECTRICAL 1,180.00 
320 ORYWALL 1,162.00 
370 PREHUNG DOORS 1 18.57 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. -LABOR 37.84 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 13.69 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 43 .50 
490 GLASS 72.00 
560 PAINTING 730.00 
570 ACCOUSTICAL TILE 350 .00 
610 TOILET PARTITIONS 122.53 
620 HAROWARE 100.55 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP-U\80R 96.79 
740 CONTINGENCIES 26.55 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 815.78 
99 999 PAYROLL 8UR0EN 630.75 
TOTAL ALL COOES $7,640.61 
JOB tf 719 NORTH SHOPS 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 
90 DEMOLITION-OTHER 
^ 0 0 LAYOUT 
1 10 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 
110 EXCAVATION-OTHER 
120 FOUNDATIONS-LABOR COSTS 
120 FOUNOATIONS-OTHER 
130 FLOOR SLABS 
170 STRUCTURAL FRAMING-LABOR 
170 STRUCTURAL FRAMING -OTHER 
100 STRUCTURAL STEEL 
200 FINISH CARPENTRY-EXT. - LABOR 






390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS-LABOR 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 
5'10 CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-LABOR 
510 'CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-OTHER 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 
560 PAINTING 
570 ACOUSTICAL TILE 
620 HAROWARE 
660 LANOSCAPING 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP-OTHER 
740 CONTINGENCIES 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 
780 WATER SEWER 























4 2 , 7 4 8 . 2 0 
5 .357 .65 
5 ,031.83 
9 .660 .88 










TOTAL ALL COOES $146,458.78 
JOB it 722 J.V. LEASE REPAIR 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
90 DEMOLITION $84.64 
230 ROOFING 266.00 
250 PLUMBING 198.20 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 500.00 
270 ELECTRICAL 175.00 
690 FINISH CLEANUP- LABOR 49.28 
760 SUPERVISION- LABOR 24.33 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 38.28 
TOTAL ALL CODES $1,335.73 
JOB * 841 YOUTH CARE 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
580 FLOOR COVERING 




EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUMMARY OF RELIANCE DAMAGES 
All costs incurred in acquiring and developing all the 
properties sold to Green Isle 3 /91-Ex . 65, subpart "A" 
Less those costs associated wi th acquisition and 
development of the Firestone and Ind. Test 'g 
properties - Ex. 65, subpart "B" 
Equals costs incurred in acquiring and developing 
the Brockbank property in reliance on Ernst leasing 
Less credit for rental income received on North Shops 
and from Jif fy Lube- Ex. 65 , subpart "CH 
Less credit for amount received from sale of Brockbank portion 
Brockbank portion of the property to Green Isle-Ex 65,subpart "D " 
TOTAL OUT-OF-POCKET DAMAGES 
SUFFERED BY STANGL IN RELIANCE ON ERNST LEASING 
In addition, Mr. StangI wil l testify about the loss of the banking relationship. 
EXHIBIT 65— SUBPART "A" 
Jordan Valley Plaza 
Detailed Costs and Expenditures through 3/8/91 
Description of Costs 
1 Acquisit ion of Brockbank Property- Ex. 66A $1,272,351.15 
1a Credit for Aetna escrow funds- Ex. 66A ($23,453.86) 
1b Interest payments on Note to Brockbank (9/88 to 1/91 )-Ex. 66C 48 ,333 .43 
2 VB&T Loan Origination Fee- Ex. 66B 37 ,020 .00 
3 VB & T Title Insurance-Ex. 66B 5,054.00 
4 VB & T Legal Fees- Ex.66B 2 ,167.20 
5 VB & T Inspection Fees- Ex. 66B 500.00 
6 VB & T Rigby Appraisal Fees- Ex. 66B 4 ,500 .00 
7 VB & T Interest through 3 /8 /91 - Ex. 66B 309 ,977 .80 
8 Property Taxes- 1988- Ex. 66 34 ,132 .50 
9 Value of Firestone Land-Ex. 65, Subpart G 193,828.94 
10 Value of ind,Testing Land-Ex.65, Subpart G 129,518.49 
11 Selling Cost for sale to Green Isle- Ex. 48 143,708.00 
1 2 Payment to VB & T at time of sale to Gr. Is.- Ex. 48 120,151.02 
13 Tenant expense reimb. Michow/Larsen- Ex. 66 3 ,084.66 
14 Deleted. Included in line item no. 24 0.00 
15 Dillman Electric- Ex. 66 950 .00 
16 Kimball, Parr legal fees- Ex. 66D 3,770.03 
17 Firestone expendi tures- E x . 6 6 251 ,451 .06 
18 Independent Testing expenditures-Ex. 66 86 ,750 .03 
19 Jif fy Lube expendi tures- Ex 66 190,152.49 
20 On-site expenditures- Ex. 66 127,489.33 
21 American Publishing expenditures-Ex. 66 10,740.15 
22 American Printing expenditures-Ex. 66 3,971.41 
23 Weight Watchers expenditures- Ex. 66 7,640.61 
24 North Shops expenditures-Ex. 66 146,458.78 
25 Jordan Valley lease repair exp. -Ex. 66 1,335.73 
26 Youth Care expenditures- Ex. 66 1,187.06 
27 Payments made to reduce principal after defaul t -Ex. 66B 27,963.43 
28 Less Loan Reduction Amount -Ex .66B (240,331.06) 
TOTAL ACQUISITION COSTS AND EXPENDITURES $2,900,402.38 
EXHIBIT 65, SUBPART "A" JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA- DETAILED COSTS 
BEFORE AND AFTER 9/30/88 
1 Acquisition of the Property 
1a Credit for Aetna escrow funds 
1b Interest Paid on Brockbank Note 
2 VB&T Loan Orignation Fee 
3 VB&T Title Insurance 
4 VB&T Legal Fees 
5 VB&T Inspection Fees 
6 VB&T Appraisal fee 
7 VB&T Interest through 3/8/91 
8 1988 Property Taxes 
9 Firestone Land 
10 Emission Testing/Fastech Land 
11 Selling Costs (Greenlsle Sale) 
12 VB&T to close (Greenlsle Sale) 
13 Tenant Improvement Reimbursement 
Minchow/Larsen 
14 Deleted, $375 included in item #24 
1 5 Dillman Electric 
16 Kimball, Parr Legal Fees 
(regarding acquisition) 
17 Firestone (hard costs 1/27/88 
through 11/3/88 
1 8 Emission Testing (hard costs) 
19 Jiffy Lube (hard costs 
20 On-Site Improvements (hard costs) 
21 American Publishing (hard costs) 
22 American Printing (hard costs) 
23 Weight Watchers (hard costs) 
24 North Shops (hard costs) 
25 Jordan Valley Lease Repair (hard costs) 
26 Youth Care (hard costs) 
27 Principal Reduction Payments 











































































EXHIBIT 65A- ANALYSIS OF PAYMENTS RECORDED FOR ON-SITE IMPROVEMENTS 
CATEGORY 
020 - PLANS 
030 - BLDG PERMITS 
040 - INSURANCE 
070 - LEGAL FEES 




170 - STRUCTURAL FRAME 
260 - HEATING & AIR 
270 - ELECTRICIAL 
280 - FIRE SYSTEM 
390 - FINISH CARPENTRY 
400 - SPECIALTY ITEMS 
500 - SITE DRAINAGE 
510-CURB & GUTTER 
520 - ASPHALT 
530-FENCING 
580 - FLOOR COVERINGS 
660 - LANDSCAPING 
690 - FINISH CLEANUP 
740-CONTINGENCIES 
760 - SUPERVISION 



















































































EXHIBIT 6 5 — SUBPART MBM 
Costs Associated with Acquisition and Development of 
Firestone and Independent Testing Properties 
Firestone Land (See Ex. 65, subpart "G") $193,828.94 
Independent Testing Land (See Ex. 65, subpart MG") $129,518.49 
Firestone Construction Costs and Expenditures-Ex. 66 $251,451.06 
Independent Testing Costs and Expenditures- Ex. 66 $86,750.03 
Interest Paid on these costs-Ex. 65, Subpart "E" $70,222.35 
Less Allocated Share of Loan Reduction- Ex. 65, sub.T" ($49,185.65) 
$682,585.23 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART "C" 
Total net income received on Jordan 
Valley Plaza, not including depreciation 
Firestone Rent: $115,710.00 
Firestone CAM $10,066.46 
Independent Testing Rent $47,284.82 
Independent Testing CAM $4,168.31 
Total Firestone & Ind. Test'g Rent & CAM $177,229.59 
Total Net Rental Income from 
Jordan Valley Plaza- Ex. 65C, p.2 $198,541.00 
Less Net Firestone and Ind. Tesfg Rent & CAM ($177,229.59) 
Total Net Rental Income pertaining to rest of $21,311.41 
Jordan Valley Plaza 
Calculation of Total Net Rental Income for Ex 65, Subpart "C" 
Exhibit 65C - rents received (actually rent, CAM. & misc income) 
1988 $33.275 00 
1989 $160.098 00 
1990 $195.082 00 
1991 $42.546 00 
Total $431,001 00 
Exhibit 65C- expenses (including depreciation listed 1988, 1991) 
1988 ($38.588 00) 
1989 ($117,603 00) 
1990 ($70.643 00) 
1991 ($50.768 00) 
Total ex ($277,602 00) 
Exhibit 65C identifies Jordan Valley Net Rental Income 
1988 ($5.313 00) 
1989 $42.495 00 
1990 $124.439 00 
1991 ($8.222 00) 
Total Net Rental Income for Jordan Valley $153,399 00 
Total net rental income, w/o depr'n 1988-$13,521, 1991-$31.621 
total depreciation listed in tax returns= $45,142 $45,142 00 
TOTAL NET RENTAL INCOME. NOT INCLUDING DEPREC'N $198,541 00 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART MDM 
Analysis of Amount Received for Property 
at Time of Sale to Green Isle, Using Income 
Valuation Method 
Annual Firestone Building Rent 
Annual Independent Testing Building Rent 
TOTAL RENT 
Less 7% (management, repairs.etc.) 
NET INCOME 
Valuation of Firestone & Ind. Tesfg Using 
10% Capitalization Rate 
Total Sales Price for all the Properties sold 
to Green Isle 
Less Valuation of Firestone & Ind. Tesfg 
Value of Properties Acquired from Brockbank 
in anticipation of Ernst leasing the property 










EXHIBIT 65- SUBPART "E" 
Firestone & Ind Testing Interest Calculatons 

































11 50% Interest Calculation 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00029766 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00031082 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
CK00031082 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00031555 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK00032683 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
CK000321819 
13 00% Interest Calculation 
12 50% Interest Calculation 
12 00% Interest Calculation 
CRAFT 
CODE(19C) 
0 0 0 0 6 5 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 6 5 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 4 2 
0 0 0 0 6 5 




























































From Ex 19C 
0 0 0 0 4 2 refers to 
0 0 0 0 6 5 refers to 
"Phase VIM 
"Phase VIII" 
Ex 311 identifies Phase VI as consfn of North Pad building (Ind Tesfg) 
Phase VIII as pmt for existing loan, which was Firestone 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART HF" 
Allocation of Loan Reduction 
Ind Test'g Disbursements—Ex 65, subpart *E" $71,199 06 
Firestone Disbursements- Ex 65, subpart HEM $430,280 50 
Total Disbursements Ind Test'g and Firestone $501,479 56 
Total Loan Balance Before Reduction 
as shown on Ex 66B $2,450,331 06 
Ratio of Ind Test'g/Firestone to Total 20% 
Loan Reduction Amount- Ex 66B $240,331 06 
Ind Test'g/Firestone portion of reduction $49,185 65 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUBPART "G" 
Calculation of land 
values for Firestone & IET 
FIRESTONE 
Gross Annual Rent $47,880 00 
less 7%(repairs, reserves.etc ) ($3,352 00) 
Net Rent $44,528 00 
10% Capitlization Rate $445,280 00 
Less Construction Costs (Ex 66) ($251,451 06) 
VALUE OF FIRESTONE LAND 
AT TIME OF SALE $193,828 94 
INDEPENDENT TESTING 
Gross Annual Rent $23,254 68 
less 7% ($1,627 83) 
Net Rent $21,626 85 
10% Capitalization Rate $216,268 52 
Less Construction Costs (Ex 66) ($86,750 03) 
VALUE OF IND TESTING LAND 
AT TIME OF SALE $129,518 49 
JOB #655 FIRESTONE 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $1,040.45 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 6,950.43 
40 INSURANCE 275.00 
70 LEGAL 4,604.95 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 35.04 
100 LAYOUT 530 14 
110 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 952 20 
110 EXCAVATION-OTHER 6,663 00 
1 20 FOUNDATIONS-LABOR COSTS 4.1 82 89 
1 20 FOUNDATIONS-OTHER 1 6.449 04 
1 30 FLOOR SLABS-LABOR 2,040 06 
130 FLOOR SLABS-OTHER 6.429 30 
160 CONCRETE TESTS 268 50 
1 70 STRUCTURAL FRAMING-LABOR 660 49 
1 70 STRUCTURAL FRAMING -OTHER 1 4 ,803 49 
180 STRUCTURAL STEEL 3,482 00 
200 FINISH CARPENTRY EXT 10,1 14 00 
210 HOLOMETAL-LABOR 686 92 
2 1 0 HOLOMETAL OTHER 4.4 1 7 68 
220 MASONRY 21 ,450 00 
230 ROOFING 6,025.00 
250 PLUMBING 15,807.06 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 20 ,717 .60 
270 ELECTRICAL 19,095.00 
310 INSULATION 2,574.00 
320 DRYWALL 3 ,980 00 
330 PLASTER-LABOR 107 10 
360 MISC STEEL-LABOR 480 99 
360 MISC STEEL-OTHER 327 26 
300 CABINETS 554 00 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT -LABOR 922 84 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT OTHER 1,467 67 
400 CONTINGENCIES-LABOR 1,857 06 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 12,771 67 
470 OVERHEAD DOORS LABOR 610 79 
470 OVERHEAD DOORS OTHER 1 4 .379 02 
490 GLASS 4 .256 00 
SQQ SITE ORAIN AGE-LABOR \S7 6S 
500 SITE DRAINABE OTHER 378 00 
510 CURB GUTTER, SIDEWALK LABOR 2,470 77 
510 CURB GUTTER SIOEWALK OTHER 1.112 77 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 5.309 80 
530 FENCING 240 00 
550 CAULKING 326 46 
560 PAINTING 6,308 00 
570 ACOUSTIC 2.348 00 
580 FLOOR COVERING 2.553 59 
610 TOILET PARTITIONS 540 00 
620 HARDWARE LABOR 987 82 
620 HARDWARE-OTHER 
660 LANDSCAPING 
680 SEWER WATER GAS CONNECTIONS 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 





760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 












TOTAL ALL CODES $251,451.06 
JOB #691 INDEPENDENT TESTING 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $487.93 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 435.00 
40 INSURANCE 103.00 
370 PREHUNG DOORS 98.02 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 29.978.10 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS-LABOR 135.07 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS- OTHER 546.00 
560 PAINTING 385.00 
660 LANDSCAPING 7.218.13 
680 SEWER WATER GAS CONNECTIONS 2.1 86.00 
740 CONTINGENCIES 44.00 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 21 8.97 
780 ADDITIONAL WORK 44,764.90 
99 999 PAYROLL BUROEN 149.91 
TOTAL ALL CODES $86,750.03 
JOB # 690 JIFFY LUBE 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS $1,179.44 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 2,840.00 
40 INSURANCE 141.00 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 98,278.65 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 489.50 
. 640 BLINDS 541.24 
660 LANDSCAPING 3,848.28 
740 CONTINGENCIES 106.00 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 800.1 9 
780 ADDITIONAL WORK 81,741.35 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 186.84 
TOTAL ALL CODES $190,152.49 
JOB #674 GIBSON/ON-SITE IMPRS. 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
10 LAND 
20 PLANS 




90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 
100 LAYOUT-LABOR COSTS 
1 10 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 
1 10 EXCAVATION-OTHER 
120 FOUNDATIONS 
170 STRUCTURAL FRAMING 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
270 ELECTRICAL 
280 FIRE SYSTEM 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT.-LABOR 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. - OTHER 
400 CONTINGENCIES-LABOR 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 
500 SITE DRAINAGE-LABOR 
500 SITE DRAINABE-OTHER 
510 CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-LABOR 
510 CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-OTHER 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 
530 FENCING 
580 FLOOR COVERING 
660 LANDSCAPING 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 
740 CONTINGENCIES 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 
































TOTAL ALL COOES $202,155.69 
less land (10) and less intcrest(60) (74.666.36) 
TOTAL CARRIEO TO EXHIBIT 65 $127,489.33 
JOB # 808 AMERICAN PUBLISH'G 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
30 BUILDING PERMITS $224.10 
40 INSURANCE 625 .00 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 1 21.38 
90 DEMOLITION 55.60 
130 FLOOR SLABS 299.17 
1 90 INTERIOR FRAME PART 1,462.00 
210 HOLOMETAL-LABOR COSTS 121.30 
210 HOLOMETAL 576.63 
220 MASONRY 296 .00 
250 PLUMBING 1.135.00 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 120.26 
270 ELECTRICAL 810 .00 
350 STAIRWAYS & HANDRAIL 52.02 
370 PREHUNG DOORS 174.70 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 248.84 
560 PAINTING 1,394.00 
570 ACCOUSTICAL TILE 168.00 
580 FLOOR COVERING 1,186.27 
610 TOILET PARTITIONS 59.86 
620 HARDWARE 11.16 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- 322 .88 
740 CONTINGENCIES 177.91 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 899.57 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 198.50 
TOTAL ALL CODES $10 ,740 .15 
2/21 
JOB #787 AMERICAN PRINTING 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 




370 PREHUNG DOORS 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 
490 GLASS 
560 PAINTING 
580 FLOOR COVERING 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR COSTS 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 














TOTAL ALL CODES $3,971.41 
JOB #781 WEIGHT WATCHERS 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 






370 PREHUNG DOORS 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. -LABOR 
390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 
490 GLASS 
560 PAINTING 
570 ACCOUSTICAL TILE 
610 TOILET PARTITIONS 
620 HAROWARE 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP-LABOR 
740 CONTINGENCIES 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 




















TOTAL ALL CODES 
JOB tf 719 NORTH SHOPS 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
20 PLANS 
30 BUILDING PERMITS 
90 DEMOLITION-LABOR COSTS 
90 DEMOLITION-OTHER 
100 LAYOUT 
110 EXCAVATION-LABOR COSTS 
110 EXCAVATION-OTHER 
120 FOUNDATIONS-LABOR COSTS 
120 FOUNOATIONS-OTHER 
130 FLOOR SLABS 
170 STRUCTURAL FRAMING-LABOR 
170 STRUCTURAL FRAMING -OTHER 
100 STRUCTURAL STEEL 
200 FINISH CARPENTRY-EXT. - LA80R 






390 FINISH CARPENTRY-INT. 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS-LABOR 
400 SPECIALTY ITEMS 
5*10 CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-LABOR 
510 CURB, GUTTER, SIDEWALK-OTHER 
520 ASPHALT PAVING 
560 PAINTING 
570 ACOUSTICAL TILE 
620 HARDWARE 
660 LANOSCAPING 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP- LABOR 
690 FINISH CLEAN-UP-OTHER 
740 CONTINGENCIES 
760 SUPERVISION-LABOR COSTS 
780 WATER SEWER 





































TOTAL ALL CODES $146,458.78 
JOB * 722 J.V. LEASE REPAIR 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
90 DEMOLITION $84.64 
230 ROOFING 266.00 
250 PLUMBING 198.20 
260 HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 500.00 
270 ELECTRICAL 175.00 
690 FINISH CLEANUP- LABOR 49.28 
760 SUPERVISION- LABOR 24.33 
99 999 PAYROLL BURDEN 38.28 
TOTAL ALL CODES $1,335.73 
JOB If 841 YOUTH CARE 
CODE CODE DESCRIPTION 
580 FLOOR COVERING $1,187.06 
TOTAL ALL CODES $1,187.06 
Exhibit M 
EXHIBIT 6 5 - SUMMARY OF RELIANCE DAMAGES 
All costs incurred in acquiring and developing all the 
properties sold to Green Isle 3/91-Ex. 88, subpart "A" $2,900,402.38 
Less those costs associated with acquisition and 
development of the Firestone and Ind. Test'g 
properties - Ex. 65, subpart HB" ($682,585.23} 
Equals costs incurred in acquiring and developing 
the Brockbank property in reliance on Ernst leasing $2,217,817.16 
Less credit for rental income received on North Shops 
and from Jiffy Lube- Ex. 65, subpart "C" ($122,061.08) 
Less credit for amount received from sale of Brockbank portion 
Brockbank portion ot the property to Green Isle-Ex 65,subpart "D" ($1,688,447.48) 
TOTAL OUT-OF-POCKET DAMAGES 
SUFFERED BY STANGL IN RELIANCE ON ERNST LEASING 
In addition, Mr. StangI will testify about the loss of the banking relationship 




Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766) 
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359) 
Steven fi. McCowin, Esq. (4621) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 53 3-8383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an 
individual, dba F.C. STANGL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
) TO OBJECTION 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., ) 
a Washington corporation, ) 
) Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN 
Defendant. ) 
) (Honorable Michael Murphy) 
I. Ernst has been provided notice of Stangl's claim for interest 
on the Brockbank Note for $250,000. 
A. In response to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, at p. 26, Stangl alleged that "Stangl acquired 
ownership of the subject property and took other actions of a 
substantial nature, involving the expenditure of large amounts of 
Stangl's time and money..." At p. 41 of the same responses, 
Stangl stated: "In addition, Stangl's damages will include the 
costs incurred by Stangl in connection with performance of his 
obligations under the lease... and the costs of, Stangl's efforts 
to mitigate damages and Stangl has incurred additional 
i t . , 
JiLuJutlu 
i : 2-1 C-4 
interest expense on loans as a result of Ernst's having failed to 
honor the lease agreement." Copy attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
All subsequent responses to updating of interrogatory 
answers referred to prior discovery responses. 
II. Ernst has been provided with evidence as to the amount of 
the Brockbank interest. 
A. Option agreement (Exhibit "B" hereto, trial exhibit 
5 refers to the fact that if the option was exercised, it would 
be payable, in part, with a $250,000-promissory note which was to 
be interest only payments of $1, 666.67/month) 
B. $250,000 promissory note (Exhibit "C" hereto, 
deposition exhibit 130) was produced, which specifically 
described the interest payments of $1,666.67 per month. 
C. The $250,000 promissory note was the subject of 
examination at deposition wherein Mr. Stangl disclosed that he 
had been making the payments and that he believed that he was 
current. See depo testimony at p. 363, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D". 
D. Exhibit 65C (Exhibit "E" hereto) was previously 
produced last year. Therein income tax schedules and income 
statements are attached which disclose the interest paid on both 
the Valley Bank loan and the Brockbank loan. 
E. During last year's trial, Messrs. Greenwood and 
O'Hara visited plaintiff's counsel's office where they were 
offered the backup documentation for the schedules attached to 
2 
0 0 % \ $ ? 
Exhibit 65C. Those included the general ledgers for the rental 
income and expenses which broke out the interest expenses paid 
for both the Brockbank and the Valley Bank loans. See, e.g. 
General ledger for 1989, at p. 10 (Account Code 4600- R. 
Brockbank Note Interest), p.15 (Account Code 6950- Interest 
Expense [Valley Bank]), copy attached hereto as Exhibit "F". 
DATED this ^ ^/<s/day of February, 1994. 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, 
BENDINGER & PETERSON 
136 S . Main S t r e e t 
S a l t L a k e / 6 i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 0 1 y 
T e l e p h o n / : ^ 8 0 1 ) 5 3 3 - 8 : 
Hard 
:or Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 23rd day of February, 1994, a true and correct 
copy of PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTION was hand-delivered to 
the following: 
Elizabeth D. Winter 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Roger J. Kindley 
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND 
1201 Third Avenue, 
Seattle, WA 98101 
0 0 2 1 
Exhibit A 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766) 
Kenneth C. Johnsen, Esq. (A4605) 
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq. (A5296) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., 
a Washington corporation, 
Defendant. 
U, 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT S jficarrB—" 
•SET. OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
SSCOUA DOCUMENT REQUEST 
! ) > 
> - ^ 
\ Civil No. 89-0202771CN 
I Judge Michael Murphy 
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiff, Franz C. Stangl, III ("Stangl"), responds to 
Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories and Second Document 
Request as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES 
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 1: Stangl objects to the 
interrogatories insofar as they seek information not available to 
him at this time. To date, Stangl has not completed any discovery 
in this case. Stangl believes that many documents and witnesses 
STCL\03i wc 0 0 2 1 0 7 
INTERROGATORY NO, 14: With regard to the allegations set 
forth in Paragraph 17 of the Complaint, please provide the 
following information: 
(a) State the factual basis of these allegations; 
(b) Identify all documents disclosing or relating to 
these allegations; 
(c) Identify all persons with knowledge disclosing or 
relating to these allegations; and 
(d) Identify all conversations or communications 
disclosing or relating to these allegations. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 14 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and 
seeks privileged information. At this early stage of the case, it 
is impossible for Stangl to identify each and every fact or 
document that might support his claim. Furthermore, many such 
facts or documents may be privileged. Nevertheless, for purposes 
of furthering discovery in this matter and without waiving the 
foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 14 as 
follows. 
(a) Based on the promises, commitments and 
representations made to Stangl by Ernst (see Response to 
Interrogatory No. 13), Stangl acquired ownership of the subject 
property and took other actions of a substantial nature, involving 
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the expenditure of large amounts of Stangl's time and money, which 
actions included without limitation the following: 
1. Stangl made plans and estimates, solicited and 
reviewed bids, and otherwise prepared to construct new improvements 
and remodel old improvements on the property according to Ernst's 
specifications, instructions and desires (see, e.g. , notes of 
discussion with Rob King dated July 1, 1988; notes from Larry 
Burton dated July 5, 1988; Utah Tile and Roofing bid dated July 22, 
1988; Steel Encounters bid dated August 1, 1988; construction 
estimate dated August 3, 1988; environmental summary notes by Larry 
Burton dated August 9, 1988; construction notes prepared by Larry 
Burton (undated); letter dated August 12, 1988 setting forth 
Ernst's specifications for asphalt paving, planters and curbs, 
light standards, etc.; construction estimate dated August 31, 1988; 
letter dated September 12, 1988 from Stangl to Rob King; 
construction notes dated September 12, 1988 by Jenny Hall). 
2. Stangl dealt at length with Ernst, its 
architects and engineers to facilitate construction and remodeling 
according to Ernst's specifications, instructions and desires (see 
e.g., transmittal records from Dykeman Architects dated July 5, 
1988 (3 documents), July 8, 1988, July 14, 1988; letter dated July 
7, 1988 from Dykeman Architects to West Jordan City Planner; notes 
from Larry Burton dated July 8, 1988; Structural Calculations for 
Ernst Home and Nursery, West Jordan, Utah, prepared by Dykeman 
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Architects, dated July 20, 1988; phone message from Rob King dated 
July 26, 1988; Ernst sign specifications for West Jordan Store No. 
280, prepared by Dykeman Architects, dated August 24, 1988). 
3. Stangl initiated, pursued and obtained zoning 
and construction applications, approvals and permits (see, e.g., 
letter dated July 7, 1988 from Dykeman Architects to West Jordan 
City Planner; Application to Planning Commission dated July 8, 
1988; letter dated July 19, 1988 from City of West Jordan to 
Stangl; Report of Action and minutes of meeting held July 20, 1988 
by City of West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission; West Jordan 
Planning'Commission Agenda dated July 20, 1988; Report of Action 
and* minute's of meeting held August 3, 1988 by City of West Jordan 
Planning and Zoning Commission; Reports of Action and minutes of 
meeting held September 21, 1988 by City of West Jordan Planning and 
Zoning Commission; Report of Action by West Jordan Planning and 
Zoning Commission dated September 7, 1988). 
4. Stangl sought to obtain financing for the 
construction to be done at Ernst's request (see, e. q. , letter dated 
July 16, 1988 (and attachments) from Stangl to Valley Mortgage 
Corp.) . 
5. Stangl provided market information to Ernst and 
attempted to assist Ernst in verifying the potential profitability 
of the Jordan Valley Plaza site (see, e.g., letter dated November 
30, 1988 from Stangl to Tom Stanton; letter dated April 4, 1989 
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from Stangl to Tom Stanton, p. 3 (referring to Stangl's efforts to 
find Ernst another market analyst)). 
6, Stangl refrained from attempting to lease the 
property to. other lessees while Ernst tried to resolve . its 
uncertainty regarding its decision to locate an Ernst store on the 
subject property (see, e.g. letter dated April 4, 1989 from Stangl 
to Tom Stanton, p. 3). 
The above actions were taken to accommodate Ernst, to comply 
with Stangl's obligations under the lease agreement, and to assist 
Ernst in its efforts to open a store at the Jordan Valley Plaza 
site. The actions were undertaken with Ernst's full knowledge and 
approval, and in many cases with Ernst's actual involvement- All 
actions were undertaken with Ernst's approval, encouragement and 
representation that such actions were performed pursuant to a 
binding agreement to lease the property. It was apparently only 
after Mack DuBose, Ernst's primary agent with respect to the lease 
agreement, left Ernst's employ that Ernst decided it would not 
abide by and honor the lease agreement. The above actions by 
Stangl were completely reasonable in light of the circumstances and 
in light of Ernst's statements, promises, documents and conduct. 
Stangl would not have undertaken such actions if not for Ernst's 
statements, promises, documents and conduct. 
(b) See documents identified in part (a) above and 
documents produced herewith. 
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(c) See Response to Interrogatory No, 2. 
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No. 3(d). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: With regard to the allegations set 
forth in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint, please provide the 
following information: 
(a) State the factual basis of these allegations; 
(b) Identify all documents disclosing or relating to 
these allegations; 
(c) Identify all persons with knowledge disclosing or 
relating to these allegations; and 
(d) Identify all conversations' or communications 
disclosing or relating to these allegations. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 15 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and 
seeks privileged information. At this early stage of the case, it 
is impossible for Stangl to identify each and every fact or 
document that might support his claim. Furthermore, many such 
facts or documents may be privileged. Nevertheless, for purposes 
of furthering discovery in this matter and without waiving the 
foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 15 as 
follows: 
(a) See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 12-14. 
(b) I d . 
( c ) I d . 
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(d) Id. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: In Paragraphs 1(a), 2(a), and 3(a) of 
the Prayer for Relief section of your Complaint (at pages 8 and 9) , 
you pray "for judgment in favor of Stangl and against defendant in 
an amount to be proved at trial, together with pre-judgment 
interest accruing thereon and post-judgment interest accruing 
thereon plus attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein." With 
regard to the aforesaid portions of your Prayer for Relief, please 
specify the following: 
(a) The dollar amount of all damages sustained by 
Stangl, including without limitation all general and/or 
consequential damages allegedly sustained by Stangl which Stangl 
seeks to- recover from Ernst, measured and calculated through and 
including the date of your answers to these interrogatories; 
(b) The facts, assumptions and figures used to arrive 
at the figure specified in response to subparagraph (a); 
(c) All documents evidencing your alleged damages, 
including without limitation all general and/or consequential 
damages; 
(d) The factual basis for any and all general damages 
which you claim; 
(e) The factual basis for any consequential damages 
which you claim; 
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(f) The factual basis for any and all other items or 
damages which you claim; 
(g) The dollar amount of pre-judgment interest you claim 
as of the date of your answers to these interrogatories, including 
the statutory and/or contractual basis for the alleged pre-judgment 
interest, the percent per annum you claim applies to pre-judgment 
interest, the calculation used by you to arrive at the dollar 
amount of your alleged pre-judgment interest, and any documents 
which evidence your claim to pre-judgment interest; 
(h) The percent per annum which you claim will apply to 
post-judgment interest,' if any judgment be entered against Ernst, 
and the factual basis for your claimed post-judgment' rate* of 
interest; 
(i) The precise contractual language, if any, and date 
of the document containing the contractual language upon which you 
rely for your claim of attorneys' fees; 
(j) The precise statutory provision, if any, you rely 
upon for your claim of attorneys' fees. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 21 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and 
may seek privileged information. Without waiving the foregoing 
objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 21 as follows: 
At this stage in the litigation, Stangl has not calculated his 
damages caused by Ernst's actions to the degree of specificity 
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described in Interrogatory No. 21. As intimated in previous 
responses, the actual amount of damages suffered by Stangl will not 
be known until further discovery has occurred. As a general 
matter, Stangl believes his damages will equal an amount which 
includes the lease payments that, at least through the date of this 
response, have not been paid by Ernst, together with future lease 
payments to the extent that mitigation of damages is not possible. 
In addition, Stangl's damages will include the costs incurred by 
Stangl in connection with performance of his obligations under the 
lease (see, e.g., Response to Interrogatory 14) and the costs of 
Stangl's efforts to mitigate damages. Stangl has also suffered 
reputational damages with third parties to which he indicated that 
an agreement with Ernst had been met, and Stangl has incurred 
additional interest expense on/HLoans/as a result of Ernst's having 
failed to honor the lease agreement. Stangl will seek pre-judgment 
and post-judgment interest in accordance with applicable law, 
including Chapter 1 of Title 15 of the Utah Code. Similarly, 
Stangl will seek attorneys' fees and costs to the extent he is able 
to establish that the parties agreed to pay such amounts or to the 
extent that the evidence indicates that Stangl is otherwise 
entitled to such amounts under applicable law. The factual basis 
and documents upon which Stangl seeks damages, to the extent 
currently known, are described in response to other discovery 
requests. 
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Letter dated July 15, 1988 from Mack DuBose to 
Letter dated August 23, 1988 from Mack DuBose 
Letter dated August 29, 1988 from Stangl to 
8. Letter dated September 12, 1988 from Mack 
DuBose to Stangl. 
As for the legal description of the property to be leased, see 
Response to Interrogatory No. 36. 
(b) See Response.to part (a) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: During the discovery period, did you-
obtain an option from a third party to purchase all or some of the 
real property referenced in your complaint. If so, please provide 
the following information: 
(a) From whom did you obtain the option; 
(b) How much did you pay for the option; 
(c) What were the precise terms of the option; 
(d) Under the terms of the option, did you have any 
obligation whatsoever to exercise the option; 
(e) Please identify all documents evidence the option; 
(f) Please identify all documents containing any 
information whatsoever about the option, the negotiations leading 
up to the purchase and/or execution by you of the option, and/or 
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disputes, if any, between you and third parties concerning the 
option. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 23 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and 
seeks privileged information. Without waiving the foregoing 
objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 23 as follows: 
Yes. 
(a) See Option dated June 29, 1988 produced herewith and 






INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Have you at any time obtained any 
market studies, business plans, options, leases, policies of title 
insurance, preliminary title reports, or litigation title reports 
concerning all or part of the Premises or Property (as those terms 
are used in your Complaint)? If so, please provide the following 
information: 
(a) Please identify by date and title all such documents 
and all persons who gave you said documents and/or prepared said 
documents; 
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seeks irrelevant and privileged information. Without waiving the 
foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 25 as 
follows: 
Yes. Stangl shall produce non-privileged documents which 
provide Ernst with the relevant information sought hereby. 
(a) Further to the response of Interrogatory No. 38, the 
amount of consideration paid to Mr. Brockbank by Stangl is 
reflected on the Option dated June 29, 1988 and produced herewith. 
There are no ongoing negotiations between Stangl and Mr. Brockbank 
concerning the subject property. 
(b) See documents identified in par.t (a) above and 
documents produced herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: If you claim any item of damages 
whatsoever not described in response to any of the preceding 
interrogatories, please state the factual basis for each and every 
other item of damage you claim against Ernst. In response to this 
interrogatory, please also identify each and every other document 
not identified in response to any of the preceding interrogatories 
which contains any information whatsoever regarding your damage 
claims against Ernst. Also, in responding to this interrogatory, 
please state all facts upon which you rely to support your 
contention that the damages described in response to this 
interrogatory were caused by Ernst. 
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RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 26 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, 
repetitive and seeks privileged information. Without waiving the 
foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 26 as 
follows: 
See Response to Interrogatory No. 21, which sets forth 
Stangl's response regarding damages caused by Ernst. Stangl 
reiterates that most of the discovery in this matter remains to be 
completed. Accordingly, additional bases for damage claims against 
Ernst may be substantiated later pursuant to further discovery. 
INTERROGATORY .NO. 27: Please state the precise date and time 
you claim the contract alleged in the Complaint became binding upon 
you and Ernst, and please explain in reasonable factual detail the 
basis for the date stated in response to this interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 27 on the 
grounds that it is premature, overbroad, and burdensome. Without 
waiving the foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory 
No. 27 as follows: 
As explained in prior Responses herein, 'the precise date and 
time at which the lease agreement became binding on Ernst is not 
known without further discovery concerning this matter. Current 
information indicates that the agreement was certainly binding no 
later than September 14, 1988, when Stangl and Mack DuBose met in 
Stangl's office and agreed to all remaining details of the agreed 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 37: As you use the term the "Property" in 
paragraph 6 of your Complaint, please provide a metes and bounds 
description of the "Property." 
RESPONSE: The "Property" as used.in paragraph 6 of Stangl's 
complaint comprises the property acquired from Roger R. Brockbank 
on August 5, 1988, which includes the subject property that Ernst 
agreed to lease. A metes and bounds description of the Property 
can be found in the Warranty Deed dated August 5, 1988 from Roger 
R. Brockbank to F. C. Stangl III, produced herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 38: In chronological order, starting in the 
beginning and coming.forward to the present-time, please state in 
reasonable factual detail- the history -of Stangl's ownership 
interest and/or leasehold interest and/or option interest in all 
or part of the real property described in paragraph 5 of your 
Complaint as the "Premises" and/or the real property described in 
paragraph 6 of your Complaint as the "Property." In your answer, 
please describe the entire history of Stangl's ownership interest 
and/or leasehold interest and/or option interest in the aforesaid 
real property, including but not limited to the nature of Stangl's 
ownership and/or leasehold and/or option interest in all or part 
of said real property at any time, including but not limited to 
1981 and thereafter as part of the joint venture called Stangl-
Al1iance. 
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RESPONSE: Stangl objects to Interrogatory No. 38 on the 
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and 
seeks privileged information. Without waiving the foregoing 
objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 38 as follows: 
Stangl-Alliance, a joint venture comprised of Stangl and 
Alliance Enterprises, Inc. owned the Jordan Valley Plaza Shopping 
Center, which encompasses the subject property. Stangl-Alliance 
sold it in approximately 1981 to Bruce R. Brockbank, Jeanne D. 
Brockbank, Roger R. Brockbank and Leda A. Brockbank. The sale was 
secured by a trust deed in favor of Stangl-Alliance with Western 
States Title Company as trustee. The trust deed "was subsequently 
assigned by Western States to Aetna Life Insurance Company in 1987. 
The Brockbanks eventually defaulted on their mortgage, causing 
Aetna to begin foreclosure proceedings against the Brockbanks. The 
four Brockbank owners conveyed their interest to Roger R. 
Brockbank, who then filed for bankruptcy. The property was 
thereafter tied up in bankruptcy court. 
By early June, 1988, negotiations to lease the property began 
between Stangl and Ernst. Stangl agreed to acquire the property 
provided Ernst would lease it on a long term basis from Stangl (see 
Response to Interrogatory No. 5). Based on a preliminary agreement 
with Ernst, Stangl obtained an option to acquire the subject 
property from Roger Brockbank on June 29, 1988. 
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Ernst proceeded to begin architectural work and construction 
planning for the store to be built on the leased property and, with 
Stangl, began meeting with planning and zoning officials in West 
Jordan. On July 8, Mack DuBose sent -a•document containing lease 
items not previously discussed and pointing out some errors in the 
earlier agreement. On July 14, Stangl sent a revised document 
containing the corrections and details agreed to by Stangl and 
DuBose in a telephone conversation between them. DuBose responded 
on July 15, 1988 with a letter to Stangl stating in part: 
After we have completed our Offer To Lease, 
this document will be modified to incorporate 
our business points. We are sending this in 
advance of the signed document so that the 
lease execution can be 'facilitated to keep us 
on schedule for an October 1, 1988 turnover. 
I would appreciate your review of this 
document so that we can resolve any issues 
that are not clearly outlined in our business 
agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Believing that a binding lease agreement was in place, Stangl 
exercised his option to purchase the property on July 28, 1988. 
With the consent of Aetna and the bankruptcy court, Stangl 
purchased the subject property out of bankruptcy, purcha^pri Aetna's 
beneficial interest, and received a Warranty Deed from Roger R. 
Brockbank on August 5, 1988. Stangl remains the owner of the 
property at the present time. 
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Exhibit B 
T h . t .t a legally b«na\n<3 form •/ not underwood, seek <omp«r«nf adv«« ' 
O P T I O N 
K^Oa ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS 
That JOROAN VALLEY ASSOCIATES and/or ROCER_ R _BROCKBAN!<^ 
o( S d l C L a k e C i t y . UT _ hereinafter referred to as "Seller hereby i(r<«i for and In con-
sideration of ONE T H O U S A N D ANO N O / i O O .- J - V ~ - „ ~ " (J J - - 0 0 0 9 ° « ) DoUari. 
paid by f C Scanq l I I I , a t e a l e s t a t e bro<er buying^ foe h i s _own_account 
0( S a l t ^ L a k e C i t y , UT hereinafter referred to as "Buyer". a« follow! JM/ 
I PROPERTY Seller hereby j ives ind grant* to Buyer and to his heirs and i s i t | n i (or a period oC^$ I month* from 
the date hereof hereinafter referred to as First Option Period the exclusive rlfhl and privilege of purchulnc the follow. 
l n | described real property located at 1 7 $ 5 W 9 0 t h S ( SW C o c n e C_ R e d w o o d J l d 7 9 0 t h _ S J C o u n t r of 
S a l e L a k e State of U t a h _ ^ _
 # a n d m 0 f f particularly described 
as follows 
318,507 square feet of land (approximately 7.3 acres) 
and 62.800 square feet of buildings 
The Jordan Valley Shopping Center In West Jordan, Utah 
Toceth«r with all water rtjhts appurtenant thereto or used In connection therewith.
 m y£*StL^i 
(Said real oroperty and Improvements. If any shall hereinafter jbe rdtrrt-d l o i s *Tkc Proo<*"MO ^ - ~~~ ~~ ~
 t -^ 
AM y £ ^ < calculated by adoing 7 •$50,000.00 CaalW, 
2 PRiCE. The total purchase price for said property Is t h c _ , e , X j s C n q . i c b C f » N o t c ? 5 S f c f f i F " 
(J I A L # ° A _ Q 9 A . 0^^l5Ut^W'payable In lawful money of the United States strictly wiihln the following times to-wic jJit I 
sums paid for this option and any extension thereof as herein provided shall be first applied on th« purchase price tad lh« l 
balance shall b< paid a< follows ( I ) Buyer w i l l assume and e x t i n g u i s h the i&cst mortgage 
and a c c r u e d i n t e r e s t and g i v e S e l l e r ^n. u n s e c u r e d ( 2 . ) Note c*oayS25b ,000 .00 / £& 
payable as f o l l o w s Ten year term at 8 \ i n t e r e s t p a y a b l e a t S V-f5^T-3 3/month 
wLth a b a l l o o n p r i n c i p a l payment of S^ OQ ^00 00 a l l due at the1 W a ' o T the 10th 
/ e a r T h i s Note WILL be p e r s o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d by F .C . S t a n g l I I I . ( 3 . ) 
S 5 0 , 0 0 0 00 c a s h , p a y a b l e - S 1 , 0 0 0 00 o p t i o n f e e and a d d i t i o n a l $ 4 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p a y a b l e on c l o s i n g 
3 EXTENSION OF OPTION Upon payment by Buyer to Seller of an additional sum of J&ZMXX-ttQJL^tHQUSWt 
AN0.N0/lQ0 r .r.— — r - - T ZZZZSL^ZSZJZZ^ UJJLJ&SLSIS)—} Ooiun. c^oAf^^^t 
check prior to the expiration of the f ine option period this option shall b-e extended for H T — - J Z S Z L L a\<f<\tb*. herein-
after rtftrrtd to as "Second Option Period-" Upon Buyer s payment to Seller of a further sum of _ T ^ ^ f f i Y T D ^ S 
THOc;sAWD,r\sp_wo/.iop-r-- -zzz^zzzzzzr-zzzzz-t ?liJS3U!SL.) 0 . 1 1 ^ 0 / ^ ^ 
tion of the second option period, chla option shall b-e extended for a third period of ^J: LjL/Vdditlonal montiu, 
hereinafter referred to a« "Third Option Period" 
< EXERCISE OP OPTION Thli option shall be exercised by written notice to Seller on or before the expiration of 
the first option period or If extended the expiration of the second or third option periods as the c u e may be Notice to 
exerclae this option or to extend the option for a second or third option period whether p-ersonally delivered or mailed to 
Seller at his addrexs as Indicated after Sel lers signature hereto by registered or certified mall, poalaft prepaid, and poet-
marked on or b-efore such date of expiration shall be timely and shall be deemed actual notice lo Seller S e l l e r s h a l l 
r e q u i r e the Bankruptcy Court to r e l e a s e t h i s p r o p e r t y and t e r m i n a t e the bank.-
s EVIDENCE or TITLE. s u o t c / o t o c e e d m g s to f a c i l i t a t e the f i n a l c l o s i n g of 
(a) promptly after the execution of this option Seller shall deliver to Buyer for examination such abstract* of title 
title policies and other evidences of title as the Seller may have [a the event this option l« not exercised by Buyer, all 
such evidences of title shall b-e Immediately returned without expense to Seller 
(b) In the event thl« option Is exercised a herein pr^v\<i«i Seller afrees to pay all ab«tractln< expenee or «t Seller's 
option to furnish a pollc) of title Insurance In the name of the Buyer 
(Cl If an examination of the title should reveal defects In the title Buyer shall notify Setter In wrUlnf thereof 
and Seller acrees to forthwith take alt reasonable action to dear the title If the Seller does not clear title within a reason, 
able time 8uyer may do so at Sel lers expense Seller Xfrta to ma<e final conveyance by Wsrranty Deed or ..•"."* " ,T~ ,".Z 
a s d i r e c t e d _ _ | n t ^ e event of sale of other han real property If either party falls to perform 
the provisions of this agreement the party at fault agrees to pay all costs of enforcing this acreement. or any rtjhl txlslnc 
out of the breach thereof lnctudln< a reasonable Utorney i fee 
SCO 1 0 0 1 9 
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«• CLOSINC ADJUSTMENTS. Alt rtik of Iota and destruction of property and expeneee of Ineurance ahetl be bc<ne by 
Seller until date of poeeeeelon. Al time of cloaln* of tale, property U X M , r i n d , tnaurano. Intereet and other expeneee of 
property ihatl b< prorata aa of date of possession. Alt other taxes, includln* documentary taxes, and all aaeesamenta, 
m o r u a « e liens tnd other liens, encumbrance* or charges ajalnat the property of any nature, shall be p«ld by Seller except 
aJ! 3« t f o r t h in Pa caS£*pn _2_ojf t h i s o p t i o n . 
?• POSSESSION. Seller agrees to surrender posses ion of the proQ«fty on or before 
written, notice of the exerclaln< of this option by Quyer. 
days fallowing 
Real Estate Company «. Th« Selter recognizes ^f-jJ~i~J..$.*!\S\ 
(Broker and AftnO throutjh IU latesman . . . N o n e „ 
aa the Real Estate Broker with whom S<ller Hated this property for sale, and Selter agrees to pay t comraUalon to aald 
Broker of _.Q X of the rross tale price. Seller hereby authorises the ajent to withhold auch commU4lon from the 
proceeua of Mle at time of closing. 
9. If thla option be not exercUed on or before the dates specified her«ln for exercise of lame, the option ahali expire 
of Ita own force and eff«ct and the SelUr may retain such option mont«« aa have been paid to the Seltar aa full conalderatlon 
for the /crantlna: of thla option. , 
it — r — 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller hereunto hat *«t hl» name thla ...3-3—<~ <**Y °< VJ_J^JU-' 
srcNs:o IN PRESENCE OF: 
Adtireu of Setter: . 
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